Mendoza vs. Laxina

A duly proclaimed and sworn local elective official who is unseated by execution pending appeal, but whose reinstatement is ordered by the COMELEC upon annulment of that execution, need not take a new oath of office to validly re-assume the position, because the original oath already operated as full investiture of the rights of the office, and the annulment of the writ of execution restored the status quo as though the official was never ousted.

Respondent Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. and Roque Fermo were rival candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. The disciplinary jurisdiction over elective barangay officials is vested in the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, whose decisions are immediately executory under Section 61(c) of the Local Government Code, with administrative appeals to the Office of the President provided under Section 67. Section 68 of the same Code clarifies that an appeal does not prevent the decision from being executory, but guarantees payment of salary and emoluments if the appeal results in exoneration.

On May 27, 1997, respondent Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. took his oath of office and assumed the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, having been proclaimed the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections. His rival, Roque Fermo, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. On January 18, 1999, the MeTC declared Fermo the winner. Respondent appealed to the COMELEC, but Fermo moved for execution pending appeal, which the trial court granted on January 20, 1999. Respondent vacated the position and relinquished it to Fermo.

Respondent then filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the January 20, 1999 order. On September 16, 1999, the COMELEC annulled the order granting execution pending appeal, finding no good reasons to justify it, and ordered Fermo to cease and desist from performing the functions of Punong Barangay and to relinquish the position to respondent pending final resolution of the appeal. On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution. The writ was served on Fermo on October 28, 1999, but he refused to acknowledge receipt or to vacate the barangay hall. Despite this, respondent and his staff discharged their functions and held office at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills. On the same date, respondent appointed Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary, and on November 8, 1999, he appointed Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Treasurer. On November 12, 1999, the COMELEC issued an alias writ of execution after respondent moved to cite Fermo for contempt, but this writ was likewise returned unsatisfied. On November 16, 1999, respondent took his oath of office anew before Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. The following day, November 17, 1999, Fermo turned over to respondent all the assets and properties of the barangay.

On November 20, 1999, the Barangay Council issued Resolution No. 001-S-1999 ratifying the appointment of Ramos as Barangay Secretary and Resolution No. 002-S-1999 ratifying the appointment of Liquido as Barangay Treasurer, both effective November 1, 1999. The appointees of Fermo to the same positions objected, and respondent accommodated them by granting allowances and remunerations for the period November 1–7, 1999. On December 11, 1999, the barangay council authorized the appropriation of ₱864,326.00 for the November to December 1999 salary of barangay officials and employees. The payroll issued on December 18, 1999 listed respondent and his appointees among those entitled to compensation for services rendered from November 8 to December 31, 1999. Petitioner barangay councilors Jose G. Mendoza, Jr., Rosario E. Espino, and Teresita S. Mendoza refused to sign the resolution and payroll.

Sometime in January 2000, the petitioner barangay councilors filed a complaint with the Quezon City Council charging respondent and other barangay officials with violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents. They alleged that the payroll falsely indicated that respondent and his appointees rendered services starting November 8, 1999, when they commenced serving only on November 17, 1999, and that respondent fraudulently antedated the effectivity of the appointments from November 16 to November 1, 1999. The Special Investigation Committee ruled that respondent had no power to make appointments prior to his oath taking on November 16, 1999, but found that respondent acted in good faith. Nevertheless, it found him guilty of grave misconduct and recommended a two-month suspension. The Quezon City Council adopted the findings on October 3, 2000, and implemented the decision on October 9, 2000. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC, which rendered summary judgment on November 13, 2000, annulling the City Council decision and exonerating respondent on the ground that he did not act in bad faith but merely misread the law.

• Validity of Appointments and Payroll: Petitioners contended that respondent made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting November 8, 1999, when in truth they commenced serving only on November 17, 1999, after respondent took his oath and assumed office.
• Antedated Appointments: Petitioners claimed that the effectivity date of the barangay secretary and treasurer's appointments was November 16, 1999, but respondent fraudulently antedated it to November 1, 1999.
• Connivance in Altering Payroll: Petitioners alleged that respondent connived with other barangay officials in crossing out the names of the petitioner barangay councilors in the payroll, causing them not to receive their salaries for the period November 8 to December 31, 1999.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Petitioners argued that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the trial court had no jurisdiction because appeals from the City Council's decision should be brought to the Office of the President.

