Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Industrial Relations

The Court of Industrial Relations has broad discretion in determining appropriate bargaining units, and its decision to order a plebiscite to ascertain the employees' desire to form a separate bargaining unit is not an abuse of discretion where the employees share a community of interest, work under the same conditions, and possess skills distinct from other workers in the same department.

The Philippine National Railways (PNR), formerly the Manila Railroad Company, employed workers in its Mechanical Department, which was composed of four main divisions: Operations, Manila Area and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car Crew; and Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance. The Mechanical Department Labor Union had been previously certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the department's workers and had negotiated collective bargaining agreements in 1961 and 1963. The Caloocan Shops, part of the Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance Division, employed approximately 360 workers who sought to separate from the existing bargaining unit and be represented by a new union, the Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops.

The Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops filed a petition on February 13, 1965, calling attention to the existence of three unions in the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the Samahan, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company, and the Mechanical Department Labor Union. The petition noted that no certification election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan shops and that both the Samahan and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted different labor demands upon management, for which reason a certification election was needed to determine the proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers.

The petition was opposed by the management and by the Mechanical Department Labor Union, which averred that it had been previously certified in two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of the PNR's mechanical department and had negotiated two bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963. The union further argued that a renewal agreement had been negotiated before the expiration of the latter contract and remained to be signed; that the Samahan had been organized only on January 21, 1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established nor separated from the Mechanical Department unit; that the Samahan was composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the petition was to disturb the present smooth working labor management relations.

Judge Arsenio Martinez of the CIR, after receiving the evidence, found that the petitioner union was composed of workers exclusively at the Caloocan shops charged with the maintenance of rolling stocks for repairs; that major repairs of locomotives and engines were done in the Caloocan shops while minor ones were done in the Manila sheds; that workers in the Caloocan shops did not leave their station unlike Manila shop workers who went out along the routes and lines for repairs; that workers in both locations were exposed to hazards occasioned by the nature of their work; that the Job Classification and Evaluation Plan applied to all workers; and that administration over employees was under the Administrative Division of the company. The CIR also found that the Caloocan Shops, all located in Caloocan City, had 360 workers more or less and were part and parcel of the whole Mechanical Department, which was composed of four main divisions: Operations, Manila Area and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car Crew; and Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance.

The CIR reviewed the collective bargaining history of the railway company, noting that originally there was only one bargaining unit represented by the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa MRR, and that over time, the Court had ordered the establishment of additional units through plebiscites conducted for separation from existing bargaining units. Relying on the Globe doctrine from Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294, as applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Judge Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan Shops should be given a chance to vote on whether their group should be separated from that represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union, and ordered a plebiscite held for the purpose. The ruling was sustained by the CIR en banc, whereupon the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to the Supreme Court.

• Inapplicability of the Globe Doctrine: Petitioner argued that the application of the Globe doctrine was not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan shops do not require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company.
• Prematurity of the Appeal: Petitioner took for granted that the plebiscite would favor separation, notwithstanding the technical prematurity of the appeal since the result of the ordered plebiscite might be adverse to the formation of a separate unit.
• Supervisor Membership: Petitioner charged that some members of the respondent Samahan were actually supervisors, which should constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite.
• Collective Bargaining Agreement as Bar: Petitioner contended that the collective bargaining agreement negotiated with the employer during the pendency of the original petition should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops.

• Community of Interest: Respondent Samahan argued that the Caloocan Shops workers shared a community of interest, being grouped in one place, working under the same working conditions and schedule, and exposed to the same occupational risks.
• Distinct Nature of Work: Respondent maintained that workers at the Caloocan Shops performed major repairs of locomotives, rolling stocks, and engines using heavy equipment and machineries, while those in the Manila Shed worked on minor repairs.
• Bargaining History: Respondent pointed to the history of collective bargaining in the railway company, where bargaining units had been formed through separation of new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown the workers' desire to have their own representatives.

