Mendoza vs. de Castro

A petition for reconstitution of a decision under Section 7 of Act No. 3110 requires an "authentic copy" of the decision, which means a copy officially served upon a party by a messenger, employee, or sheriff of the court, with the date of service appearing thereon. A simple copy without any seal, mark, or signature of the court does not qualify as an authentic copy, and where the existence of the original case itself is doubtful, the court cannot reconstitute the decision.

The petitioner, Carmelino Mendoza, sought the reconstitution of a decision in a divorce case allegedly prosecuted in Manila in September 1943 and decided on or about June 27, 1944. The petition was based on Section 7 of Act No. 3110, which provides the procedure for reconstituting decisions in civil cases when the original records have been lost or destroyed. The respondent, Josefina de Castro, was the defendant in the alleged divorce case and opposed the reconstitution.

Carmelino Mendoza filed a petition for reconstitution of a decision in a divorce case allegedly prosecuted in Manila in September 1943 and decided on or about June 27, 1944, by Judge Gervasio Diaz of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. Attached to the petition was a copy of the alleged decision, marked as Exhibit A. The petition was based on Section 7 of Act No. 3110, which provides that if a civil case has already been decided, the decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy, and in case an authentic copy cannot be found, the Court shall make a new decision as if the case had never been decided.

At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that Exhibit A was handed to him by the stenographer after the hearing of the case and after the decision was dictated by Judge Gervasio Diaz and the notes transcribed by the stenographer. The defendant, Josefina de Castro, on the other hand, testified that the petition for divorce was filed in Diliman, Quezon City, and that she received from Judge Gervasio Diaz a copy of the decision in the City Hall of Manila in April 1944. The trial court took judicial notice that all branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila were in Intramuros in April 1944 and were moved to the City Hall only after the first bombing of Manila on September 21, 1944. Furthermore, the alleged copy of the decision was dated June 27, 1944, and could not have been handed to her by Judge Diaz in April 1944. The defendant also stated that she married for the second time on April 14, 1944, which was more than two months before the alleged decision dated June 27, 1944.

The trial court found that Exhibit A was a simple copy of the alleged decision, bearing no initial of the stenographer or of the judge, and no seal or mark of the court. There was no evidence tending to establish the authenticity of this copy. The court also noted that the certificate of the Clerk of Court of Manila merely stated that the supposed record of the case could not be found, and no docket was presented to show that a case had really been filed and decided. The trial court concluded that the parties had not satisfactorily proved that the divorce case had been actually presented and decided, and denied the petition for reconstitution.

• Duty to Make a New Decision: The appellant argued that since no authentic copy of the decision sought to be reconstituted could be found, the court below should have made a new decision as if the case had never been decided, pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3110.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondent's specific arguments on appeal.

• Reconstitution of Decision: Whether the court below erred in denying the petition for reconstitution of the alleged decision dated June 27, 1944, despite the absence of an authentic copy thereof.

• Reconstitution of Decision: No. The petition for reconstitution was properly denied because the copy presented was not an authentic copy as required by Section 7 of Act No. 3110, and the parties failed to prove that the divorce case had actually been filed and decided.

• Reconstitution of Decision: The Court agreed with the trial court that the parties had not satisfactorily proved that the divorce case had been actually presented and decided. The copy presented, Exhibit A, was a simple copy without any seal, mark, or signature of the court, and thus did not qualify as an "authentic copy" under Section 7 of Act No. 3110. The Court defined an authentic copy as "a copy officially served upon a party by a messenger, employee, or sheriff of the court, with the date of service appearing thereon." The procedure described by the plaintiff — that the copy was handed to him by the stenographer after the hearing — was irregular and not in conformity with practice, since copies of decisions are formally served upon parties after the decision has been filed with the clerk of court and duly stamped and sealed. The Court also noted the inconsistencies in the testimonies of both parties, including the defendant's claim that she received the decision in April 1944 at the City Hall of Manila when the courts were still in Intramuros at that time, and her second marriage on April 14, 1944, which was before the alleged decision dated June 27, 1944. The certificate of the Clerk of Court merely stated that the record could not be found, and no docket was presented to show that a case had been filed. The Court concluded that the existence of the supposed case was questionable, and thus the petition for reconstitution could not be granted.

• Authentic Copy Requirement for Reconstitution — Under Section 7 of Act No. 3110, a decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy. An authentic copy is a copy officially served upon a party by a messenger, employee, or sheriff of the court, with the date of service appearing thereon. A simple copy without any seal, mark, or signature of the court does not qualify. In this case, the copy presented was a mere simple copy without any indicia of authenticity, and thus the petition for reconstitution was properly denied.

• Burden of Proof in Reconstitution Proceedings — The party seeking reconstitution of a judicial record or decision must satisfactorily prove that the original case was actually filed and decided. Where the existence of the case itself is doubtful, and the record and docket cannot be found, the petition for reconstitution cannot be granted. In this case, the parties failed to prove the existence of the alleged divorce case, and the inconsistencies in their testimonies further undermined their claim.

• "The law provides that 'the decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy.' The copy presented at the hearing by the plaintiff, Exhibit A, is a simple copy of the alleged decision dated June 27, 1944. There is no evidence tending to establish the authenticity of this copy. It bears no initial of the stenographer or of the judge, or any seal or mark of the court. It is a simple copy without any sign that it came from the court. Authentic copy, as the court understands the term is a copy officially served upon a party by a messenger, employee, or sheriff of the court, with the date of service appearing thereon." — This passage defines the term "authentic copy" as used in Section 7 of Act No. 3110 and explains why the copy presented by the petitioner did not qualify.

• "In the absence of an authentic copy, the law provides that 'the court shall make a new decision as if the case had never been decided.' There is no record of the said case in the Court of First Instance of Manila nor is there means for the parties to reconstitute said record. Hence the decision, if any, cannot he reconstituted." — This passage explains the alternative remedy under the law and why it could not be applied in this case, given the absence of any record of the alleged case.

• "The existence of the supposed case is questionable, the simple copy of the decision presented by the plaintiff not bearing the seal of the court which issued it or the signature of the clerk who supposedly gave it. We agree with the trial court that the parties have not satisfactorily proved that the divorce case had been actually presented and decided by the court, hence the petition for reconstitution of the decision under Section 7 of Act No. 3110 cannot be granted." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that the existence of the alleged case was not satisfactorily proved, and thus the petition for reconstitution was properly denied.

N/A — The decision does not cite any prior jurisprudence.

• Section 7, Act No. 3110 — This provision governs the reconstitution of decisions in civil cases. It provides that if a civil case has already been decided, the decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy, and in case an authentic copy cannot be found, the Court shall make a new decision as if the case had never been decided. The Court applied this provision in denying the petition, holding that the copy presented was not an authentic copy and that the existence of the alleged case was not proved.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.

N/A — There were no dissenting opinions in this case.