Medina vs. Lozada

An order of dismissal of a complaint is a final order subject to appeal under Rule 41, and certiorari under Rule 65 cannot serve as a substitute for a lost appeal, the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.

Petitioners are heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Clemente Dalandan, who during his lifetime owned several parcels of land including salt beds ("banigan" or "irasan") located at Balite, Ilaya, Las Piñas City. Respondents Spouses Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 0-78 covering 31,535 square meters of land in the same locality, pursuant to a Decision dated February 23, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 134 in LRC No. M-24, which confirmed respondent Nicomedes Lozada's title. Petitioners claim entitlement to a 10,929-square-meter portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 005-37120 in Clemente's name.

Petitioners Editha S. Medina, Raymond A. Dalandan, and Clemente A. Dalandan are heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Clemente Dalandan, who during his lifetime owned several parcels of land including salt beds known as "banigan" or "irasan" located at Balite, Ilaya, Las Piñas City. Upon Clemente's death, the property passed to his children Emiliano and Maria Dalandan, and thereafter to their respective heirs, including the petitioners. The petitioners claim entitlement to a 10,929-square-meter portion covered by Tax Declaration No. 005-37120 in Clemente's name.

On July 10, 1997, respondents Spouses Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 0-78 covering 31,535 square meters of land in the same locality, issued pursuant to a Decision dated February 23, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 134 in LRC No. M-24, which confirmed Nicomedes Lozada's title. The issuance of OCT 0-78 resulted in the cancellation of Clemente's tax declaration over the property.

On January 11, 2001, the heirs of Clemente Dalandan filed a complaint against Spouses Lozada for quieting of title and reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-0010. However, due to the plaintiffs' non-appearance during the pre-trial conference on January 29, 2004, the case was dismissed. The dismissal was appealed to the CA and ultimately to the Supreme Court, both of which affirmed the lower court's dismissal.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a second complaint for quieting of title, reconveyance with damages with lis pendens, docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0041, praying that they be declared the only ones entitled to the 10,929-square-meter lot and for reconveyance of the excess of two hectares covered by OCT 0-78 corresponding to their claimed property. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, plaintiffs had no cause of action, the court lacked jurisdiction, the parties were guilty of forum shopping, and the action had prescribed. On July 27, 2007, the RTC issued an order dismissing the case on the ground of res judicata, finding that the four requisites were satisfied by the 1989 LRC decision. The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on December 28, 2007. Instead of appealing the dismissal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on April 8, 2008, after receiving the denial of their motion for reconsideration on February 7, 2008.

• Nature of the RTC Orders: Petitioners argued that the RTC Orders dated July 27, 2007 and December 28, 2007 were mere interlocutory orders and not final orders, because their action was not adjudged on its merits and an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioners maintained that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to assail the RTC orders, implying that appeal was unavailable or inadequate.

• Finality of the Dismissal Order: Respondents argued that an order granting a motion to dismiss is a final order, being an adjudication on the merits, so that the proper remedy is appeal; and the order becomes final 15 days from receipt thereof with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once it achieves finality.
• Certiorari as Improper Remedy: Respondents countered that certiorari proceedings cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, given that the proper remedy was appeal under Rule 41.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. The CA committed no reversible error. An order of dismissal of a complaint is a final order subject to appeal under Rule 41, and certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailable where appeal is an available plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

• Propriety of Certiorari: An order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, leaving nothing more to be done by the lower court. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order because it terminates the proceedings; it is not interlocutory. The remedy of the aggrieved party is therefore appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Certiorari is a remedy of last resort and will not prosper where appeal is available, even if the ground for certiorari is grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the RTC orders dismissing Civil Case No. 07-0041 on the ground of res judicata and denying the motion for reconsideration were final orders completely disposing of the case. Appeal under Rule 41 was the correct remedy. Petitioners received the December 28, 2007 order on February 7, 2008, but filed their certiorari petition only on April 8, 2008—by which time the reglementary period to appeal had already lapsed. In fact, the certiorari petition was filed a day late even under the 60-day period for Rule 65 petitions, considering that 2008 was a leap year. Having adopted an improper remedy, petitioners could not use certiorari as a substitute for a lost appeal.

• Finality of Orders of Dismissal — An order of dismissal of a complaint, whether correct or not, is a final order because it terminates the proceedings and leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. As a final order, it is subject to appeal under Rule 41, not to certiorari under Rule 65. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the RTC's dismissal of Civil Case No. 07-0041 on the ground of res judicata was a final order, making appeal the proper remedy.

• Mutual Exclusivity of Appeal and Certiorari — The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Certiorari is a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse; it will not prosper where appeal is available, even if the ground for certiorari is grave abuse of discretion. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm the CA's dismissal of the certiorari petition, as petitioners had an available remedy of appeal but failed to avail of it within the reglementary period.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal — The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss. When a party adopts an improper remedy, the petition may be dismissed outright.

• "An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore, the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: that a dismissal order is final and appealable, not interlocutory, and thus certiorari is unavailable.

• "Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the mutual exclusivity doctrine, frequently cited in subsequent remedial law jurisprudence.

• "The instant Petition for Certiorari cannot be used by petitioners as a substitute for a lost appeal. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, the petition may be dismissed outright." — This passage applies the doctrine that certiorari cannot substitute for appeal, directly supporting the dispositive outcome.

• Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479 Phil. 768 (2004) — Followed for the propositions that a final order is one that finally disposes of a pending action leaving nothing more to be done in the lower court, that an order of dismissal is a final order, and that certiorari is unavailable where appeal exists.
• Young vs. Spouses Sy, 534 Phil. 246 (2006) — Followed for the proposition that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.
• Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 620 (2006) — Followed for the reminder that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.
• Balayan vs. Acorda, 523 Phil. 305 (2006) — Followed for the proposition that certiorari will not prosper where appeal is available, even if the ground is grave abuse of discretion.
• Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 484 Phil. 438 (2004) — Followed for the rule that when a party adopts an improper remedy, the petition may be dismissed outright.
• Congressional Commercial Corporation vs. CA, 230 Phil. 188 (1986) — Cited by respondents for the proposition that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

• Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Mandates that appeal is the remedy with respect to a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. Applied to hold that the RTC's order of dismissal was appealable.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to hold that certiorari was unavailable because appeal was the proper remedy.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Sets the period for filing a certiorari petition at not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution. Applied to note that the petition was filed a day late, considering 2008 was a leap year.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred.