Medina vs. Orozco, Jr.

Detention under a valid information and order of commitment is a separate and distinct concept from arbitrary detention anterior thereto; the illegality of the initial arrest does not entitle the accused to discharge on habeas corpus once a valid information for a capital offense has been filed and his commitment ordered by the court. Accordingly, the 18-hour period fixed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delivering an arrested person to the judicial authorities is not transgressed where the arrest falls on a Sunday and two official holidays and the accused is brought to court on the first office day thereafter.

Petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was detained in the Caloocan City jail in the custody of respondent Marcelo F. Orozco, Jr., the Acting City Warden of Caloocan City, on a charge of murder for the death of Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 17, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, fixes the period within which an arresting officer must deliver a person arrested without a warrant to the proper judicial authorities, and the legality of petitioner's continued custody under that provision supplied the statutory backdrop to the habeas corpus petition. The case thus called for the reconciliation of the statutory duty to deliver an arrested person promptly to the courts with the authority of a trial court to hold an accused for a capital offense upon a valid information.

At about noon on November 7, 1965, Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail, allegedly as one of those responsible for the death of Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa, which had occurred on October 31, 1965 in that city. Earlier that same day, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the case against Medina and two others for Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a preliminary investigation in petitioner's presence.

At about 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965, an information for murder was filed against petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul, together with Antonio Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez y Raginio, in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of that court. By court order, the three accused were promptly committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused stood trial, which had not yet terminated. On November 12, 1965, petitioner moved the office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case, and that reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965.

The proceedings thereafter were marked by successive postponements at the instance of the defense. The arraignment of petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965, thence to February 28, 1966, and then to March 14, 1966, all on petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. On April 14, 1966, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. The hearing scheduled for July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6, 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of petitioner's counsel. Finally, on motion of petitioner's counsel, the hearing on September 6, 1966 was recalendared for December 6, 1966.

From his confinement, petitioner sought release by habeas corpus. He claimed that he had been arbitrarily detained in violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, more than 75 hours having elapsed from his arrest at 12:00 o'clock noon on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965 when the information for murder was actually in court; that no preliminary investigation had been conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge against him was registered in court; and that he was being deprived of a speedy trial. No bail had been provided for him because he stood charged with a capital offense.

• Arbitrary Detention: Petitioner claimed a violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the arresting officer being duty-bound either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours or thereafter to release him, whereas more than 75 hours elapsed from his arrest at 12:00 o'clock noon on November 7, 1965 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965 when the information for murder was actually in court.
• Absence of Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner asserted that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge against him was registered in court.
• Speedy Trial: Petitioner raised the cry of deprivation of a speedy trial, the arraignment and hearings having been successively postponed.

• Arbitrary Detention: Whether petitioner was arbitrarily detained in violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, more than 75 hours having elapsed between his arrest and the filing of the information for murder.
• Effect of Prior Illegal Detention: Whether petitioner was entitled to discharge from custody on habeas corpus even assuming that his detention was originally arbitrary, he being held under a valid information for a capital offense and an order of commitment.
• Preliminary Investigation: Whether the absence of a preliminary investigation before the filing of the information invalidated the criminal charge and warranted petitioner's release.
• Proper Forum: Whether the Supreme Court was the proper forum in which to ventilate the absence of a preliminary investigation.
• Speedy Trial: Whether petitioner was denied his right to a speedy trial.

• Arbitrary Detention: No. The intervening days — November 7 being a Sunday and November 8 and 9 official holidays — sufficiently explain the lapse, and petitioner was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.
• Effect of Prior Illegal Detention: No. Detention under a valid information is one thing; arbitrary detention anterior thereto is another, and the latter does not affect the former.
• Preliminary Investigation: No. The claim rests on a bare averment contradicted by petitioner's own motion for reinvestigation, and the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties sustains the fiscal's conduct of the investigation.
• Proper Forum: No. Absence of preliminary investigation goes not to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings; it is a matter for the Court of First Instance, not the Supreme Court.
• Speedy Trial: No. The postponements were all sought by the accused's own counsel, and delay of the accused's own making cannot be oppressive to him.

• Arbitrary Detention: The arresting officer's duty under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 17, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, was either to deliver petitioner to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours or thereafter to release him; from his arrest at 12:00 o'clock noon on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10, over 75 hours had elapsed. Stock was nevertheless taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday, November 8 was declared an official holiday, and November 9, election day, was also an official holiday. During those three no-office days it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information, search for the judge to act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case, and prepare the order of commitment; the difficulty of locating those officers and employees compounded the fiscal's task. These considerations were sufficient to deter a declaration that Medina was arbitrarily detained, for he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.

• Effect of Prior Illegal Detention: Even on the assumption that the detention was originally arbitrary, discharge from custody could not by then be justified. Petitioner was at present jailed because of the court's order of commitment of November 10, 1965 upon a murder indictment, and no bail was provided for him because he was charged with a capital offense. Such detention remained unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention, because detention under a valid information is one thing and arbitrary detention anterior thereto another; they are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception the detention was wrong was no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge of murder had been clamped upon him and his detention ordered by the court — the first is illegal, but the second is not. The petition for habeas corpus therefore came too late.

