Mejia vs. Balolong

A municipal corporation created by statute comes into existence as a juridical entity from the moment the law creating it takes effect, even though its government is not yet organized and its officers not yet appointed or elected. The organization of the city government and the appointment or election of its officers is a separate and subsequent step that enables the corporation to act but does not determine its creation or existence.

Act No. 170 (Republic Act No. 170), approved on June 20, 1947, created the City of Dagupan from the territory of the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan. Section 2 of the Act declared that "the City of Dagupan, which is hereby created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan." Section 11 provided that the municipal councilors of the city shall be elected during every general election for provincial and municipal officials in accordance with the Election Code. Section 88, entitled "Change of government" and falling under Article XV ("Transitory provisions"), authorized the President to fix the date for the organization of the city government and to appoint the members of the Municipal Board pending the next general election for provincial and municipal officials, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President fixed January 1, 1948 as the date for organizing the city government, and on December 30, 1947 appointed the respondents as councilors. The petitioners had been elected as councilors in the general election of November 11, 1947.

Act No. 170, approved on June 20, 1947, created the City of Dagupan, comprising the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan. Section 2 of the Act expressly stated that "the City of Dagupan, which is hereby created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan." Section 11 provided that the municipal councilors of the city shall be elected during every general election for provincial and municipal officials in accordance with the Election Code. Section 88, a transitory provision, authorized the President to fix the date for the organization of the city government and to appoint the members of the Municipal Board pending the next general election for provincial and municipal officials, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

In October 1947, the President issued Executive Order No. 96, adding the Municipality of Calasiao to the City of Dagupan; this municipality was later segregated by Executive Order No. 115 in December 1947. Executive Order No. 115 also fixed January 1, 1948 as the date for the organization of the city government of Dagupan. On November 11, 1947, a general election for provincial and municipal officials was held pursuant to the Revised Election Code. The petitioners — Flaviano Mejia, Teofilo P. Guadiz, Ruperto Z. Tandoc, and Policronio de Venecia — filed their certificates of candidacy for councilors of the City of Dagupan and were elected in that election. The respondents — Pedro U. Balolong, Ricardo Villamil, Toribio Quimosing, and Crisologo Zarate — also filed certificates of candidacy for the same positions but were defeated.

On December 30, 1947, the President appointed the respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan, in lieu of the petitioners who had been elected. The city government was subsequently organized on January 1, 1948. The petitioners instituted a quo warranto action, contending that the respondents' appointments were null and void because the City of Dagupan had already come into existence on June 20, 1947, making the November 11, 1947 election the "next general election" contemplated by sections 11 and 88 of Act No. 170, and that the petitioners, having been elected in that election, were entitled to the offices.

• Date of Creation: Petitioners maintained that the City of Dagupan came into existence on June 20, 1947, the date Act No. 170 was approved and became effective, because section 2 expressly declared that the city "is hereby created."
• Next General Election: Petitioners argued that because the city was created on June 20, 1947, the "next general election" referred to in sections 11 and 88 of Act No. 170 was the November 11, 1947 general election, in which they were duly elected as councilors.
• Invalidity of Appointments: Petitioners contended that the President's power to appoint members of the Municipal Board under section 88 was limited to the period before the next general election, and since the November 11, 1947 election had already occurred, the President's appointments of respondents on December 30, 1947 were null and void.

• Date of Organization as Date of Creation: Respondents contended that the City of Dagupan did not come into existence until its government was organized on January 1, 1948, as fixed by Executive Order No. 115, and therefore the "next general election" referred to in sections 11 and 88 was the election to be held in 1951, not the one on November 11, 1947.
• Section 88 as Enabling Provision: Respondents argued that section 88, entitled "Change of government" and falling under "Transitory provisions," was the enabling provision of the charter, and that the municipality of Dagupan was to assume its legal transformation into a city only upon compliance with the conditions set forth in section 88.
• Application of Section 10 of the Revised Election Code: Respondents invoked section 10 of the Revised Election Code, which lays down the general rule as to the filling of elective offices in a new political division, arguing that the petitioners' election pertained to the old municipality of Dagupan and did not subsist upon the organization of the city government.

• Date of Creation: Whether the City of Dagupan came into existence as a juridical entity on June 20, 1947 upon approval of Act No. 170, or on January 1, 1948 upon the organization of its government by executive order.
• Validity of Appointments: Whether the President's appointments of the respondents as councilors on December 30, 1947 were valid, or whether the petitioners elected on November 11, 1947 were entitled to the offices.

