Meram vs. Edralin

Jurisdiction over protests against appointments and promotions is vested in the Merit Systems Board and, on appeal, in the Civil Service Commission, whose decisions are reviewable only by the courts; P.D. No. 1409 repealed the Office of the President's power of review under Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807, and a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the MSB and the Commission by seeking relief from them is estopped from later impugning that jurisdiction.

Petitioner Erlinda P. Meram and private respondent Filipina V. Edralin were both career personnel of the Bureau of Forest Development, as was Hermecio M. Agravio, whose competing claim to the same promotional position generated the controversy. The dispute unfolded against the statutory framework of Presidential Decree No. 807, promulgated on October 6, 1975, which governed the civil service and, in Section 19(6), provided for appeals by qualified next-in-rank employees, and Presidential Decree No. 1409, promulgated on June 8, 1978, which created the Merit Systems Board, defined its powers, and prescribed its relationship with the Civil Service Commission.

On July 29, 1982, Filipina V. Edralin, then a training officer of the Bureau of Forest Development, was proposed for appointment to the position of Administrative Officer V, R-73, in the Administrative Division of the BFD. Erlinda P. Meram, who held the position of Administrative Officer III, R-70, and Hermecio M. Agravio, Supply Officer V, R-70, filed protests against the proposal.

On the same date, the Director of the BFD sent a memorandum to the Minister of Natural Resources stating that the BFD Promotion Board had found four BFD personnel in the Central Office to be "next-in-rank" to the contested position: Meram, Administrative Officer III, Range 70, assigned as Chief of the Internal Control Staff; Agravio, Supply Officer V, Range 70, Chief of the Property Section, designated Assistant Chief of the Administrative Division from October 8, 1981 to July 20, 1982; Atty. Dominador Malong, Legal Officer, Range 69, of the Legal Division; and Atty. Salome T. Cansino, Trial Attorney, Range 69, of the Legal Division. The Board found that Edralin, a Training Officer at Range 60 assigned to the Training Center, was not next-in-rank.

On August 10, 1982, the Civil Service Commission forwarded the protests of Meram and Agravio to the Minister for appropriate action. Two days later, on August 12, 1982, the Minister forwarded Edralin's permanent appointment, to take effect on August 17, 1982, to the Commission. The Minister explained that he had assessed the recommendation of the Promotions Board and considered other aspects vital to the dynamism of the service, and that upon seeing Edralin to be eminently qualified, the person on whom he could repose his trust and confidence, and one possessing the necessary integrity, knowledgeability, and sound judgment, he decided to appoint her for the best interest of the service. The Commission approved the appointment "subject to the final outcome of the protests against the appointment by Erlinda Meram and H. Agravio."

On September 1, 1982, the Minister rendered a decision, embodied in two separate letters, dismissing the protests. In his letter to Meram, received by her on September 10, 1982, the Minister assured her that when another opportunity came and he had a chance to better appreciate her qualities and capabilities, he would consider her for appointment to a more senior position. Meram and Agravio appealed to the Merit Systems Board pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1409.

On January 13, 1983, the MSB promulgated a decision in favor of Agravio, revoking the previous approval of Edralin's appointment and directing the Minister to appoint Agravio in her stead. The Board found that all the parties met the eligibility requirement; that while Edralin and Meram held bachelor's degrees supplemented with at least 12 units in management and/or public administration, Agravio's relevant in-service trainings and seminars sufficiently offset his one-year deficiency in college work and the required 12 units; and that all therefore met the education requirement. As to the required five years of experience, Agravio had been Administrative Officer II for four years of progressively responsible experience, while Meram had served as Disbursing Officer for more than one year, Budget Examiner for six months, Cashier IV for five years, and Administrative Officer III for more than three years, or a total of about nine years and six months. Edralin's relevant experience consisted of three years as Training Assistant and about one year as Training Officer, which, though considerable, fell short of the required five years, although her deficiency could be offset by her relevant trainings and academic units earned in a Master of Public Administration program. The Board further ruled that the contested position was not confidential but belonged to the second level of the career service, so that trust and confidence were not the decisive factors in filling it. Under the BFD Merit Promotion Plan, the positions next-in-rank to Administrative Officer V (R-73) were Administrative Officer III (R-70), Supply Officer IV (R-70), and Senior Legal Officer (R-69); Meram held the first and Agravio the second, while Edralin's Training Officer (R-60) position was not listed. Edralin was therefore not next-in-rank, and Meram and Agravio should have been considered. Comparing the two, the Board found Agravio more competent and qualified, noting his 13 years of relevant experience, 23 relevant trainings, and nine months as Officer-in-Charge of the Administrative Division under MNR Special Order No. 359, series of 1981.

