Matute vs. Court of Appeals

In a contest for the administration of an estate, the jurisdictional amount is the total value of the entire estate, not merely the value of the particular property or portion subject to a co-administrator's separate administration; and a probate court's removal of an administrator on grounds discovered motu proprio, without affording the administrator the full benefit of a day in court, constitutes a denial of due process rendering the removal order void.

The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, valued at over P2,000,000 and comprising five haciendas in Governor Generoso, Davao, among other properties, had been in settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) before the Court of First Instance of Manila since 1955. Fifteen heirs—including Jose S. Matute, Matias S. Matute, Carlos S. Matute, and Carlos V. Matute—were locked in intra-fraternal strife that delayed the estate's settlement for more than a decade. Matias was appointed co-administrator by a fixed, final, and executory order dated May 29, 1963, while Carlos V. Matute served as general administrator. In a prior proceeding, CA-G.R. 35124-R, the Court of Appeals had already refused to take jurisdiction over a certiorari petition contesting Matias's appointment, ruling that the estate's value exceeded P200,000.

The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, comprising five haciendas in Governor Generoso, Davao, among other properties and valued at over P2,000,000, had been in settlement proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) since 1955. Fifteen heirs inherited the estate, including Jose S. Matute, Matias S. Matute, Carlos S. Matute, and Carlos V. Matute. Matias was appointed co-administrator by a fixed, final, and executory order dated May 29, 1963, while Carlos V. Matute served as general administrator. During his incumbency, Matias leased the five haciendas—La Union, Sigaboy, Monserrat, Colatinan, and Pundaguitan—to Mariano Nasser on February 10, 1965 for P5,000 a month.

On August 20, 1965, Carlos S. Matute filed a petition in the probate court seeking Matias's removal as co-administrator, alleging that Matias had neglected to render a true and complete account for over two years and was incompetent due to a pending murder charge occupying his time. Matias opposed, contending that he had submitted accounts for 1963 and 1964, that his competence had been established by the final order of appointment, and that the criminal charge was trumped up and had not consumed his time. On September 21, 1965, the Candelario-Matute heirs moved for the immediate appointment of Agustina Matute Candelario, Carlos S. Matute, and Jose S. Matute as joint co-administrators in place of Matias, citing additional grounds including failure to pay real property taxes, improperly authenticated financial statements, unauthorized disbursements, and failure to file inventories. During the reception of evidence on December 29, 1965, the movants submitted exhibits which Matias objected to as hearsay, self-serving, and unauthenticated photostatic copies. On January 12, 1966, Matias filed with leave of court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence," expressly reserving the right to present his own evidence should the motion be denied.

Instead of resolving the demurrer, the probate judge issued an order on January 31, 1966 removing Matias as co-administrator and appointing Jose S. Matute in his place, requiring Jose to post a P15,000 bond. The removal was based not on the evidence adduced by the movants—no exhibit was specifically cited—but on the probate judge's own findings drawn from the records of Sp. Proc. No. 25876: the disapproval of Matias's 1964 account for his failure to appear at a hearing, a considerable decrease in income of the properties under his charge, the failure to report calves born during the accounting period, unauthorized disbursements of over one million pesos in advances to heirs, and non-payment of estate taxes. Matias was not afforded an opportunity to controvert any of these findings. Two days before the removal order, Matias had moved for reconsideration of the January 5, 1966 order disapproving his 1964 account, citing illness as the reason for his non-appearance; on February 19, 1966, the same probate judge set aside that disapproval order.

Armed with letters of co-administration issued on February 3, 1966, Jose attempted to take possession of the five haciendas previously under Matias's separate administration. Nasser, who was in actual possession under the lease from Matias, opposed the takeover and filed civil case 4968 in the Court of First Instance of Davao on February 15, 1966, alleging that Jose was forcibly wresting possession with hired goons. The court issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction on February 16, 1966. Jose moved to dismiss on February 23, 1966, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over properties in custodia legis under the probate court of Manila and that the lease was simulated and unapproved. The motion was denied on March 31, 1966, but Jose's counsel did not receive notice until April 25, 1966 due to a mailing delay admitted by the clerk of court. Nevertheless, Jose was declared in default on April 16, 1966—before he received notice of the denial—and a judgment by default was rendered on April 23, 1966, permanently enjoining Jose from interfering with Nasser's possession and ordering him to pay P50,000 in attorney's fees, P2,400 monthly for security guard salaries, P7,000 for expenses, and P700 for injunction bond premiums. An order of execution issued on May 3, 1966.

