Mejia-Espinoza vs. Cariño

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which governs annulment of judgments or final orders, cannot be used to annul court processes — such as a writ of execution, notice of levy, or notice of sale — issued pursuant to a final and executory judgment whose validity is not itself being questioned. The proper remedy to challenge such processes is a motion to nullify them before the court that issued them, as that court retains inherent power to control its own processes and correct errors of its ministerial officers.

Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza was the plaintiff in an ejectment case against respondent Nena A. Cariño before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 1420, involving a parcel of land. That case was consolidated with a separate ejectment case, Civil Case No. 1419, involving Espinoza and one Alberto Cariño covering a different property. The ejectment proceedings culminated in a judgment that became final and executory after the Supreme Court denied Nena's petition for review on certiorari for failure to file within the extended period, with an entry of judgment issued on December 3, 2003. The subsequent dispute centered on the execution of that final judgment — specifically, the writ of execution, the levy on Nena's separate commercial lot to satisfy monetary awards, and the demolition of a one-story building on the subject property.

Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza filed an action for ejectment against respondent Nena A. Cariño before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 1420, involving a parcel of land. The case was consolidated with another ejectment case, Civil Case No. 1419, involving Espinoza and Alberto Cariño, Nena's co-defendant, covering a different property. On August 25, 1998, the MTC rendered a joint decision in favor of Espinoza, ordering both Nena and Alberto to vacate their respective premises and to pay rentals from the time of default, litigation expenses of ₱1,000.00, and attorney's fees of ₱5,000.00, in addition to costs of suit. Nena and Alberto separately appealed to the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 43, which reversed the MTC decision only with respect to Civil Case No. 1420 and dismissed the case against Nena for lack of cause of action. Espinoza then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals Special Seventeenth Division, which reversed the RTC and affirmed the MTC decision insofar as it decreed the ejectment of Nena. Nena sought to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari, but the petition was denied for failure to file within the extended period, and an entry of judgment was issued on December 3, 2003.

After the judgment became final, Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before the MTC, which Nena opposed. The MTC granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and issued the writ on March 10, 2005. Sheriff Vinez A. Hortaleza served the writ upon Nena on March 16, 2005. Upon proceeding to the property, the sheriff found that Nena had voluntarily vacated the premises and turned over the padlock to her caretaker, Gertrudes Taberna; the sheriff then peacefully turned over the property to co-petitioner Norma Mejia Dellosa, Espinoza's attorney-in-fact. The sheriff thereafter levied a separate commercial lot owned by Nena to satisfy the monetary awards for rent, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees, and issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property scheduled for September 26, 2005.

On September 19, 2005, Nena filed a complaint captioned as "Annulment of Court's Processes with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Prohibition, and Damages" before the RTC of Dagupan City, raffled to Branch 41. Nena argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the order granting the writ of execution because she was not furnished a copy, that Espinoza illegally caused the demolition of a one-story building Nena claimed to have constructed on the land without a special court order, and that the levy on her commercial lot was premature and the computation of the judgment debt erroneous. Espinoza, in her Answer, countered that the writ was properly served and received, that Nena had already removed her belongings before service, that the demolished building was constructed by the previous owners (the Penullars), and that the levy was proper due to Nena's continued defiance of a final judgment. The RTC Branch 41 dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, finding that the issue on the writ's irregularity was mooted by its implementation, that Nena had voluntarily relinquished possession, that the levy was proper because the sheriff found no personal properties, and that Nena availed of the wrong remedy. The CA Fourth Division reversed, holding that Nena correctly filed under Rule 47, that the writ was void for lack of notice, that the levy was void because the CA 17th Division's dispositive portion did not mention monetary awards, and that Nena was entitled to damages for demolition without a special writ. Espinoza's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

• Ministerial Duty to Issue Writ of Execution: Petitioner asserted that the issuance of a writ of execution based on a final and executory decision is a ministerial duty of the MTC, and that Nena was nonetheless given her day in court when she filed her opposition to the motion for execution.
• Conformity with the Judgment: Petitioner faulted the CA 4th Division for failing to properly appreciate the dispositive portion of the CA 17th Division Decision, which affirmed the MTC decision that ordered Nena to vacate and pay rentals, litigation costs, and attorney's fees.
• Inapplicability of Section 10(d), Rule 39: Petitioner maintained that a writ of demolition was unnecessary because Section 10(d) of Rule 39 applies only to improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, and since it was the Penullars who constructed the building, the provision is inapplicable; in any case, Nena's claim that she built the building was unsubstantiated.
• Estoppel: Petitioner argued that Nena is estopped from questioning the validity of the writ of execution because she already voluntarily surrendered possession of the property.

• Nullity of Court Processes: Respondent reiterated the reasoning of the CA 4th Division that the court processes — the writ of execution, levy, and notice of sale — were void because she did not receive a copy of the MTC order granting the motion for issuance of the writ of execution, which she claimed did not become final and executory insofar as she was concerned.
• Entitlement to Damages: Respondent claimed entitlement to damages arising from the demolition of her one-story building without a special writ of demolition as required by Section 10(d) of Rule 39.

