Meking vs. Remulla

The DOJ may validly promulgate rules governing the quantum of evidence and procedure for preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings conducted by public prosecutors, as these are executive in character and fall outside the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional rule-making power over pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, provided the Court retains its power to correct any prosecutorial rule or action that impairs constitutional rights on grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Atty. Hazel L. Meking is a member of the bar who filed the petition in her personal capacity. Respondent Jesus Crispin C. Remulla is the Secretary of the Department of Justice. The dispute centers on Department Circular No. 015, promulgated by the DOJ on July 16, 2024, which contains the 2024 DOJ-NPS Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings. Prior to the circular, Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure — promulgated by the Supreme Court — established probable cause as the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations. The circular changed this standard to "prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction," prompting the petitioner to assail it as an encroachment on the Court's exclusive rule-making power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.

On July 16, 2024, the Department of Justice promulgated Department Circular No. 015, containing the 2024 DOJ-NPS Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings. Rule II, Section 5 of the circular established a new quantum of evidence for preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings, defined as "prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction." Under this standard, a prima facie case must be established by the evidence at hand — including testimonial, documentary, and real evidence — such that, if left uncontradicted, the evidence would be sufficient to establish all elements of the crime or offense charged and warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum is met when the prosecutor is convinced that the entirety of evidence presented is admissible, credible, and capable of being preserved and presented to establish all elements of the crime as well as the identity of the person responsible, including a summary evaluation of the evidence presented by respondents through their counter-affidavit.

Prior to the circular, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations was governed by Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the Supreme Court had promulgated. That rule required the complaint to be accompanied by affidavits and supporting documents to establish probable cause. Atty. Hazel L. Meking filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that by promulgating Department Circular No. 015 and effectively changing the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigation, the DOJ overstepped and violated the rule-making power of the Supreme Court as enshrined in Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which vests in the Court the exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.

The Court, however, had already addressed the matter in its Resolution in A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC, captioned Re: Draft Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service's Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings. There, the Court expressly recognized the authority of the DOJ to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings, traced the historical underpinnings of probable cause as the quantum of evidence, and differentiated preliminary investigation as an executive function rather than a judicial one. The Court further decreed the repeal of inconsistent portions of Rule 112 to remove any impediment to the 2024 DOJ-NPS Rules, harmonizing the DOJ's rule-making authority within the executive sphere with the Court's constitutional rule-making power within the judicial sphere.

• Encroachment on Supreme Court's Rule-Making Power: Petitioner argued that by promulgating Department Circular No. 015 and effectively changing the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigation, the DOJ overstepped and violated the rule-making power of the Supreme Court as enshrined in Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.
• Alteration of Established Quantum of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the original text of Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure established probable cause as the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations, and that the DOJ's substitution of this standard with "prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction" constituted an unauthorized exercise of rule-making power reserved to the Court.

• Rule-Making Power: Whether the DOJ, in promulgating Department Circular No. 015 or the 2024 DOJ-NPS Rules, undermined the Supreme Court's exclusive rule-making power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.

• Rule-Making Power: No. Department Circular No. 015 was upheld as a valid exercise of the DOJ's authority over prosecutorial processes, which are executive in nature. The circular regulates only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors and does not dictate practice or procedure in court. The Court's constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, and the Court retains its power to correct, on grave abuse of discretion, any prosecutorial rule or action that impairs constitutional rights.

• Rule-Making Power: The Court had already resolved the matter in its Resolution in A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC, where it expressly recognized the DOJ's authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings. The Court traced the historical underpinnings of probable cause as the quantum of evidence and differentiated preliminary investigation as an executive function, not judicial in character. As early as Salta vs. CA, the Court held that preliminary investigation proper is not a judicial function but part of the prosecution's job within the Executive, underscoring the twin aims of shielding the accused from needless trials and conserving judicial resources. People vs. Navarro reiterated that preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial function, stressing the prosecutor's duty to ascertain whether sufficient ground exists to engender a well-founded belief of an offense and the accused's probable guilt. The Court adopted a policy of non-interference in the public prosecutor's conduct of preliminary investigation and recognized that, pursuant to the 2005 revisions to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the authority to conduct preliminary investigation has been vested in the exclusive domain of public prosecutors. While Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo affirmed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is within the Court's exclusive domain, the Court itself decreed the repeal of inconsistent portions of Rule 112 to remove any impediment to the 2024 DOJ-NPS Rules and in recognition of the DOJ's authority over prosecutorial processes. This harmonizes the DOJ's rule-making authority within the executive sphere and the Court's constitutional rule-making power within the judicial sphere. Department Circular No. 015 regulates only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive in nature, and does not dictate practice or procedure in court. The Court's constitutional rule-making authority remains supreme over judicial proceedings, and its power to correct, on grave abuse of discretion, any prosecutorial rule or action that impairs constitutional rights is retained.

