McGee vs. Republic of the Philippines

A stepfather who already has a legitimate child may not adopt his stepchild under Article 335, paragraph 1, of the New Civil Code, notwithstanding the permission in Article 338, paragraph 3, which is confined to stepfathers and stepmothers who have no children of their own.

Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen, was married to a woman by whom he had one legitimate child. His wife had two minor children, Maria and Amada Magpayo, by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo, who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation. McGee thus stood as stepfather to Maria and Amada. The governing statutory framework was the New Civil Code, whose Article 335, paragraph 1, disqualified persons with legitimate children from adopting, while Article 338, paragraph 3, allowed a stepchild to be adopted by a stepfather or stepmother.

Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen, was married to a woman by whom he had one legitimate child. His wife had two minor children, Maria Lualhati Magpayo and Amada Magpayo, both surnamed Magpayo, by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo, who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation. McGee therefore stood as stepfather to Maria and Amada.

McGee filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor stepchildren. At the hearing, the Government filed its opposition to the petition on the ground that petitioner had a legitimate child and was consequently disqualified to adopt under Article 335, paragraph 1, of the New Civil Code.

The trial court granted the petition for adoption. The Government appealed from that decision. The text does not recite any disputed factual findings; the controversy centered on whether McGee’s legitimate child disqualified him from adopting his stepchildren despite Article 338, paragraph 3.

• Surplusage and Contradiction: Petitioner-appellee argued that holding a stepfather with a legitimate child unable to adopt a stepchild would render Article 338, paragraph 3, meaningless and a surplusage, because without that provision a husband without a legitimate child may adopt a stepchild anyway; worse, Article 338 would contradict Article 335.
• Exception to an Exception: Petitioner-appellee contended that Article 335’s prohibition on adoption by a parent who already has a child should not be considered exclusively but in relation to Article 338, so that the latter is regarded as an exception to an exception.

• Disqualification under Article 335: The Government, as oppositor-appellant, opposed the petition on the ground that petitioner had a legitimate child and was consequently disqualified to adopt under Article 335, paragraph 1, of the New Civil Code. It appealed from the decision granting the adoption.

• Adoption by a Stepfather with a Legitimate Child: Whether a stepfather who already has a legitimate child may adopt his stepchild under Article 338, paragraph 3, of the New Civil Code notwithstanding the prohibition in Article 335, paragraph 1.
• Construction of Articles 335 and 338: Whether Article 338, paragraph 3, is rendered meaningless or contradictory by Article 335, paragraph 1, or should instead be construed as confined to stepfathers and stepmothers who have no children of their own.

• Adoption by a Stepfather with a Legitimate Child: No. A stepfather who already has a legitimate child may not adopt a stepchild under Article 335, paragraph 1, of the New Civil Code, notwithstanding Article 338, paragraph 3, which is confined to stepfathers and stepmothers who have no children of their own.
• Construction of Articles 335 and 338: Article 338, paragraph 3, is not surplusage or contradictory. It is an express authorization for stepchild adoption but remains subordinate to the mandatory negative prohibition in Article 335, paragraph 1.

• Adoption by a Stepfather with a Legitimate Child: The Court began from its recent ruling in Ball vs. Republic, decided December 21, 1953, which held that a husband with a legitimate child may not adopt a stepchild because Article 335’s negative provisions confine Article 338’s permission to stepfathers and stepmothers with no children of their own. Article 335 states that certain persons “cannot adopt,” including those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction. Article 338 states that a stepchild “may be adopted” by the stepfather or stepmother. Because Article 335 is phrased negatively and Article 338 affirmatively, negative words are mandatory while affirmative words are directory. The prohibition therefore controls. The principal reason behind Article 335, paragraph 1, is that adoption would create conflicts within the family and materially affect or diminish the successional rights of the child already had. Although this objection may be less formidable when the adopting parent’s child is by the same spouse whose child is adopted, the law does not limit the disqualification to that situation; a stepfather or stepmother may have a child by a previous marriage, in which case the legitimate child and adopted child would be complete strangers with no family ties to soften resentment. Thus, McGee’s legitimate child disqualified him.
• Construction of Articles 335 and 338: The argument that Article 338, paragraph 3, would be meaningless surplusage without allowing a stepfather with a legitimate child to adopt was rejected. The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed before; where a parent-child relationship already exists by blood or by affinity, as with illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to superimpose another relationship through adoption. An express authorization like Article 338 is therefore necessary, if not to make the adoption proper and legal, at least to remove all doubt. The old Code of Civil Procedure similarly contained a general authorization in section 765 and a specific provision in section 766 for adoption of a stepchild by a stepfather, showing that such specific authorization was not surplusage. American jurisprudence also recognizes that a person may not adopt his own relative because it is unnecessary to establish a relationship already existing, and some states have special laws authorizing adoption of relatives. Another reason for the express authorization is to remove doubt about the propriety and advisability of stepchild adoption due to possible pressure by the legitimate and natural parent. Article 338 is thus not an exception to Article 335; it is confined to stepfathers and stepmothers who have no children of their own.