• Date of Creation: Yes. The City of Dagupan came into existence on June 20, 1947 when Act No. 170 was approved and took effect, because section 2 expressly declared the city "is hereby created," and a statute taking effect upon approval is operative from the instant of its approval.
• Validity of Appointments: No. The President's appointments of the respondents were null and void, the "next general election" contemplated by sections 11 and 88 being the November 11, 1947 election in which the petitioners were duly elected; the President's appointing power under section 88 was limited to the period before that election.

• Date of Creation: The Court distinguished between the creation of a municipal corporation and the organization of its government. Section 2 of Act No. 170 expressly declared that "the City of Dagupan, which is hereby created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan," and section 90 provided that the Act shall take effect upon its approval on June 20, 1947. A statute that takes effect upon approval is operative from the exact instant of its approval. The fact that the President, by Executive Order No. 96 promulgated in October 1947, added the Municipality of Calasiao "to the City of Dagupan" constituted a recognition that the city already existed, since the President was authorized to increase the territory of the City, not of the Municipality. The Court emphasized that to create a public corporation is one thing and to organize its government is another; a public corporation comes into existence from the moment the law creating it becomes effective, but it cannot act or transact business until its officers are appointed or elected and have qualified. The organization of the government presupposes the prior existence of the city, since no officers may be appointed or elected for an entity that does not yet exist. Section 2168 of the Administrative Code, cited by analogy, provides that a new municipality comes into existence upon the qualification of its officers "unless some other time be fixed therefor by law" — and Act No. 170 fixed the time of creation as the date of its approval, which is different from the organization of its government.

• Validity of Appointments: Since the City of Dagupan came into existence on June 20, 1947, the "next general election" for provincial and municipal officials referred to in sections 11 and 88 was the election held on November 11, 1947, which was the next election after the city's creation. Section 11 expressly provided that the municipal councilors "shall be elected during every general election for provincial and municipal officials in accordance with the Election Code," and section 7 of the Election Code provides that when a new political division is created, the elective officers thereof shall be chosen at the next general election unless otherwise provided — and Act No. 170 provided nothing to the contrary. The President's power to appoint members of the Municipal Board under section 88 was limited to the period "pending the next general election," meaning before the November 11, 1947 election. After that election, the offices were to be filled by the persons elected. To construe "next general election" as referring to an election after the organization of the city government would render the alternative provision "or election of the members of the municipal board" in section 88 nugatory, since on the date set for organization there would never be elected members. It would also grant the President discretion to defeat the purpose of the law by indefinitely postponing the organization of the city government, since Act No. 170 did not fix a time within which the President should set the date of organization.

• Creation vs. Organization of Municipal Corporations — A municipal corporation created by statute comes into existence as a juridical entity from the moment the law creating it takes effect, even if its government has not yet been organized and its officers not yet appointed or elected. The creation of a public corporation and the organization of its government are distinct concepts: the former is effected by the law creating it; the latter involves the selection and qualification of officers who will act for and represent the corporation. A public corporation cannot act or transact business before its governing body is organized, but it may exist before then. The organization of the government presupposes the prior existence of the corporation, since no officers may be appointed or elected for an entity that does not yet exist. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the City of Dagupan came into existence on June 20, 1947 when Act No. 170 was approved, even though the city government was not organized until January 1, 1948.

• Statutory Construction — "Next General Election" — Where a statute creating a new political division provides that its elective officers shall be elected at the "next general election," and the statute takes effect before a scheduled general election, the "next general election" refers to the first general election following the statute's effectivity, not the first election following the executive organization of the political division's government. Construing "next general election" as referring to an election after the organization of the government would render nugatory the statutory alternative of "appointment or election" of the members of the governing body, and would grant the executive discretion to defeat the legislative purpose by indefinitely postponing the organization date.

• "It is evident that the City of Dagupan created by said Act came into existence as a legal entity or a public corporation upon the approval of Act No. 170, on June 20, 1947; because a statute which, like Act No. 170, is to take effect upon its approval, is operative from the exact instance upon its approval or becoming a law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the city came into existence upon the statute's approval, establishing the distinction between creation and organization of a municipal corporation.

• "It is obvious that to create a public corporation or city is one thing and to organize the government thereof is another. A public corporation is created and comes into existence from the moment the law or charter that creates it becomes effective." — This formulation articulates the canonical distinction between creation and organization that is the central doctrine of the case.

