Melita O. Del Rosario vs. People of the Philippines

The prescriptive period for the offense of failing to file a sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 is reckoned from the date of commission—that is, the statutory deadline for filing—not from the date of discovery of the non-filing, unless the offender actively concealed the omission or the information was suppressed from the public.

Melita O. Del Rosario held the position of Chief of the Valuation and Classification Division-Office of the Commissioner at the Bureau of Customs. As a public officer, she was required under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 to file a detailed sworn SALN “on or before April 30 of every year.” She failed to file her SALNs for calendar years 1990 and 1991. The Office of the Ombudsman brought a complaint against her only on October 28, 2004, charging her with violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713, dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Informations for two counts of violating Section 8 were eventually filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court on March 11, 2008.

• The SALN Requirement: Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 mandates all public officials and employees to file a sworn SALN (a) within 30 days from assumption of office, (b) on or before April 30 of every year thereafter, and (c) within 30 days after separation from service. Section 8(C) declares that all filed SALNs “shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours” and “for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed,” and further requires that they remain accessible to the public for ten years after receipt.

• Petitioner’s Non-filing: Melita O. Del Rosario, then Chief of the Valuation and Classification Division at the Bureau of Customs, failed to file her SALN for calendar year 1990 (deadline April 30, 1991) and for calendar year 1991 (deadline April 30, 1992).

• Discovery and Charges: The Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against her only on October 28, 2004—more than 13 years after the 1990 deadline and more than 12 years after the 1991 deadline. Two criminal informations for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 were subsequently filed in the MeTC on March 11, 2008.

• Government Monitoring Mechanisms: The Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman had issued memorandum circulars in 1994 and 1995 establishing guidelines for monitoring SALN compliance. Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 95-13 provided for a computerized database of all officials required to file SALNs and directed administrative/personnel divisions to prepare reports listing those who failed to submit their statements.

• No Concealment: There was no allegation or finding that petitioner concealed her failure to file or conspired with others to suppress information about her omission.

• Prescription: Petitioner maintained that the offenses had prescribed under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, which sets an eight-year prescriptive period for violations of special laws punished by imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years. The period should be computed from the respective statutory filing deadlines (April 30, 1991 and April 30, 1992), and the complaint filed in 2004 came well beyond the eight-year limit.

• Non-applicability of the Discovery Rule: Petitioner argued that the discovery rule under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not apply because the non-filing was not concealed. SALNs are public records that the law makes accessible for inspection and copying; the government agencies charged with monitoring compliance had the means to detect the omission within the prescriptive period.

• Discovery Rule: Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Ombudsman, contended that the prescriptive period began to run only from the discovery of the non-filing, because it would be difficult for the Ombudsman to know of the omission on the filing date itself, and requiring a tracking system to ferret out violators on or about the filing dates would be “burdensome” and “highly impossible.”

• Policy and Precedent: Respondent invoked the rulings in the behest loans cases and Benedicto v. Abad Santos, Jr., arguing that reckoning prescription from the date of commission would defeat the anti-corruption purpose of R.A. No. 6713 by enabling offenders to escape liability through concealment until the prescriptive period expired.

• Reckoning Point of Prescription: Whether the prescriptive period for the violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 should be counted from the date of commission (the respective April 30 deadlines) or from the date the non-filing was discovered by the State.

• Reckoning Point of Prescription: The prescriptive period began to run from the dates of commission—the April 30 deadlines—not from the date of discovery. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the general rule is that prescription of violations of special laws “shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation,” while the exception—known as the discovery rule or blameless ignorance doctrine—applies only “if the violation be not known at the time.” The discovery rule is not triggered merely because the aggrieved party lacked knowledge; it requires either that the information necessary to discover the offense was suppressed or that the plaintiff had no reasonable means of knowing the cause of action. In the present case, the SALN filing requirement is a public obligation, the SALNs themselves are expressly made accessible to the public by Section 8(C) of R.A. No. 6713, and there was no concealment or connivance by petitioner. Moreover, the Ombudsman and the Civil Service Commission had, through their own circulars, created a tracking system to monitor compliance, so the State had reasonable means to discover the omission within the eight-year period. Accordingly, the informations filed more than eight years after the deadlines had already prescribed under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, and the MeTC’s quashal was correct.

• Prescription of Offenses Penalized by Special Laws (Act No. 3326, Section 2) — The general rule is that prescription runs from the day of the commission of the violation. The exception—the discovery rule—shifts the reckoning point to the date of discovery of the offense, but only if the violation was not known at the time of its commission. The fact that an aggrieved party has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts giving rise to the right does not by itself prevent the running of the prescriptive period.

• Guidelines for Applying the Discovery Rule (summarized from PCGG v. Carpio-Morales) — In determining whether the general rule or the exception governs the reckoning of the prescriptive period for violations of special laws, the following factors control: (1) As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of commission. (2) If the date of commission is not known, it is counted from the date of discovery. (3) The availability or suppression of information relative to the crime must first be determined; if the necessary information, data, or records are readily available to the public, the general rule applies and prescription runs from the date of commission. If martial law prevented the filing or information about the violation was suppressed through connivance, the exception applies and prescription is reckoned from discovery. The discovery rule does not apply where there are reasonable means to be aware of the commission of the offense, and it may not be invoked to excuse governmental inaction or lapses in enforcement.

• “If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.” (Citing PCGG v. Carpio-Morales)

• “[W]hen there are reasonable means to be aware of the commission of the offense, the discovery rule should not be applied. To prosecute an offender for an offense not prosecuted on account of the lapses on the part of the Government and the officials responsible for the prosecution thereof or burdened with the duty of making sure that the laws are observed would have the effect of condoning their indolence and inaction.”

• Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014 — Followed; its summative guidelines for determining whether the discovery rule or the general rule on prescription applies were directly adopted and treated as controlling.

• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011 (and related behest loans cases) — Distinguished; the discovery rule was applied in those cases because the public officials connived with loan beneficiaries and information was suppressed under martial law, factors absent here.

• Benedicto v. Abad Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 74689, March 21, 1990, 183 SCRA 434 — Distinguished; the ruling involved an information filed ten years after discovery, while here the critical fact was the ready accessibility of the violation to the public.

• People v. Monteiro, G.R. No. L-49454, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 548 — Distinguished; the case involved a successful concealment of the offense during the prescriptive period, a circumstance not present in the petitioner’s situation.

• Act No. 3326, Section 1 — Establishes the prescriptive periods for violations of special acts: eight years for offenses punishable by imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years. Applied as the governing prescriptive period because R.A. No. 6713 does not provide its own.

• Act No. 3326, Section 2 — Prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or from discovery if the violation is not known at the time. The general rule governed because the SALN requirement is publicly verifiable and no concealment was shown.

• Republic Act No. 6713, Section 8 — Mandates the filing of sworn SALNs on or before April 30 of every year; paragraph (C) declares the statements accessible to the public for inspection and copying. The public nature of the records negated any claim of warranted ignorance by the State and foreclosed application of the discovery rule.

• Republic Act No. 3019, Section 11 — Provides a 15-year prescriptive period for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Declared irrelevant because the informations charged only a violation of R.A. No. 6713, not R.A. No. 3019, which requires SALN filing within January of every other year.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Francis H. Jardeleza, and Alexander G. Gesmundo. (Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires did not participate, having been a member of the Sandiganbayan division that issued the assailed decision.)