• Applicability of Rule 47: Whether a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 may be used to annul court processes — specifically, a writ of execution, notice of levy, and notice of sale — issued pursuant to a final and executory judgment whose validity is not being questioned.
• Estoppel from Questioning the Writ: Whether respondent Nena is estopped from questioning the validity of the writ of execution after voluntarily complying with it.
• Entitlement to Damages for Demolition: Whether respondent Nena is entitled to damages for the demolition of the one-story building without a special writ of demolition under Section 10(d) of Rule 39.
• Conformity of the Writ to the Judgment: Whether the writ of execution conformed to the judgment, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit monetary award in the dispositive portion of the CA 17th Division's Decision.

• Applicability of Rule 47: No. Rule 47 applies only to judgments or final orders, not to writs of execution, notices of levy, or notices of sale, which are merely processes issued to enforce a final judgment. The proper remedy is a motion to nullify those processes before the issuing court.
• Estoppel from Questioning the Writ: Yes. Nena was estopped from questioning the writ's validity because she received it without protest, voluntarily vacated the premises, and turned over possession to Espinoza's representative, thereby acquiescing to the writ.
• Entitlement to Damages for Demolition: No. Nena's claim for damages based on the demolition is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia, as she admitted having already filed a separate complaint for damages on the same ground. Moreover, she failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that she constructed the building.
• Conformity of the Writ to the Judgment: Yes. The CA 17th Division's decision affirmed the MTC decision, which included monetary awards for rentals, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees; the phrase "AFFIRMED insofar as it decreed the ejectment of Nena Cariño" was merely intended to limit the affirmance to Nena's case and did not delete the monetary awards.

• Applicability of Rule 47: Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy available only when ordinary remedies are no longer accessible through no fault of the petitioner, and only on grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Critically, it applies only to judgments or final orders — defined as those that dispose of the subject matter in its entirety or terminate a particular proceeding, leaving nothing but enforcement. A writ of execution is not a final order or resolution; it is a judicial process issued to carry out the mandate of the court in enforcing a final judgment. Similarly, notices of levy and sale are not judgments or final orders. The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the writ and notices before the MTC, because jurisdiction once acquired by a trial court is not lost and continues until the case is terminated, and the issuing court has inherent power to correct errors of its ministerial officers and control its own processes. The CA 4th Division and RTC Branch 41 erred in characterizing Nena's complaint as a Rule 47 petition. While the RTC Branch 41 was partially correct in dismissing for wrong remedy, it incorrectly identified a Rule 38 petition for relief as the proper recourse; the correct remedy was a motion to nullify court processes filed with the MTC.

• Estoppel from Questioning the Writ: Nena received a copy of the writ without protest and voluntarily vacated the premises, turning over possession to Espinoza's representative. These actions evince recognition of and acquiescence to the writ of execution, estopping her from later questioning its validity. A judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with a judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom. Furthermore, Nena's voluntary compliance rendered moot any issue arising from the issuance or enforcement of the writ, as injunction was no longer available — the act sought to be enjoined was already fait accompli. Nena's contention that her failure to receive a copy of the order granting execution deprived her of due process was without legal basis: once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, and it is not mandatory for the movant to serve a copy of the motion for execution on the adverse party or to set it for hearing. The opportunity to move for reconsideration of an order granting execution is not indispensable to due process. In any event, the MTC gave Nena ample opportunity to contest the motion when it allowed her opposition and heard arguments.

• Entitlement to Damages for Demolition: While a special writ of demolition is required under Section 10(d) of Rule 39 even if a writ of execution already exists, and demolition without such writ may serve as basis for an independent civil action for damages, the CA 4th Division overlooked that Nena had already filed a separate complaint for damages regarding the same demolition. Her complaint, insofar as it sought damages for the demolition, was therefore dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. Moreover, the CA 4th Division merely assumed Nena was the builder of the one-story building. Apart from bare allegations in her pleadings and her own testimony, no tax declaration, construction receipts, or worker testimonies were presented. The party who alleges must prove; Nena failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that she constructed the building at her expense. Furthermore, Article 446 of the Civil Code presumes that all works on land are made by the owner and at his expense unless the contrary is proved — there is no presumption under Philippine law that improvements on land were made by the lessee.

• Conformity of the Writ to the Judgment: The CA 4th Division erred in reading the CA 17th Division's dispositive portion narrowly. The CA 17th Division explicitly affirmed the MTC decision, which ordered Nena to vacate and pay rentals, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees. When an appellate court affirms a trial court's decision without modification, execution must conform to the terms of the trial court's fallo. The phrase "AFFIRMED insofar as it decreed the ejectment of Nena Cariño" was intended only to clarify that the affirmance applied to Nena's case and not to Alberto's, who did not appeal. Had the CA 17th Division intended to delete the monetary awards, it would have explicitly stated its modifications. Nothing in the body of the decision supported deletion of the awards.