• Adoption by a Stepfather or Stepmother with a Legitimate Child — Under Article 335, paragraph 1, of the New Civil Code, a person who has legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction cannot adopt. The permission in Article 338, paragraph 3, allowing a stepchild to be adopted by a stepfather or stepmother is confined to those who have no children of their own. Applied: McGee’s legitimate child disqualified him from adopting Maria and Amada.
• Negative and Affirmative Statutory Language — Negative words and phrases are mandatory; affirmative words are directory. Article 335’s “cannot adopt” is mandatory and prevails over Article 338’s “may be adopted.” Applied to subordinate Article 338 to Article 335.
• Philosophy of Adoption — Adoption exists to establish paternity and filiation where none existed before. Where the parent-child relationship already exists by blood or by affinity, as with illegitimate or stepchildren, adoption is unnecessary and superfluous, and an express legal authorization is needed only to remove doubt. Applied to reject the surplusage argument.
• Successional Rights and Family Harmony — The principal reason for disqualifying persons with children from adopting is that adoption creates family conflicts and diminishes the successional rights of the existing child. Applied to uphold the disqualification even for stepchild adoption.

• "In conclusion, we hold that pursuant to the provisions of article 335, paragraph 1, a step-father who already has a child may not adopt a step-child regardless of the provisions of article 338, paragraph 3 of the same Code, the latter provisions being confined and applicable to those step-fathers and step-mothers who have no children of their own." — This is the Court’s ratio decidendi, stating the controlling rule that Article 335, paragraph 1, prevails over Article 338, paragraph 3.
• "The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through adoption." — This passage defines the philosophy of adoption and explains why Article 338 is not a meaningless surplusage.
• "Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory." — This is the statutory-construction principle the Court used to make the negative prohibition in Article 335 control over the affirmative permission in Article 338.
• "The principal reason behind article 335, paragraph 1 denying adoption to those who already have children is that adoption would not only create conflicts within the family but it would also materially affect or diminish the successional rights of the child already had." — This states the policy rationale behind the disqualification and supports the denial of the adoption.

• Ball vs. Republic of the Philippines — In re application of Norman H. Ball to adopt the minor George William York, Jr., Norman H. Ball vs. Republic of the Philippines, supra, p. 106. Decided December 21, 1953. The Court relied on this recent similar case, which applied Article 335 and held that although Article 338 permits adoption of a stepchild by a stepfather or stepmother, the permission is confined to those without children of their own. It was the controlling precedent for the present appeal.

• Article 335, paragraph 1, New Civil Code — “The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction.” Applied to disqualify McGee because he had a legitimate child.
• Article 338, paragraph 3, New Civil Code — “The following may be adopted: x x x (3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.” Applied but construed as confined to stepfathers and stepmothers without children of their own, subordinate to Article 335.
• Sections 765 and 766, old Code of Civil Procedure — Section 765 generally authorized inhabitants of the Philippines to adopt a minor child; Section 766 specifically authorized a stepfather to adopt a stepchild. Cited to show that an express provision for stepchild adoption was not surplusage and to support the construction of Article 338.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.