Mendoza vs. Soriano

In actions for damages based on quasi-delict, the amount of damages claimed is included in determining the jurisdictional amount because such claims constitute the main cause of action, not merely incidental damages; and an employer is solidarily liable for damages caused by an employee acting within the scope of assigned tasks unless the employer proves observance of the diligence of a good father of a family in selection and supervision.

Petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza was the registered owner of a Tamaraw FX vehicle driven by her employee, Lomer Macasasa. Respondents Mutya Soriano and her minor daughter Julie Ann Soriano were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the deceased Sonny Soriano. The dispute arose from a vehicular accident on Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City, which resulted in Sonny Soriano's death. Respondents filed a civil complaint for damages against both Macasasa and Mendoza, premised on quasi-delict under the Civil Code. The complaint against Macasasa was dismissed upon respondents' motion, leaving Mendoza as the sole defendant.

At around 1:00 a.m. on July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano was crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon City when he was struck by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Soriano was thrown five meters by the impact, and the vehicle came to a stop only some 25 meters from the point of collision. Gerard Villaspin, one of Soriano's companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital. Macasasa initially appeared to agree but, after surveying the scene, returned to the FX and fled. A passing school bus eventually brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical Center, where he later died. The Quezon City Prosecutor subsequently recommended the filing of a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against Macasasa.

On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano—Sonny Soriano's wife and daughter, respectively—filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle, docketed as Civil Case No. C-18038 in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121. Respondents prayed for moral damages of ₱200,000, ₱500,000 for lost income, ₱22,250 for funeral services, ₱45,000 for a burial lot, ₱15,150 for interment and lapida, ₱8,066 for hospitalization and other medical and transportation expenses, ₱28,540 for food and drinks during the wake, ₱50,000 exemplary damages, ₱60,000 indemnity for Soriano's death, and ₱25,000 attorney's fees plus ₱500 per court appearance. In her answer, petitioner maintained that she was not liable because, as owner of the vehicle, she had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family over her employee Macasasa. Upon respondents' motion, the complaint against Macasasa was dismissed.

After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint against petitioner as well. The trial court found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue through a small gap in the island's fencing rather than using the pedestrian overpass, and ruled that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and supervision of Macasasa because respondents had presented no evidence to support their allegation of petitioner's negligence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also found Macasasa negligent for speeding, rendering him unable to avoid hitting the victim. It held that Soriano's own negligence did not preclude recovery of damages arising from Macasasa's negligence, and that because petitioner failed to present evidence to the contrary, the presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and supervision of employees under Article 2180 of the Civil Code stood. The appellate court awarded hospital and burial expenses of ₱80,926.25, loss of earning capacity of ₱77,000, moral damages of ₱20,000, and indemnity for death of ₱50,000, subject to a 20% reduction for contributory negligence under Article 2179.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the total amount prayed for in the complaint fell within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the Regional Trial Court. She contended that only the claims for funeral services (₱22,250), burial lot (₱45,000), interment and lapida (₱15,150), hospitalization and transportation (₱8,066), food and drinks (₱28,540), and indemnity for death (₱60,000)—totaling ₱179,006—should be considered in determining the jurisdictional amount, and that moral damages (₱200,000), lost income (₱500,000), exemplary damages (₱50,000), and attorney's fees (₱25,000 plus ₱500 per appearance) must be excluded under Section 19(8) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
• Basis for Award of Damages: Petitioner argued that since respondents caused the dismissal of the complaint against Macasasa, there was no longer any basis to find her liable. She claimed that "no iota of evidence" was presented to prove Macasasa's negligence, and that respondents could recover damages in the criminal case against him.

• Employer Negligence: Respondents countered that as Macasasa's employer, petitioner was presumed negligent in selecting and supervising Macasasa after he was found negligent by the Court of Appeals.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case, given the total amount of damages prayed for in the complaint.
• Award of Damages: Whether there was sufficient legal basis to award damages against petitioner, notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint against the driver Macasasa.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The RTC properly exercised jurisdiction because the claim for damages was the main cause of action in a quasi-delict suit, not merely incidental to another claim; the full amount of damages prayed was therefore properly included in the jurisdictional computation under Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
• Award of Damages: Yes. Petitioner was primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Macasasa under Article 2180, having failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the supervision of her employee; the victim's contributory negligence warranted a 20% reduction under Article 2179.

• Jurisdiction: Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides that Regional Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases where the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, exceeds ₱200,000 in Metro Manila. However, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 clarifies that the exclusion of "damages of whatever kind" applies only where damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. Where the claim for damages is itself the main cause of action—or one of the causes of action—the amount of such claim must be considered in determining jurisdiction. Actions for damages based on quasi-delict are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for tortious acts. Respondents' claim of ₱929,006 in damages and ₱25,000 in attorney's fees plus ₱500 per appearance represented the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury and constituted the principal relief sought. The RTC of Caloocan City therefore properly exercised jurisdiction.