• Oath of Office as Mere Formality: Respondent countered that the taking anew of the oath of office as barangay chairman was a mere formality and not a requirement before he could validly discharge the duties of his office.
• Entitlement to Remuneration: Respondent argued that his appointees were entitled to remuneration for the period stated in the payroll as they commenced to serve as early as October 28, 1999.
• Crossing Out of Names Justified: Respondent explained that the names of the three petitioner barangay councilors who refused to sign the resolution and payroll were crossed out to prevent further delay in the release of salaries of all barangay officials and employees listed therein.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether respondent was required to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the Office of the President before seeking judicial intervention.
• Necessity of Re-taking Oath of Office: Whether the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official is a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the COMELEC orders the relinquishment of the contested position.
• Date of Valid Re-assumption: Whether respondent validly re-assumed office on October 28, 1999, when the writ of execution was served on Fermo and respondent commenced discharging his functions, or on November 17, 1999, when Fermo turned over the barangay assets.
• Grave Misconduct: Whether respondent committed grave misconduct in appointing barangay officials and granting them emoluments, and in crossing out the names of petitioner barangay councilors from the payroll.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No, exhaustion was not required. Although an appeal to the Office of the President was available under Section 67 of the Local Government Code, the issues raised were purely questions of law, which fall under a recognized exception to the doctrine.
• Necessity of Re-taking Oath of Office: No. The re-taking of the oath of office was a mere formality. The original oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as full investiture of the rights of the office, and the COMELEC's annulment of the writ of execution restored the status quo as though respondent was never ousted.
• Date of Valid Re-assumption: October 28, 1999. Re-assumption was reckoned from the date the writ of execution was served on Fermo and respondent actually commenced discharging his functions, not from the date of physical turnover of assets, as the latter would reward Fermo's defiance of a lawful writ.
• Grave Misconduct: No. All lawful acts arising from respondent's re-assumption on October 28, 1999 were valid, including his appointments and grant of emoluments. The crossing out of the petitioners' names was justified because their names and salaries were actually written on the payroll but they refused to sign it.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Sections 61 and 67 of the Local Government Code provide that decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod in disciplinary cases against elective barangay officials are final and executory, but Section 68 clarifies that an appeal does not prevent enforcement — it simply means the decision is immediately executory while the respondent may still appeal. The trial court erroneously interpreted "final and executory" as precluding appeal. Nevertheless, the trial court correctly took cognizance of the case because the issues — whether the City Council's decision is appealable to the Office of the President and whether re-taking the oath of office is necessary — are purely questions of law, which constitute an exception to the exhaustion doctrine. Furthermore, an appeal to the Office of the President would not render the case moot because Section 68 guarantees payment of salary and emoluments if the appeal results in exoneration.

• Necessity of Re-taking Oath of Office: An oath of office is a qualifying requirement and prerequisite to full investiture with a public office. However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in, a public officer is entitled to assume office and exercise its functions, and the pendency of an election protest does not enjoin him from doing so. Respondent was proclaimed and sworn in on May 27, 1997, vesting him with full rights to the office. Although he was temporarily unseated by execution pending appeal, the COMELEC annulled that execution in its September 16, 1999 Resolution, which was sustained by the Court in Fermo vs. COMELEC. The status quo restored was the period when respondent was occupying and discharging the functions of the office. For purposes of continuity, it was as if the writ of execution was never issued and respondent was never ousted. The original oath operated as full investiture, making the re-taking of the oath on November 16, 1999 a mere formality.

• Date of Valid Re-assumption: The COMELEC served the writ of execution on Fermo on October 28, 1999, but Fermo refused to comply and his supporters prevented respondent from occupying the barangay hall. An alias writ was issued on November 12, 1999, but was also returned unsatisfied. Physical turnover occurred only on November 17, 1999. To reckon re-assumption from November 17 would sanction dilatory maneuvers and reward disobedience of lawful orders. Moreover, respondent actually exercised the powers and functions of the office at the SK-Hall starting October 28, 1999, effectively enforcing the COMELEC decision. All lawful acts arising from his re-assumption on that date are valid, including his appointments of Ramos and Liquido and the grant of emoluments for the period served.

