Mendoza vs. Allas and Olores

A judgment in a quo warranto proceeding binds only the individual respondent and does not reach the respondent’s successor in office, even if the successor traces title to the same source. The writ of quo warranto is personal in nature; it determines whether a specific person is legally authorized to hold the office, and its effects cannot be extended to one who was not a party to the action.

Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972 and held several high-ranking positions. On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS); the position was later reclassified to Director III. He performed the duties of Director III, CIIS, until April 22, 1993, when he was temporarily designated Acting District Collector for Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent Ray Allas was appointed Acting Director III of the CIIS in his place, although Mendoza continued receiving the salary and benefits of Director III.

In September 1994, Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario informed Mendoza that his services were terminated effective March 4, 1994, because President Fidel V. Ramos had appointed Allas as Director III. Mendoza demanded reinstatement and, receiving no reply, filed a quo warranto petition against Allas.

• Appointment and termination: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza was the Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS) until temporarily designated Acting District Collector for Cagayan de Oro on April 22, 1993. Respondent Ray Allas was appointed Acting Director III in his stead, but petitioner continued to receive the salary and benefits of Director III. Effective March 4, 1994, President Ramos appointed Allas as permanent Director III, and petitioner was terminated from the service.

• Quo warranto suit: Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto solely against Allas, praying that Allas be ousted and petitioner seated as the legally appointed holder of the office. The trial court granted the petition, finding petitioner had been illegally terminated without due process and in violation of his security of tenure. Allas’s appointment was declared void ab initio, and petitioner was ordered reinstated with full back salaries and benefits.

• Change in office occupancy: During Allas’s appeal, President Ramos promoted him to Deputy Commissioner of Customs. Respondent Godofredo Olores was thereupon appointed and assumed the contested position of Director III, CIIS.

• Execution denied: When petitioner sought execution of the final judgment, the trial court refused because Olores, a non-party, occupied the position. Petitioner retired at the compulsory age of 65 on November 13, 1997, rendering reinstatement impossible, and he alternatively prayed for back salaries.

• Execution should issue against successor-in-office: Petitioner argued that the position was never legally vacant because his termination was illegal; thus, he is deemed never to have left office. Respondent Allas’s appointment was void, and that nullity extends to respondent Olores as Allas’s successor-in-interest. Consequently, the writ of execution should issue notwithstanding Olores’s occupancy.

• Entitlement to back salaries: Since reinstatement had become impossible due to his compulsory retirement, petitioner prayed for payment of back salaries and benefits from the time of dismissal until finality of the trial court’s decision.

• Non-party successor cannot be bound: Respondent Olores maintained that he was not a party to the quo warranto action, and therefore the judgment could not be enforced against him as the incumbent of the contested office.

• No personal or agency liability for back salaries: Respondent Allas could not be held personally liable for back salaries because he was merely appointed by the President in the exercise of constitutional powers. The Bureau of Customs could not be compelled to pay either, as it was never impleaded as a party to the quo warranto suit.

• Execution Against Successor-in-Office: Whether a final and executory judgment in a quo warranto case, which ordered ouster of the respondent and reinstatement of the petitioner, may be executed against a successor-in-office who was not impleaded as a party.

• Back Salaries and Benefits: Whether petitioner, after reaching compulsory retirement age, is entitled to recover back salaries and benefits from respondent Allas or the Bureau of Customs.

• Execution Against Successor-in-Office: Execution was properly denied. A judgment in quo warranto is strictly personal; it does not bind the respondent’s successor in office even if the successor derives title from the same source. The writ is never directed to an officer as such but always against the person, to determine whether that individual is constitutionally and legally authorized to hold the office. The trial court’s decision resolved the right to the position solely as between petitioner and respondent Allas. Respondent Olores was never given an opportunity to be heard, and therefore the judgment cannot be executed against him. The nullity of Allas’s appointment did not automatically extend to Olores; the latter’s right to the office must be litigated in a separate proceeding.

• Back Salaries and Benefits: The prayer for back salaries cannot be granted. Respondent Allas, having been appointed by the President, cannot be held personally liable. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the quo warranto petition, and a judgment cannot impose monetary liability on a non-party. Consequently, no basis exists to compel payment of back salaries or benefits.

• Personal character of quo warranto judgment — A judgment in a quo warranto proceeding binds only the individual respondent and does not bind the successor to the office, even if the successor traces title to the same source. The writ is directed against the person, not the office, and its function is to determine whether a specific individual is legally authorized to exercise the functions of the office claimed. The successor’s right must be litigated independently.

• Judgment in quo warranto under Rule 66 — Where a respondent is found guilty of usurping or unlawfully holding an office, the court may order (1) the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; (2) recovery of costs; and (3) a determination of the respective rights of all parties to the action as justice requires. The judgment’s effects are confined to the parties to the action; it cannot reach third persons occupying the office who were not impleaded.

• "A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim." — This passage captures the ratio decidendi and the strictly personal reach of the writ.

• Castro v. del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 (1967) — Cited to define quo warranto as a proceeding to determine the right to an office and to oust the holder if the claim is not well-founded; also for the rule that a private petitioner must prove his own entitlement to the office.
• Angara v. Gorospe, 101 Phil. 79 (1957) — Relied on for the principle that a government office not impleaded as a party cannot be compelled to pay back salaries.
• Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. IV-B, citing 44 Am. Jur. 88-89, 181-182 — Authoritative commentary cited for the nature of quo warranto and the rule that a judgment does not bind the successor-in-office.

• Rule 66, Sections 1 to 6 and 10, Revised Rules of Court (now Rule 66, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) — These provisions govern who may bring a quo warranto action, the requirement that a private person must prove entitlement to the office, and the permissible scope of judgment upon a finding of usurpation. The Court relied on these to underscore that the judgment’s effects are limited to the parties, and that ouster and reinstatement are the primary reliefs, without reaching non-parties.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concurred.