• Award of Damages: The records established that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed, as both the trial and appellate courts found him overspeeding; the fact that Soriano was thrown five meters and the vehicle stopped 25 meters from the point of impact corroborated this conclusion. Second, Macasasa violated Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code by failing to aid the accident victim—he fled the scene without reporting to a police officer or summoning a doctor, and there was no factual basis for petitioner's claim that he fled out of fear. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. While respondents could recover from Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, petitioner as owner and employer was directly and separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. The damage suit was for the quasi-delict of petitioner as owner and employer, not for the delict of Macasasa as driver. Under Article 2180, employers are liable for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and this liability arises from the presumed negligence of the employer unless the employer proves observance of the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Petitioner failed to present such proof—indeed, she harbored the notion that the RTC lacked jurisdiction and opted not to present evidence on this point. The victim's contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass was conceded by respondents and properly warranted a 20% reduction in damages under Article 2179, which provides that where the plaintiff's negligence is merely contributory and the defendant's lack of due care is the immediate and proximate cause, the plaintiff may recover but the courts shall mitigate the damages.

• Employer's Presumed Negligence (Article 2180, Civil Code) — Employers are liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. This liability arises from the presumed negligence of the employer in the selection and supervision of employees. The presumption may be rebutted only by proof that the employer observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence of such diligence, so the presumption stood and she was held primarily and solidarily liable.

• Presumption of Negligence from Traffic Violation (Article 2185, Civil Code) — Unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Macasasa's speeding and failure to aid the victim established the presumption of his negligence, which in turn triggered the employer's presumed negligence under Article 2180.

• Contributory Negligence and Mitigation of Damages (Article 2179, Civil Code) — When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Soriano's failure to use the pedestrian overpass constituted contributory negligence, justifying a 20% reduction in the award.

• Jurisdictional Amount — Main vs. Incidental Damages (Administrative Circular No. 09-94) — The exclusion of "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) of BP Blg. 129 applies only where damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. Where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In quasi-delict actions for damages, the damages claimed are the principal relief and must be included in the jurisdictional computation.

• Quasi-delict vs. Delict — Separate Civil Liability of Employer — A damage suit based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 is directed against the employer for the employer's own negligence in supervision, not for the employee's delict. The employer's civil liability is direct and separate, and recovery may be had from the employer independently of any criminal case against the employee.

• "Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages for tortious acts." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on jurisdiction: because quasi-delict claims are inherently monetary recovery actions, the damages sought are the main cause of action and must be counted toward the jurisdictional threshold.

• "We must emphasize that this damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee." — This distinguishes the employer's direct civil liability under Article 2180 from any subsidiary liability arising from a criminal conviction of the employee, clarifying that the two are independent causes of action.

• "Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage." — This is the canonical formulation of the employer's presumed negligence doctrine as applied in this case, frequently cited in subsequent quasi-delict jurisprudence.

• Iniego vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006 — Cited for the proposition that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for tortious acts, supporting the conclusion that damages constitute the main cause of action for jurisdictional purposes.
• Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004 — Cited in support of the principle that the employer is directly and separately civilly liable for failure to exercise due diligence in supervising employees, and that respondents could recover directly from the employer.
• Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Heirs of Andres Malecdan, G.R. No. 154278, December 27, 2002 — Cited for the rule that the employer is held primarily and solidarily liable for damages caused by an employee, and that recovery may be had directly from the employer.
• Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-65295, March 10, 1987 — Cited in support of the affirmance of the 20% reduction in damages based on the victim's contributory negligence under Article 2179.

• Article 2180, Civil Code — Imposes liability on employers for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, arising from the employer's presumed negligence in selection and supervision, which ceases only when the employer proves observance of the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Applied to hold petitioner solidarily liable because she failed to rebut the presumption.
• Article 2185, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation, unless there is proof to the contrary. Applied to presume Macasasa negligent based on his speeding and failure to aid the victim.
• Article 2179, Civil Code — Provides that if the plaintiff's negligence is merely contributory, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages awarded. Applied to reduce the award by 20% due to Soriano's contributory negligence in not using the pedestrian overpass.
• Section 19(8), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Defines the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, excluding interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs from the jurisdictional amount, except where damages are the main cause of action. Applied to uphold RTC jurisdiction.
• Administrative Circular No. 09-94 — Clarifies that the exclusion of "damages of whatever kind" from the jurisdictional amount applies only where damages are incidental to the main cause of action; where damages are the main cause of action, the amount is included. Applied to determine that the RTC had jurisdiction.
• Section 35, Article I, Chapter IV, Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) — Requires drivers to operate at a careful and prudent speed, not endangering life, limb, or property. Applied to establish Macasasa's speeding as a traffic violation.
• Section 55, Article V, Chapter IV, Republic Act No. 4136 — Requires drivers involved in vehicular accidents to aid the victim and prohibits leaving the scene except under specified circumstances. Applied to establish Macasasa's failure to aid the victim as a traffic violation.

Antonio T. Carpio (on official leave), Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.