Memita vs. Masongsong

A party who is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard but fails to avail it cannot claim denial of due process; a motion for postponement is a privilege, not a right, and its denial rests on the trial court’s sound discretion. When an action is founded on a written instrument, its genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth the facts constituting the defense.

Masongsong, under the business name RM Integrated Services, was a distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.’s Magnolia chicken products. Memita operated Vicor Store in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City, and obtained Magnolia chicken products from Masongsong on a 25-day payment credit. Their arrangement required Memita to pay after the credit period, and the sales invoices documented each delivery.

Masongsong was the distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.’s Magnolia chicken products under the business name RM Integrated Services, while Memita ran Vicor Store in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City. From 11 March 1996 to 25 June 1996, Memita purchased goods on credit from Masongsong, and the unpaid credit reached ₱603,520.50. Masongsong made several demands; on 25 July 1996 he sent a demand letter but received no reply. On 12 August 1996, Masongsong filed a complaint before the RTC and prayed for a writ of attachment.

On 21 August 1996, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment based on the verified complaint, the testimonies of Masongsong and Joel Go, and Masongsong’s bond. The sheriff’s return dated 16 September 1996 stated that the Provincial Sheriff issued a notice of levy on attachment to the Registrar of the Land Transportation Office and a notice of embargo to the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.

In his Answer, Memita did not deny purchasing goods on credit. He refused payment citing questionable deliveries, short deliveries and discrepancies, and possible manipulation of delivery receipts. He counterclaimed for ₱300,000 actual damages for the seizure of two vehicles, ₱500,000 moral damages, at least ₱200,000 exemplary damages, and ₱150,000 attorney’s fees.

At trial, Masongsong’s evidence consisted of sales invoices annexed to the complaint. The RTC found that except for Sales Invoice No. 6557 dated June 4, 1996 and Sales Invoice No. 6300 dated May 29, 1996, all sales invoices bore the signature of Memita or his authorized representative acknowledging receipt of the deliveries. Joel Go’s signatures on the “Payment Received by:” portion were explained as inadvertent and no payment was received because Memita always obtained goods on credit and paid later by check. Memita failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of the receipts or signatures, and he did not raise payment in his Answer. The RTC gave credence to Go’s testimony.

Memita claimed short and questionable deliveries and presented the Load Order Manifest and Issue Form, plus witnesses from San Miguel Foods, Inc. The RTC found that the Issue Form reflected goods obtained by Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, not quantities delivered to each customer, and the Load Order Manifest was Masongsong’s own document reflecting goods to be delivered; the Sales Invoice was the document evidencing the transaction and signed by Memita or his representative. The RTC also found that Memita raised doubts about the amounts only after Masongsong asked him to pay his credit, and that UCPB Check No. 05760 dated July 1, 1996 for ₱127,238.40 was for Memita’s other past account, as Masongsong credibly explained.

Memita did not testify. On 22 January 1998, Memita and Atty. Allan L. Zamora failed to appear; Atty. Zamora filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement on 21 January 1998 because he had to go to Iloilo City for an urgent personal matter, and said only minor details were being discussed in settlement negotiations. The RTC denied the motion because the 9 December 1997 hearing had set 22 January 1998 as intransferrable, the motion did not comply with the three-day notice rule, and Masongsong did not accept the settlement offer. The RTC deemed the case submitted for decision. Atty. Zamora’s motion for reconsideration said his aunt, who had supported his education, had died recently; the RTC denied it on 6 March 1998, noting the visit could have been timed late in the day and that Memita had asked for several postponements on January 17, 1997, January 22, 1997, August 18, 1997, September 17, 1997, December 19, 1997, and January 22, 1998.

• Due Process — Denial of Opportunity to Testify: Petitioner argued that he was denied his right to a day in court when the trial court did not allow him to testify.
• Due Process — Offering of Documentary Exhibits: Petitioner argued that he was denied due process when the trial court precluded him from offering his documentary exhibits for admission.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Verified Answer: Petitioner argued that Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply because his Answer with Counterclaim was verified and under oath.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Party to All Sales Invoices: Petitioner argued that Rule 8, Section 8 was inapplicable because he did not appear to be a party to all 72 sales invoices admitted in evidence.
• Authenticity and Due Execution of Sales Invoices: Petitioner argued that the 72 sales invoices should have been excluded and denied admission because Masongsong failed to prove their authenticity and due execution during trial.