• Preliminary Investigation: Petitioner's claim that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge was registered in court rested on nothing more than the averment in the petition. Against it stood the assertion that the investigation was made on the very day of petitioner's arrest and in his presence, confirmed by the fact that on November 12, 1965 he moved the office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case, which reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965, after which the case proceeded to trial. With the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties under Section 5(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the question of lack of preliminary investigation was well nailed down.

• Proper Forum: The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not the Supreme Court. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings; it could even be waived, and indeed is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate court.

• Speedy Trial: The arraignment of petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965, thence to February 28, 1966, and to March 14, 1966, all on petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. On April 14, 1966, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. The hearing scheduled for July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6, 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of petitioner's counsel, and on motion of petitioner's counsel the September 6, 1966 hearing was recalendared for December 6, 1966. In that factual environment, no denial of the right to speedy trial was seen; delay of the accused's own making cannot be oppressive to him.

• Arbitrary detention under Article 125, Revised Penal Code — The arresting officer must deliver a person arrested without a warrant to the proper judicial authorities within the periods fixed by Article 125 — 18 hours for offenses punishable by death or afflictive penalties, as implemented by Section 17, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court — failing which the person must be released. In this case, the 75-hour interval between arrest and the filing of the information was excused because the intervening days were a Sunday and two official holidays and the accused was brought to court on the first office day following arrest; the detention was therefore not arbitrary.

• Detention under a valid information as distinct from arbitrary detention anterior thereto — A detention that begins illegally does not taint a subsequent detention ordered by the court upon a valid information. The two are separate concepts: the first is illegal, the second is not. Consequently, the illegality of the inception of custody is not a ground for release once the accused is held under a valid information for a capital offense and a lawful order of commitment, and a petition for habeas corpus filed at that stage comes too late.

• Preliminary investigation as a matter of procedural regularity, not jurisdiction — The absence of a preliminary investigation does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the criminal case; it affects only the regularity of the proceedings. The defect may be waived, and is frequently waived, and the question is properly raised before the Court of First Instance rather than an appellate court.

• Waiver of the right to speedy trial — The right to a speedy trial may be waived by not objecting to postponements or other delays of trial, and the waiver is even clearer when the accused himself or his counsel asks for the postponements. The accused is entitled to remedial action only when the delays are due to the prosecution; delay of the accused's own making cannot be oppressive to him.

• Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties — Under Section 5(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed. The presumption defeated petitioner's bare averment that no preliminary investigation had been conducted, particularly since he himself moved for a reinvestigation and one was in fact held.

• "But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday." — This passage supplies the factual basis for excusing the 75-hour interval between arrest and the filing of the information, and is the point at which the Article 125 claim of arbitrary detention fails.
• "Because, detention under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto another. They are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception detention was wrong is no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not." — This is the ratio decidendi of the decision on the habeas corpus claim, distinguishing the validity of custody under a court-ordered commitment from the legality of the initial arrest.
• "Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived." — This states the canonical rule on the effect of a defective or absent preliminary investigation and identifies the waiver doctrine that accompanies it.
• "Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him." — This is the controlling formulation on the right to a speedy trial, grounding the denial of relief in the fact that the postponements were procured by the defense.

• U.S. vs. Vicentillo, 19 Phil. 118, 119 — Cited, together with Sayo vs. Chief of Police, in support of the conclusion that petitioner's detention was not arbitrary.
• Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 870 — Cited with U.S. vs. Vicentillo on the same point concerning the lawfulness of the detention.
• People vs. Mabong, 100 Phil. 1069, 1070-1072 — Cited for the proposition that detention under a valid information is unaffected by an alleged previous arbitrary detention; the decision in turn cites Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995.
• Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050, 1051-1052 — Cited in support of the ruling that the petition for habeas corpus came too late.
• People vs. Oliveria, 67 Phil. 427, 429-430 — Cited, with Bustos vs. Lucero, for the rule that the absence of a preliminary investigation may be waived and that the objection is addressed to the regularity of the proceedings.
• Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640, 644 — Cited with People vs. Oliveria on the waivability of the preliminary investigation requirement.
• People vs. Conde, G.R. No. L-6358, May 25, 1955 — Distinguished in the footnote on speedy trial, the delays in the present case being attributable to the defense.
• Velasquez vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 983, 985 (1947) — Distinguished on the same point, the delay there being due to the destruction of records and the petitioner's failure to move for reconstitution.
• Manabat vs. Provincial Warden, G.R. No. L-6483, November 27, 1953 — Cited in the footnote on waiver of the right to speedy trial, the postponements there having been requested by the defense.
• Rebotoc vs. Benitez, 71 Phil. 408, 413-414 (1941) — Cited in the same footnote on the waiver of the right to a speedy trial.

• Article 125, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the period within which an arresting officer must deliver a person arrested without a warrant to the proper judicial authorities, here 18 hours for the capital offense of murder, or thereafter release him. The provision anchored petitioner's arbitrary detention claim; the Court held it was not violated because the intervening days were a Sunday and two official holidays and petitioner was brought to court on the first office day following arrest.
• Section 17, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Cited in relation to Article 125 as the procedural implementation of the arresting officer's duty to deliver the arrested person to the judicial authorities within the prescribed period.
• Section 5(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Supplies the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The presumption defeated petitioner's bare claim that no preliminary investigation had been conducted, especially as he himself sought and obtained a reinvestigation.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ., concurred. Barrera, J., took no part.