• Executive Nature of Preliminary Investigation — Preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial function. It is part of the prosecution's job within the Executive branch, serving the twin aims of shielding the accused from needless trials and conserving judicial resources. Because it is executive in character, the DOJ may promulgate rules governing the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings by prosecutors without encroaching on the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional rule-making power over pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold Department Circular No. 015, which changed the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations, as a valid exercise of DOJ authority.

• Supreme Court's Exclusive Rule-Making Power — Under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has the exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The Court reaffirmed this principle citing Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo, but clarified that the DOJ's rules on preliminary investigation do not intrude upon this power because they regulate executive prosecutorial processes, not judicial proceedings. The Court retains its power to correct, on grave abuse of discretion, any prosecutorial rule or action that impairs constitutional rights.

• Policy of Non-Interference in Preliminary Investigation — The Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the public prosecutor's conduct of preliminary investigation, consistent with the characterization of preliminary investigation as an executive function vested in the exclusive domain of public prosecutors pursuant to the 2005 revisions to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

• "Preliminary investigation was differentiated as an executive function and not judicial in character." — This passage captures the Court's foundational rationale for sustaining the DOJ's rule-making authority over preliminary investigations, distinguishing the executive character of prosecutorial processes from the judicial sphere over which the Court's constitutional rule-making power is supreme.

• "This harmonizes the DOJ's rule-making authority within the executive sphere and the Court's constitutional rule-making power within the judicial sphere, and forecloses Atty. Meking's encroachment claim." — This sentence articulates the Court's framework for reconciling the respective rule-making powers of the DOJ and the Supreme Court, establishing the boundary between executive prosecutorial rule-making and judicial procedural rule-making.

• "Thus, Department Circular No. 015 or the 2024 DOJ-NPS Rules regulates only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive in nature. It does not dictate practice or procedure in court. This Court's constitutional rule-making authority remains supreme over judicial proceedings, and its power to correct, on grave abuse of discretion, any prosecutorial rule or action that impairs constitutional rights, is retained." — This passage defines the scope and limits of the DOJ's rule-making authority and preserves the Court's supervisory power, serving as the decision's concluding analytical framework.

• Salta vs. CA, 227 Phil. 213 (1986) — Controlling precedent on the executive character of preliminary investigation. The Court held that preliminary investigation proper is not a judicial function but part of the prosecution's job within the Executive, underscoring the twin aims of shielding the accused from needless trials and conserving judicial resources while applying the well-founded belief standard.

• People vs. Navarro, 337 Phil. 122 (1997) — Followed. Reiterated that preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial function, stressing the prosecutor's duty to ascertain whether sufficient ground exists to engender a well-founded belief of an offense and the accused's probable guilt.

• Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 789 (2017) — Cited to reaffirm that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is within the Court's exclusive domain. The Court acknowledged this principle while distinguishing it from the DOJ's authority over executive prosecutorial processes.

• Re: Draft Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service's Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings, 955 Phil. 15 (2024) (A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC) — Directly controlling. The Court had already resolved the matter in this resolution, expressly recognizing the DOJ's authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings, tracing the historical underpinnings of probable cause, and decreeing the repeal of inconsistent portions of Rule 112.

• Article VIII, Section 5(5), 1987 Constitution — Vests in the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Petitioner invoked this provision to argue that the DOJ's circular encroached on the Court's exclusive rule-making power. The Court held that the provision was not violated because the circular regulates executive prosecutorial processes, not judicial proceedings.

• Rule 112, Section 3(a), Rules of Criminal Procedure — Previously established probable cause as the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations, requiring the complaint to be accompanied by affidavits and supporting documents to establish probable cause. The Court decreed the repeal of inconsistent portions of this rule upon promulgation of Department Circular No. 015, harmonizing the DOJ's executive rule-making authority with the Court's judicial rule-making power.

• Department Circular No. 015, Rule II, Section 5 (2024 DOJ-NPS Rules) — Established "prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction" as the quantum of evidence for preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings. The Court upheld this circular as a valid exercise of the DOJ's authority over prosecutorial processes, consistent with A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr., Singh, and Villanueva, JJ., concurred. Leonen, SAJ., filed a separate concurring opinion, the text of which is not provided. Hernando and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., were on official business.