• Grave Misconduct: Since respondent validly re-assumed office on October 28, 1999, his appointments and grant of emoluments were lawful acts. As for the crossing out of the petitioners' names, the payroll actually contained their names and corresponding salaries, but they refused to sign and acknowledge receipt as a form of protest. Under the maxim quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentire, he who suffered injury through his own fault is not considered to have suffered any damage. The investigative committee correctly brushed aside this charge.

• Full Investiture Doctrine — An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office and a prerequisite to full investiture with the office. Once a public officer has satisfied this prerequisite, his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. The Court applied this by holding that respondent's original oath on May 27, 1997 constituted full investiture, and the subsequent annulment of the writ of execution restored the status quo as though he was never ousted, rendering the re-taking of the oath a mere formality.

• Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Before a party may seek judicial intervention, it is a precondition that all available administrative remedies be exhausted first. The premature invocation of judicial power is fatal to one's cause of action. The Court recognized the exception for purely legal questions, applying it here because the issues of appealability and the necessity of re-taking the oath were questions of law calling for judicial intervention.

• Status Quo Restoration in Election Contests — When the COMELEC nullifies a writ of execution pending appeal, the decision of the trial court proclaiming the protestant is stayed and the status quo — the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy — is restored. The Court applied this by holding that the status quo was the period when respondent occupied and discharged the functions of the office, making it as if the writ of execution was never issued.

• Quod Quis Ex Culpa Sua Damnum Sentire — He who suffered injury through his own fault is not considered to have suffered any damage. The Court applied this maxim to the charge that petitioners were deprived of their salaries, finding that their names were on the payroll but they refused to sign it as a form of protest, thus attributing the injury to their own conduct.

• "However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions." — This passage articulates the principle that proclamation and oath of office vest full rights to the position, which is the ratio decidendi for dispensing with the need to re-take the oath upon reinstatement.

• "To reckon, therefore, the effectivity of respondent's assumption in office on November 17, 1999, as petitioners insist, would be to sanction dilatory maneuvers and to put a premium on disobedience of lawful orders which this Court will not countenance." — This passage establishes the principle that a defiant party's non-compliance with a lawful writ cannot be used to delay the prevailing party's re-assumption of office.

• "The phrases 'final and executory,' and 'final or executory' in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the Local Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial court, indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions." — This passage clarifies the distinction between immediate executory character and finality of administrative decisions under the Local Government Code.

• Fermo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140179, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 52 — Controlling precedent. The Court sustained the COMELEC's annulment of the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of Fermo, holding that the status quo was restored to the period when respondent occupied and discharged the functions of the office. This case was central to the ruling that respondent's original oath remained operative.

• Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that a decision of the sanggunian is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal to the Office of the President or the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

• Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890 (1999) — Followed. Cited for the principle that an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office and a prerequisite to full investiture.

• Cereno vs. Dictado, G.R. No. L-81550, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 759 — Followed. Cited for the rule that a proclaimed and sworn public officer is entitled to assume office unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision or a valid execution pending appeal.

• Castro vs. Secretary Gloria, G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001 — Followed. Cited for the exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine when the issue involved is purely legal.

• Section 61(c), Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Provides that a complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, whose decision shall be final and executory. The Court clarified that "final and executory" means immediately executory but does not preclude an appeal.

• Section 67(b), Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Provides that decisions in administrative cases may be appealed to the Office of the President in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. The Court held that this provision applies to appeals from the Quezon City Council's decision.

• Section 68, Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) — Provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory, that the respondent shall be considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of appeal, and that if the appeal results in exoneration, the respondent shall be paid his salary and emoluments. The Court relied on this provision to hold that an appeal would not render the case moot and to order payment of respondent's salaries and emoluments during his suspension.

Justices Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna concurred. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. concurred in the result.