• Globe Doctrine Applicability: Whether the Court of Industrial Relations gravely abused its discretion in applying the Globe doctrine to order a plebiscite for the separation of the Caloocan Shops workers from the Mechanical Department bargaining unit.
• Skill Differentiation: Whether the Caloocan Shops workers require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department to warrant the creation of a separate bargaining unit.
• Supervisor Membership: Whether the presence of supervisors among the members of the respondent union constitutes a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite.
• Collective Bargaining Agreement as Bar: Whether the collective bargaining agreement negotiated during the pendency of the petition should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops.

• Globe Doctrine Applicability: No grave abuse of discretion. Republic Act No. 875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the CIR in matters concerning the representation of employee groups.
• Skill Differentiation: Yes. The Industrial Court found a basic difference in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs, requiring special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers.
• Supervisor Membership: No. The question of the status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite, and the appellant may later question whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.
• Collective Bargaining Agreement as Bar: No. The collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two years; hence, such agreements cannot constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative.

• Globe Doctrine Applicability: The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the ruling under appeal as would justify interfering with it. Republic Act No. 875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and in view of its intimate knowledge concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, the Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the CIR in matters concerning the representation of employee groups, citing Manila Paper Mills Employees & Workers' Association vs. C.I.R. and Benguet Consolidated vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Association.

• Skill Differentiation: The question of whether the workers require different skills is primarily one of facts. The Industrial Court found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs. The Court reasoned that it is easy to understand that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers.

• Supervisor Membership: As to the charge that some members of the appellee are actually supervisors, the Court noted that the question of the status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later question whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.

• Collective Bargaining Agreement as Bar: The record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two years; hence, such agreements cannot constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative, citing PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the employer during the pendency of the original petition should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops is a question that should be first passed upon by the Industrial Court.

• Globe Doctrine — The will of the employees, as expressed through a plebiscite or certification election, is a determining factor in deciding what union should represent them and whether a separate bargaining unit should be established. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the CIR's order for a plebiscite, noting that the CIR had relied on this doctrine as applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co.

• Community of Interest Test — A group of employees may constitute a separate bargaining unit where they share a community of interest, including being grouped in one place, working under the same working conditions and schedule, and being exposed to the same occupational risks. The Court found that the Caloocan Shops workers satisfied this test, particularly given their performance of major repairs using heavy equipment.

• Collective Bargaining Agreement as Bar Rule — A collective bargaining agreement that has been in existence for more than two years cannot constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative. The Court applied this rule to reject the appellant's contention that its existing agreements barred the plebiscite.

• "We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the ruling under appeal as would justify our interfering with it. Republic Act No. 875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and, in view of its intimate knowledge concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, this Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters concerning the representation of employee groups." — This passage articulates the standard of review applied by the Supreme Court to CIR decisions on bargaining unit determination, emphasizing judicial deference to the CIR's expertise.

• "The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers." — This passage states the factual basis for upholding the CIR's finding of a distinct bargaining unit, emphasizing the special skills required by Caloocan Shops workers.

• "In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative." — This passage states the rule that collective bargaining agreements existing for more than two years do not bar certification elections for a new bargaining representative.

• Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294 — Controlling precedent establishing the doctrine that the will of employees determines what union should represent them; applied by the CIR and affirmed by the Supreme Court in this case.
• Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., L-10321, February 28, 1958 — Philippine precedent applying the Globe doctrine; relied upon by the CIR in ordering the plebiscite.
• Manila Paper Mills Employees & Workers' Association vs. C.I.R., 104 Phil. 10 — Cited to support the principle that the Supreme Court upholds the exercise of discretion of the CIR in matters concerning representation of employee groups.
• Benguet Consolidated vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Association, 103 Phil. 1150 — Cited to support the same principle of deference to CIR discretion in representation matters.
• PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519 — Cited for the rule that collective bargaining agreements in existence for more than two years cannot bar the determination of a new bargaining representative by proper elections.

• Republic Act No. 875 — The Industrial Peace Act, which entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations; applied to affirm the CIR's broad discretion in matters concerning the representation of employee groups.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concurred.