Both Meram and Edralin filed motions for reconsideration. On May 16, 1983, the MSB promulgated another decision modifying the earlier one and appointing Meram, after finding that Agravio's designation as Assistant Officer-in-Charge had been revoked because he had been ineffective in that position. Edralin appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which dismissed the appeal on October 5, 1983 and denied her motion for reconsideration on May 3, 1984.

On May 18, 1984, Edralin filed a letter-petition with the Office of the President invoking Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807. She alleged that jurisdiction in promotional contests was lodged with the ministry head and that an appeal by an aggrieved party from the decisions of the ministry head should be taken to the Office of the President, so that the MSB and the Commission had no jurisdiction to act on Meram's appeal. Meram, in turn, filed a motion for execution of the Commission's decision. On June 14, 1984, the Confidential Legal Assistant of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs directed the Commission to forward the entire records of the case within fifteen days in view of Edralin's appeal. On July 19, 1984, the Commission rejected the order of the Office of the President, stating that under Section 8 of P.D. No. 1409, decisions of the Commission were subject to review only by the courts. On October 9, 1984, the Minister of Natural Resources issued a memorandum to the BFD Director instructing him to enforce and implement the Commission's order, which had become final and executory, and on October 15, 1984, the BFD Director issued Meram's appointment as Administrative Officer V effective that date.

On February 20, 1985, Confidential Legal Assistant Sabio issued an order directing the Ministry of Natural Resources to transmit all relevant records of the case. Edralin wrote another letter to the President, on top of which appeared a note in the President's purported handwriting dated March 9, 1985, directing Justice Lazaro to tell Director Cortes to suspend everything pending study by the Office of the President and to prepare a decision on appeal for reconsideration. Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Lazaro furnished Director Cortes of the BFD a copy of Edralin's letter with the marginal note. On March 19, 1985, the BFD Director issued a memorandum informing Lazaro that the matters the President was directing him to suspend were already fait accompli and that, while he was willing to comply, implementation of his compliance had become legally untenable. Notwithstanding, on May 27, 1985, Lazaro rendered the questioned decision affirming the Minister's September 1, 1982 decision, dismissing the appeals of Agravio and Meram for lack of merit, and permanently enjoining the Minister of Natural Resources and the BFD Director from carrying out the January 13, 1983 and May 16, 1983 MSB decisions in MSB Case No. 813 and Resolutions Nos. 83-427 and 84-138 dated October 5, 1983 and May 3, 1984 of the Commission in CSC Case No. 84.

• Jurisdiction of the MSB and the Commission: Petitioner contended that by virtue of P.D. No. 1409, promulgated on June 8, 1978, the MSB and the Commission had validly acquired jurisdiction over her formal protest to the exclusion of all other officials, boards, or offices.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the respondent Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded and declared as null and void the decisions of the MSB and the resolutions of the Commission which had already become final and executory and had in fact been executed, enforced, and implemented.

• Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction of the Office of the President: The Solicitor-General contended that P.D. No. 807 vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction upon the Office of the President in cases of appeal by a qualified next-in-rank employee from decisions of ministry (department) heads arising from appointments in three specific cases, one of which is where the employee contests the appointment of one who is not next-in-rank.
• Improper Forum: Respondent maintained that the petitioner's protest should have been elevated to the Office of the President and not to the Commission, much less to the Merit Systems Board.