• Due Process — Denial of Postponement: Respondent countered that the trial court committed no error in denying Memita’s motion for postponement because due process demands proper obedience to procedural rules.
• Sales Invoices — Specific Denial: Respondent argued that Memita failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of the receipts or any of the signatures on them.
• Short and Questionable Deliveries: Respondent argued that Memita failed to discharge the burden of proving his allegations of short or questionable deliveries.

• Due Process — Denial of Opportunity to Testify: Whether Memita was denied his right to a day in court when the trial court did not allow him to testify.
• Due Process — Offering of Documentary Exhibits: Whether Memita was denied due process when the trial court precluded him from offering his documentary exhibits for admission.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Verified Answer: Whether Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies despite Memita’s Answer with Counterclaim being verified and under oath.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Party to All Sales Invoices: Whether Rule 8, Section 8 is inapplicable because Memita does not appear to be a party to all 72 sales invoices.
• Authenticity and Due Execution of Sales Invoices: Whether the 72 sales invoices should have been excluded for failure of Masongsong to prove their authenticity and due execution during trial.

• Due Process — Denial of Opportunity to Testify: No. Memita was given reasonable opportunity to be heard but failed to avail it; the denial of his motion for postponement was within the trial court’s sound discretion.
• Due Process — Offering of Documentary Exhibits: No. The submission of the case after denying the postponement did not violate due process because Memita had the opportunity to present evidence but failed to appear.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Verified Answer: No. The Answer did not specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of the sales invoices under oath and did not set forth the facts supporting his denial.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Party to All Sales Invoices: No. The sales invoices showed that Memita or his representative acknowledged receipt of the deliveries, and his failure to specifically deny them under oath brought them within the rule.
• Authenticity and Due Execution of Sales Invoices: No. The sales invoices were the best evidence of the transaction, and Memita failed to prove fraud or short deliveries; they were properly admitted.

• Due Process — Denial of Opportunity to Testify: The SC held that the essence of due process is a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence. Memita was afforded that opportunity but failed to avail it. He asked for postponement six times—on 17 January 1997, 22 January 1997, 18 August 1997, 17 September 1997, 9 December 1997, and 22 January 1998—giving varying reasons such as counsel’s traffic accident, hearing in another branch, need for settlement, severe migraine, and urgent personal matter. The trial court had repeatedly warned that it would no longer entertain further postponements. A motion for postponement is a privilege, not a right, and its grant or denial is addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. The SC cited Limpot vs. Court of Appeals on obedience to procedural rules, China Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals on postponement as a privilege, and Gohu vs. Spouses Gohu on waiver for dilatory actions. Because Memita did not avail the opportunity, he could not claim denial of due process.
• Due Process — Offering of Documentary Exhibits: The SC treated the claim that Memita was precluded from offering his documentary exhibits as part of the same due process question. Since the trial court had already afforded Memita an opportunity to participate and had warned against further delays, the submission of the case after the denied postponement did not deprive him of due process. The opportunity to offer exhibits was not availed of, and it was deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Verified Answer: Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when an action or defense is founded on a written instrument copied in or attached to the pleading, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. Section 10 requires a defendant to specify each material allegation of fact he does not admit and, whenever practicable, to set forth the substance of the matters on which he relies to support his denial. Memita admitted purchasing goods but alleged questionable deliveries, short deliveries, discrepancies, and possible manipulation of delivery receipts without specifying the date of purchase or receipt number. He did not explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of the sales invoices or the signatures on them. His Answer therefore did not comply with the requirement of a specific denial under oath.
• Rule 8, Section 8 — Party to All Sales Invoices: The SC did not apply the non-party exception in Section 8. The sales invoices showed that Memita or his authorized representative acknowledged receipt of Masongsong’s deliveries without protest; except for Sales Invoice No. 6557 dated June 4, 1996 and Sales Invoice No. 6300 dated May 29, 1996, all sales invoices bore Memita’s or his representative’s signature. Memita’s claim that he was not a party to all 72 sales invoices did not excuse his failure to specifically deny their genuineness and due execution under oath.
• Authenticity and Due Execution of Sales Invoices: The SC held that the sales invoices were the best evidence of the transaction between Memita and Masongsong. Memita alleged questionable and short deliveries, which in effect alleged fraud; as the party invoking fraud, he had the burden to substantiate it, since a person is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns are presumed fair and regular. Memita’s evidence—the Load Order Manifest, Issue Form, and testimonies of San Miguel Foods, Inc. employees—did not prove fraud. The Issue Form reflected goods obtained by Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, not quantities delivered to each customer; the Load Order Manifest was Masongsong’s own document reflecting goods to be delivered. The sales invoices showed Memita or his representative acknowledged receipt without protest, and Memita raised doubts only after demands to pay. The UCPB Check No. 05760 dated July 1, 1996 for ₱127,238.40 was for Memita’s other past account. The SC cited Mangahas vs. Court of Appeals on the burden of proving fraud. The trial court correctly admitted the sales invoices and held Memita liable.

