Medina vs. People

When an accused admits taking personal property but claims lawful transfer to another vehicle owned by the same person, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove lawful taking with the owner's consent; failure to substantiate such claim with corroborative evidence or documentary proof sustains a conviction for theft.

Henry Lim, owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep (Plate No. WPC-207) damaged in an accident but still in running condition, engaged the services of mechanic Herman Medina to repair the vehicle. Medina maintained an auto repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. After several months elapsed without repairs, Lim’s sister, Purita Lim, instructed Danilo Beltran to retrieve the jeep on September 4, 2002. Beltran discovered that the alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims—valued at ₱22,500—were missing. Medina admitted taking these parts but claimed he had installed them in Lim’s Isuzu pick-up, which was also allegedly being repaired at the shop. Beltran towed the jeep without the missing parts. On September 12, 2002, Purita Lim filed a criminal complaint for simple theft against Medina.

• The Entrustment: On April 27, 2002, Henry Lim delivered his Sangyong Korando Jeep to Medina’s repair shop. The vehicle remained serviceable, with its alternator, starter, battery, and tires intact and functioning.
• The Discovery: On the morning of September 4, 2002, Danilo Beltran proceeded to Medina’s shop to retrieve the jeep per Purita Lim’s instructions. Medina informed Beltran that he had removed the alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims, claiming he installed the starter in Lim’s Isuzu pick-up and kept the alternator in the shop. Beltran had never seen any other vehicle of Lim at the shop. Beltran returned in the afternoon and towed the jeep without the missing parts.
• The Defense: Medina testified that he transferred the parts to Lim’s pick-up with consent and presented an acknowledgment receipt dated July 25, 2002 (Exhibit "2"), purportedly signed by Crispin Mendoza (Lim’s alleged employee), Jovy Bardiaga (Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario Pascual (Medina’s helper), and barangay kagawads Rosalina Bautista and Angelina Tumamao. Medina admitted, however, that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually witness the removal of the parts from the jeep or their installation in the pick-up. Mendoza was not presented as a witness.
• Prosecution Evidence: Beltran testified positively regarding the missing parts and Medina’s admission. Lim testified that the jeep was complete when entrusted and that he never authorized the transfer of parts to any other vehicle. The prosecution also established that Medina failed to prove the pick-up was owned by Lim or that it was fully repaired and placed in running condition.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution relied solely on the single circumstance of Beltran’s testimony that the parts were missing, which was insufficient to sustain conviction under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
• Reliance on Weakness of Defense: Petitioner maintained that the conviction was based on the weakness of the defense rather than the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, contrary to the ruling in Philippines v. Alvario.
• Lawful Taking with Consent: Petitioner contended that the taking was not furtive or unlawful because it was done with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner, citing Abundo v. Sandiganbayan.
• Admissibility of Acknowledgment Receipt: Petitioner asserted that the acknowledgment receipt marked as Exhibit "2" (defense) and Exhibit "C" (prosecution) should be admitted in evidence despite not being formally offered, pursuant to the exception in Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank and Mato v. CA.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Reliance on Defense Weakness: Whether the conviction was improperly based on the weakness of the defense rather than the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
• Lawful Taking and Consent: Whether the taking was done with the owner’s consent, negating the element of "without consent" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Admissibility of Documentary Evidence: Whether the acknowledgment receipt should be considered in evidence despite not having been formally offered.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The conviction was affirmed. Medina’s judicial admission that he took the parts shifted the burden of evidence to him to prove that the taking was lawful. The prosecution’s positive and categorical testimonies of Beltran and Lim, combined with Medina’s failure to substantiate his claims, constituted sufficient proof of guilt.
• Reliance on Defense Weakness: The conviction was not based on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and Medina’s own admissions regarding the taking of the parts.
• Lawful Taking and Consent: The taking was without the owner’s consent. Abundo v. Sandiganbayan was distinguished because Medina failed to prove: (1) that Lim owned the alleged pick-up; (2) that the missing parts were actually installed in that vehicle; (3) that Lim consented to the transfer; and (4) that Mendoza witnessed the removal and placement. No documentary evidence or corroborative testimony supported these claims.
• Admissibility of Documentary Evidence: Even assuming the acknowledgment receipt was admissible under the relaxed rule in Mato v. CA (requiring identification by testimony and incorporation in the records), it would not exonerate Medina. Medina admitted that the signatories Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see the removal and transfer of the parts, and Mendoza was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm the claim. The receipt was thus insufficient to overcome the prosecution’s evidence.

• Elements of Theft: The crime of theft requires: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) intent to gain; (4) taking without the owner’s consent; and (5) absence of violence, intimidation, or force upon things.
• Intent to Gain (Animus Lucrandi): Intent to gain is an internal act presumed from the unlawful taking of the thing subject of asportation. Although proof of motive is essential when evidence is circumstantial, intent to gain is the usual motive presumed from all furtive taking of useful property belonging to another.
• Taking without Asportation: "Taking" in theft does not require asportation or carrying away. It includes any act intended to transfer possession, which may be committed through the offender’s own hands or any mechanical device.
• Shifting Burden of Evidence: When an accused admits taking personal property but alleges lawful justification (such as transfer to another vehicle with consent), the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove such justification by clear and convincing evidence.
• Admissibility of Evidence Not Formally Offered: Under Mato v. CA, evidence not formally offered may be admitted if: (1) it was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) it was incorporated in the records of the case.
• Denial as Defense: Denial is inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted. It cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings: Factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless totally bereft of support in the records or so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.

• "Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent."
• "Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation."
• "The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of 'asportation,' which is defined as 'carrying away.'"
• "With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken."
• "A thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious."
• "Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with caution because it is inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted."

• Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97880, January 15, 1992 — Distinguished; held that theft implies invasion of possession, and there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parts with possession through written request and memorandum receipt.
• Mato v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 344 (1995) — Followed; established the two-pronged test for admitting evidence not formally offered: (1) identification by testimony duly recorded; and (2) incorporation in the records of the case.
• Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48700, July 2, 1990 — Followed; factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Supreme Court in the absence of serious abuse of discretion.

• Article 308, Revised Penal Code — Defines theft.
• Article 309(1), Revised Penal Code — Penalizes simple theft with prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods if the value exceeds ₱12,000 but does not exceed ₱22,000; if the value exceeds ₱22,000, the penalty is the maximum period of the prescribed penalty plus one year for each additional ₱10,000.
• Article 65, Revised Penal Code — Mandates division into three equal portions of the time included in the penalty when the penalty prescribed contains only two periods.
• Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Requires formal offer of evidence for the court to consider it.

Mariano C. Del Castillo, Lucas P. Bersamin, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Francis H. Jardeleza