• Jurisdiction over the Promotional Contest: Whether the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of respondent's letter-petition, passing upon the same, and thereafter setting aside the decisions of the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission.
• Estoppel to Question Jurisdiction: Whether respondent Edralin, having filed a motion for reconsideration with the MSB and appealed to the Commission, was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of those bodies.

• Jurisdiction over the Promotional Contest: No. P.D. No. 1409 vested the MSB with jurisdiction to hear and decide protests by employees aggrieved by personnel actions, with appeals to the Commission whose decisions are reviewable only by the courts; the Office of the President's review power under Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807 was repealed.
• Estoppel to Question Jurisdiction: Yes. Having submitted to the jurisdiction of the MSB and the Commission by seeking reconsideration and appeal, Edralin could not belatedly attack that jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction over the Promotional Contest: Section 5(2) of P.D. No. 1409 empowers the Board to hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against officers arising from abuses in personnel actions or violations of the merit system. Section 8 of the same decree provides that decisions of the Board involving removal are subject to automatic review by the Commission, that the Commission shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, and that the decisions of the Commission are subject to review only by the courts. Against this framework, Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807 contains nothing connoting exclusivity of jurisdiction in the Office of the President to take cognizance of the specific cases it enumerates. Even if it did, the promulgation of P.D. No. 1409 divested that power of review of its exclusivity and, in fact, repealed it altogether. The petitioner therefore correctly filed her protest with the MSB in accordance with P.D. No. 1409, and the respondent Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs acted without authority in setting aside the MSB decisions and the CSC resolutions.
• Estoppel to Question Jurisdiction: Independently of the statutory allocation of jurisdiction, Edralin was estopped from questioning the orders of the MSB and the Commission. She submitted to the jurisdiction of both bodies by filing a motion for reconsideration with the MSB and, upon denial, by appealing to the Commission. Under Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, a party who could have seasonably taken exception to a tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction but instead invoked that very jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief and participated in the proceedings cannot later adopt the inconsistent posture of attacking the jurisdiction to which it had voluntarily submitted. The rule was reiterated in Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Both the MSB and the Commission thus had jurisdiction to pass upon the petitioner's protest with or without the application of the principle of estoppel. On the merits, the MSB found that Edralin was not next-in-rank to the vacated position. While there is no mandatory or peremptory requirement that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointments, the very purpose of the civil service law dictates that persons who are qualified and next-in-rank should be given preferential consideration when filling a vacated position through promotion. The BFD personnel considered next-in-rank to the vacated position were identified, and Edralin was not one of them; she was nine or ten salary ranges below the next-in-rank personnel. The foremost consideration why her appointment was ordered by the Office of the President, notwithstanding that the petitioner was more qualified and was next-in-rank, was her letter-petition to the President, which opened by introducing herself as "Filipina Villeses-Edralin, wife of Efren E. Edralin of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte." The clear intent of that letter-petition was not to appeal in accordance with P.D. No. 807 but to elicit a favorable response based on considerations of blood ties, influence, or ethnic and regional affiliations. Such a practice must be struck down, for it goes against the very purpose behind the establishment of the civil service. Appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be. Even granting that Edralin possessed the qualifications required for the contested position, the petitioner equally possessed them, if not in greater degree, and, more important, was next-in-rank to the vacated position; she therefore deserved the appointment.