• "The organization of the government of a city presupposes necessarily the previous existence of the city at the time its government is organized, because no officials of the city may be appointed or elected before the city has come into existence." — This passage reinforces the logical necessity that creation precedes organization, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on municipal corporations.

• "A juridical institution or entity can not act as such, but it may exist, before the officers provided by law to represent and act in its behalf or representation had been appointed or elected." — From the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, this statement crystallizes the distinction between existence and functioning of a juridical entity.

• Administrative Code, Section 2168 — Cited by analogy as a legal fiction providing that a new municipality comes into existence upon the qualification of its officers "unless some other time be fixed therefor by law." The Court used this provision to support the proposition that the legislature may fix a time for the creation of a municipal corporation different from the organization of its government, which Act No. 170 did by declaring the city "is hereby created" upon approval.

• City of Dansalan (Commonwealth Act No. 592) — Distinguished. The Court noted that the Dansalan charter did not contain an express provision creating the city upon approval, unlike Act No. 170 which declared the City of Dagupan "is hereby created." Dansalan would come into existence only upon the organization of its government because its charter did not fix a time of creation different from the organization of its government. The President never appointed officers for Dansalan, and it remained a municipality — a result consistent with the Court's distinction between creation and organization.

• Section 2, Act No. 170 (City of Dagupan Charter) — Declared that "the City of Dagupan, which is hereby created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Dagupan." The Court relied on the phrase "is hereby created" to conclude that the city came into existence upon the Act's approval on June 20, 1947.

• Section 11, Act No. 170 — Provided that the municipal councilors of the City of Dagupan shall be elected during every general election for provincial and municipal officials in accordance with the Election Code. The Court used this provision to establish that the councilors were to be elected at the general election, not appointed indefinitely.

• Section 88, Act No. 170 — Authorized the President to fix the date for the organization of the city government and to appoint members of the Municipal Board "pending the next general election for provincial and municipal officials." The Court construed "pending the next general election" as referring to the period before the November 11, 1947 election, after which the elected officers were entitled to the offices.

• Section 7, Revised Election Code — Provided that when a new political division is created, the elective officers thereof shall, unless otherwise provided, be chosen at the next general election. The Court found nothing in Act No. 170 providing otherwise, and thus applied this general rule.

• Section 2168, Administrative Code — Provided that a new municipality comes into existence upon the qualification of its officers "unless some other time be fixed therefor by law." The Court cited this as analogous authority supporting the proposition that the legislature may fix a time of creation different from the organization of the government.

Moran, C.J., Perfecto, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concurred in the September 16, 1948 decision. In the January 25, 1949 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, Moran, C.J., Perfecto, Briones, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concurred.

• Paras, J. — Argued that section 88, entitled "Change of government" under "Transitory provisions," was the enabling provision of the charter, and that the municipality of Dagupan was to assume its legal transformation into a city only upon compliance with the conditions in section 88, i.e., when the President fixed the date for the organization of the city government. Paras contended that section 2, which merely delimited territorial jurisdiction, should be construed in relation to section 88, and that the President's appointing power under section 88 was intended to enable the city to have an appointive governing body between the date of organization and the next general election following that date. He drew an analogy to Act No. 3117 (1923), which divided Leyte into two provinces but made the division contingent on a gubernatorial executive order that was never issued, arguing that no one would claim the provinces were created by mere passage of the Act. Paras maintained that the petitioners' election pertained to the old municipality of Dagupan and did not subsist upon the organization of the city government on January 1, 1948.

• Pablo, M. — Concurred with the dissent of Paras, J., expressing agreement in Spanish ("Concurro con esta disidencia").

• Ozaeta, J. — Voted to grant the motion for reconsideration, arguing that the majority's conclusion was "erroneous and fraught with absurd consequences." Ozaeta contended that a city as a municipal corporation cannot be said to exist until it is enabled to exercise the powers conferred by its charter, which requires the appointment or election and qualification of its officers. He argued that the distinction between "organization of the city" and "organization of the city government" was false, as a city cannot be organized without organizing its government. Ozaeta warned that the majority's holding would imply that the Municipality of Dagupan ipso facto became a city independent of Pangasinan on June 20, 1947, with the absurd consequence that the municipal officers would have become city officers free from provincial supervision, and that the city could claim land taxes collected during the transition period. He cited the case of Dansalan, where the charter was approved in 1940 but the city government was never organized, leaving Dansalan a municipality — a result he argued was inconsistent with the majority's reasoning.