• Due Process — Reasonable Opportunity to Be Heard — Due process requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence; if the opportunity is afforded but not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited. The SC applied this to Memita, who failed to appear and testify after repeated postponements.
• Motion for Postponement — A motion for postponement is a privilege, not a right; the movant should not assume it will be granted, and its grant or denial is addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. The SC upheld the denial of Memita’s sixth postponement and the submission of the case.
• Deemed Admission of Genuineness and Due Execution of Written Instrument — Under Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when an action or defense is founded on a written instrument copied in or attached to the pleading, its genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; the oath requirement does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for inspection of the original instrument is refused. The SC applied this to the sales invoices.
• Specific Denial — Under Section 10, Rule 8, a defendant must specify each material allegation of fact he does not admit and, whenever practicable, set forth the substance of the matters on which he relies to support his denial; a denial of only part of an averment must specify the true and material part and deny only the remainder. The SC held Memita’s general allegations did not satisfy this.
• Fraud — Burden of Proof — A party alleging fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate the allegation, since a person is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns are presumed fair and regular. The SC applied this to Memita’s claims of short and questionable deliveries.
• Sales Invoices as Best Evidence of the Transaction — The sales invoices, signed by the customer or representative acknowledging receipt, are the best evidence of the transaction; the Load Order Manifest and Issue Form did not reflect quantities delivered to the particular customer. The SC used this to uphold admissibility and liability.

• “The essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense.” — The SC used this to reject Memita’s due process claim after he failed to appear despite repeated postponements.
• “Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.” — This is the operative rule on waiver of the opportunity to be heard.
• “A motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. A movant for postponement should not assume beforehand that his motion will be granted.” — The SC cited this to uphold the trial court’s denial of Memita’s sixth postponement.
• “The best evidence of the transaction between Memita and Masongsong are the sales invoices. The sales invoices show that Memita or his representative acknowledged receipt of Masongsong’s deliveries without protest.” — This supported the admission of the sales invoices and the finding of liability.

• Air Phils. Corp. vs. International Business Aviation Services Phils., G.R. No. 151963, 9 September 2004, 438 SCRA 51 — Cited for the essence of due process as a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence.
• Tiomico vs. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 558 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a party who was afforded an opportunity to participate but failed to do so cannot complain of deprivation of due process.
• China Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 162 Phil. 505 (1976) — Cited for the rule that a motion for postponement is a privilege, not a right.
• Gohu vs. Spouses Gohu, 397 Phil. 126 (2000) — Cited for the rule that an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for dilatory actions upholds the trial court’s duty to ensure trial proceeds.
• Limpot vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 44642, 20 February 1989, 170 SCRA 367, 377 — Cited for the value of procedural rules and the limited reasons for relaxing them.
• Mangahas vs. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 13, 21 (1999) — Cited for the rule that whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate the allegation.

• Section 8, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that the genuineness and due execution of a written instrument copied in or attached to the pleading are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; the oath requirement does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for inspection of the original instrument is refused. The SC applied it to the sales invoices.
• Section 10, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires a defendant to specify each material allegation of fact he does not admit and, whenever practicable, to set forth the substance of the matters on which he relies to support his denial; a partial denial must specify the true and material part and deny only the remainder. The SC applied it to Memita’s Answer.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The petition for review on certiorari was filed under this Rule; the SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA.
• Constitutional due process guarantee — The SC applied the essence of due process to Memita’s claim, holding that the opportunity to be heard was afforded but waived.