• Estoppel to Question Jurisdiction — A party who could have prevented a tribunal from exercising jurisdiction by seasonably taking exception thereto, but instead invokes that very jurisdiction by filing an answer or seeking affirmative relief and participates in the proceedings, cannot later attack the jurisdiction of the tribunal to which it had voluntarily submitted. In this case, Edralin filed a motion for reconsideration with the MSB and, upon denial, appealed to the Commission; she was thereby barred from asserting that those bodies lacked jurisdiction over the promotional protest.
• Repeal of the Office of the President's Review Power over Promotional Contests — Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807, which granted a qualified next-in-rank employee the right to appeal initially to the department head and finally to the Office of the President, did not connote exclusive jurisdiction in the Office of the President. With the promulgation of P.D. No. 1409, that power of review was not only divested of its exclusivity but was repealed altogether, jurisdiction being lodged in the Merit Systems Board with appeals to the Civil Service Commission, whose decisions are reviewable only by the courts.
• Preferential Consideration of Next-in-Rank Employees — There is no mandatory or peremptory requirement that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointments. However, the very purpose of the civil service law dictates that persons who are qualified and next-in-rank should be given preferential consideration when filling a vacated position through promotion. The Court applied this principle in favor of Meram, who was next-in-rank while Edralin was not, and who was found equally, if not better, qualified.
• Merit and Fitness as the Basis of Civil Service Appointments — The civil service system rests on the application of the merit system instead of the spoils system; civil service laws are designed to eradicate appointment to public office based on political considerations and to eliminate, as far as practicable, partisanship and personal favoritism. Appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be. The Court struck down the practice of political, ethnic, religious, or blood ties being used to obtain choice appointments.

• "There is nothing in the above-quoted provision which connotes exclusivity of jurisdiction in the Office of the President to take cognizance of the specific cases cited above. Furthermore, even if it were so, with the promulgation of P.D. No.1409, this power of review by the Office of the President was not only divested of its exclusivity but was, in fact, repealed altogether." — This is the ratio decidendi on jurisdiction; it disposes of the Solicitor-General's argument that Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807 vested exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Office of the President.
• "Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily." — Quoted from Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, this passage supplies the estoppel ground applied against Edralin, who had sought reconsideration from the MSB and appealed to the Commission before asserting that those bodies lacked jurisdiction.
• "To a certain extent she succeeded but this Court must strike down the practice of political, ethnic, religious, or blood ties being used to get choice appointments for it goes against the very purpose behind the establishment of the civil service in our country." — The Court's pronouncement condemning the use of influence and affiliation in appointments, made in reference to Edralin's letter-petition to the President.
• "As earlier stated, appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be." — This states the controlling standard for civil service appointments and explains why the petitioner's next-in-rank status and qualifications prevailed over the private respondent's political access.

• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 — Cited as the leading case establishing that a party who invokes a tribunal's jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief and participates in the proceedings cannot later attack that jurisdiction; applied to bar Edralin's challenge to the MSB and the Commission.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 — Cited as reiterating the Tijam ruling on estoppel to question jurisdiction.
• Taduran vs. Commissioner of Civil Service, 131 SCRA 66 — Cited for the rule that there is no mandatory or peremptory requirement that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointments, a qualification the Court acknowledged before ruling that the purpose of the civil service law nonetheless requires preferential consideration of qualified next-in-rank employees.
• Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 654 — Quoted on the general purpose of the Civil Service Law, namely, to insure and promote appointments according to merit and fitness and to maintain an honest and efficient civil service.
• Hanley vs. Murphy, 255 P. 2d 1 — Quoted for the principle that the civil service system rests on the application of the merit system instead of the spoils system in the matter of appointment and tenure of office.

• Section 5(2), Presidential Decree No. 1409 — Vests the Merit Systems Board with the power to hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against officers arising from abuses in personnel actions or violations of the merit system. This provision supplied the basis for the MSB's jurisdiction over Meram's protest.
• Section 8, Presidential Decree No. 1409 — Provides that decisions of the Board involving removal are subject to automatic review by the Commission, that the Commission shall hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, and that the decisions of the Commission are subject to review only by the courts. This provision established the Commission's appellate jurisdiction and the finality of its rulings, which the Office of the President had disregarded.
• Section 19(6), Presidential Decree No. 807 — Grants a qualified next-in-rank employee the right to appeal initially to the department head and finally to the Office of the President in specified cases of contested appointments. The Court held that the provision connotes no exclusivity of jurisdiction in the Office of the President and that, in any event, its review power was repealed by P.D. No. 1409.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.