• Annulment of Judgment Under Rule 47 — Scope and Limitations — Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy of last resort, available only when ordinary remedies (new trial, appeal, petition for relief) are no longer accessible through no fault of the petitioner, and only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Critically, it applies only to judgments or final orders — those that dispose of the subject matter in its entirety or terminate a proceeding — not to writs of execution, notices of levy, or notices of sale, which are merely judicial processes issued to enforce a final judgment. The Court applied this by holding that Nena's complaint challenging the writ of execution, levy, and notice of sale could not proceed under Rule 47 because those processes are not judgments or final orders.

• Inherent Power of the Issuing Court to Control Its Processes — A court that issued a writ of execution retains inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The proper remedy to challenge irregularities in execution processes is a motion to nullify filed with the same court that issued them, not a separate action before a different court.

• Estoppel by Acquiescence to a Final Judgment — A judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with a judgment is estopped from questioning its validity or taking an appeal therefrom. Satisfaction of a judgment passes it beyond review, as satisfaction is the last act and end of the proceedings, producing permanent and irrevocable discharge.

• Ministerial Duty to Issue Writ of Execution Upon Final Judgment — Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, and its issuance is the trial court's ministerial duty. It is not mandatory for the movant to serve a copy of the motion for execution on the adverse party or to set it for hearing; the absence of such advance notice does not constitute a denial of due process.

• Presumption of Ownership of Improvements (Article 446, Civil Code) — All works on land are presumed made by the owner and at his expense unless the contrary is proved. There is no presumption under Philippine law that improvements on leased land were made by the lessee. A party claiming reimbursement for improvements must prove by preponderance of evidence that the improvements were constructed at her expense.

• "Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it apply to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party." — This passage states the central ratio decidendi: Rule 47's scope is limited to judgments and final orders and does not extend to execution processes.

• "The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the writ of execution and notices of levy and sale before the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint before the RTC." — This defines the correct procedural remedy for challenging execution processes, a point the lower courts failed to identify.

• "[W]hen a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom." — This articulates the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence, which the Court applied to bar Nena from questioning the writ after voluntarily complying with it.

• "When an appellate court affirms a trial court's decision without any modification, the execution must necessarily conform to the terms and conditions of the trial court's fallo." — This principle resolves the issue of conformity of the writ to the judgment, clarifying that affirmance without modification carries forward all awards in the original dispositive portion.

• Deltaventures Resources, Inc. vs. Cabato, G.R. No. 118216, March 9, 2000 — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the principle that jurisdiction once acquired by a tribunal is not lost and continues until the case is terminated, and that irregularities in execution should be referred to the same court that rendered the decision, which has inherent power to control its own processes.

• Bañares II vs. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000 — Followed. Cited for the definition of a final order or resolution as one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a proceeding, leaving nothing but enforcement.

• Guiang vs. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that a writ of execution is not a final order but a judicial process to enforce a final judgment.

• Jacinto vs. Gumaru, Jr., G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with a judgment is estopped from questioning it.

• Asilo, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 9, 2011 — Followed. Cited for the rule that a special writ of demolition is required even with an existing writ of execution, and that demolition without a special writ may serve as basis for an independent civil action for damages.

• Florentino vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006 — Followed. Cited for the principle that when an appellate court affirms a trial court's decision without modification, execution must conform to the trial court's fallo.

• Anama vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171897, October 14, 2015 — Followed. Cited for the rule that when a prevailing party files a motion for execution of a final judgment, it is not mandatory to serve a copy on the adverse party or set it for hearing, and absence of such notice does not violate due process.

• Rule 47, Rules of Court — Governs annulment of judgments or final orders. The Court held that Rule 47 applies only to judgments or final orders, not to writs of execution, notices of levy, or notices of sale. The three requirements for a Rule 47 petition were discussed: (1) unavailability of ordinary remedies through no fault of the petitioner; (2) grounds limited to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction; and (3) filing within the prescribed period.

• Rule 39, Section 10(d), Rules of Court — Governs removal of improvements on property subject of execution. Provides that a sheriff shall not destroy, demolish, or remove improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the obligor has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time. The Court agreed that a special writ of demolition is required even with an existing writ of execution.

• Article 446, Civil Code — Provides that all works on land are presumed made by the owner and at his expense unless the contrary is proved. The Court applied this provision to hold that Nena, as lessee, could not rely on any presumption that she constructed the building; she bore the burden of proving ownership by preponderance of evidence, which she failed to do.

• Rule 132, Section 34, Rules of Court — Requires that evidence be formally offered for the court to consider it. The Court cited this in emphasizing that factual findings must be based on relevant evidence formally offered during trial.

• Rule 129, Sections 1-4, Rules of Court — Governs judicial notice, judicial admissions, and presumptions. The Court referenced these provisions in discussing the recognized exceptions to the rule that courts must base factual findings on formally offered evidence.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa concurred.