Separately, on February 5, 1966, Matias had filed civil case 4252 in the Court of First Instance of Davao on behalf of the estate, seeking annulment of a compromise agreement dated November 26, 1962 between former co-administrator Julian V. Matute and Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, the compromise judgment of December 5, 1962, and subsequent deeds of conveyance transferring estate properties to Canlas, Daniel Rivera Sr., Pablo del Rosario, and Nicanor Vergara. Matias alleged the compromise was entered in fraud of the estate, without authority of the general administrator, without notice to heirs, and without probate court approval. Canlas moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, citing the compromise judgment and the July 13, 1963 order denying a petition for relief from judgment filed by two heirs. Jose and Luis Matute intervened on August 17, 1964, adopting the estate's complaint. After the case was reshuffled to Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, he dismissed the complaint with prejudice on February 15, 1966 on the ground of res judicata. On March 29, 1966, the same judge declared the intervenors in default for failure to answer Canlas's counterclaim for P100,000 in damages and rendered judgment by default against them, despite Matias having filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 1, 1965. A writ of execution issued on April 12, 1966.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (L-26751): Petitioner Jose S. Matute argued that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain CA-G.R. 37039-R or issue writs of certiorari and preliminary injunction therein, because the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave was worth more than P200,000. He further contended that the CA had already ruled in CA-G.R. 35124-R that it lacked jurisdiction over the estate, the value of which was placed at P2,132,282.72 per a compromise agreement signed by all heirs.
• Validity of the Removal Order (L-26751): Petitioner maintained that the probate judge accorded Matias all opportunity to adduce evidence but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics by filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence; that the evidence presented was incontrovertible documentary evidence from the records of Sp. Proc. No. 25876; and that the evidence on record conclusively supported the probate judge's findings.
• Jurisdiction over the Haciendas (L-26085): Petitioner contended that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction over the subject haciendas because they were properties in custodia legis under the probate court of Manila in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, and that the alleged contract of lease was simulated, fictitious, and never approved by the probate court.
• Nullity of the Default (L-26085): Petitioner asserted it was legally impossible to declare him in default on April 16, 1966 for failure to file a responsive pleading, because he received notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss only on April 25, 1966.
• Void Dismissal Order (L-26106): Petitioners Jose and Luis Matute contended that the order of February 15, 1966 dismissing civil case 4252 was a nullity because it was predicated on a void motion to withdraw filed by Matias, who had already been removed as co-administrator and thus lacked authority to represent the estate.
• Nullity of Default Against Intervenors (L-26106): Petitioner Jose S. Matute claimed the respondent Judge failed to consider that Matias filed a timely answer to Canlas's counterclaim on March 1, 1965, which inured to the benefit of the intervenors who were jointly charged in the same counterclaim.

• Jurisdiction Based on Rental Value (L-26751): Respondent Matias S. Matute maintained that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R because the subject matter was merely the right to collect P5,000 monthly rentals pursuant to the lease contract he executed with Nasser covering the five haciendas under his separate administration, and that this sum—not the total estate value—should be the jurisdictional basis.
• Due Process Violation in Removal (L-26751): Respondent contended the removal order was a patent nullity because he was removed without due process, the evidence adduced by the movants was insufficient, and he was removed on grounds discovered motu proprio by the probate judge without opportunity to rebut.
• Proper Remedy is Appeal (L-26085): Respondent Nasser argued that the proper remedy for a defendant declared in default was an ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3, not a petition for certiorari.
• Failure to Move for Reconsideration (L-26085): Respondent contended the petition should be denied for failure of the defendant-petitioner to move for reconsideration of the challenged orders so as to afford the court a quo the chance to amend its errors.
• Failure to Personally Answer Counterclaim (L-26106): Respondent Canlas contended that the intervenors' failure to personally answer his counterclaim was fatal and that they could not take refuge under the answer filed by Matias Matute.

• Jurisdictional Amount: Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R, a certiorari petition contesting the removal of a co-administrator and the appointment of a replacement, given that the estate's total value exceeded P200,000 but the respondent claimed the controversy involved only P5,000 in monthly rentals.
• Due Process in Removal: Whether the probate court's order removing Matias as co-administrator was valid, given that he was removed on grounds discovered motu proprio by the probate judge without being afforded an opportunity to rebut, and that his demurrer to evidence with express reservation to present evidence was never resolved.
• Validity of Appointment: Whether the appointment of Jose as co-administrator was valid, given that no hearing was conducted on the petition for appointment and a general administrator remained in charge of the estate.
• Validity of Default (L-26085): Whether the order declaring Jose in default in civil case 4968 was valid, given that he had not yet received notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss when the default was declared.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari was the proper remedy to challenge the default judgment in civil case 4968, or whether an ordinary appeal was the exclusive remedy.
• Finality of Dismissal (L-26106): Whether the order dismissing civil case 4252 with prejudice had become final and could no longer be challenged by certiorari, given the intervenors' failure to seasonably appeal.
• Validity of Default Against Intervenors (L-26106): Whether the order declaring intervenors in default on Canlas's counterclaim was valid, given that Matias had filed an answer to the counterclaim that inured to the jointly-charged intervenors' benefit.

• Jurisdictional Amount: No. The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because in a contest over administration of an estate, the jurisdictional amount is the total value of the entire estate, which exceeded P200,000, not merely the value of the particular property under separate administration.
• Due Process in Removal: No. The removal order was void because the probate judge removed Matias on motu proprio findings without affording him a day in court, and the grounds relied upon lacked evidentiary justification—the disapproval of his 1964 account had been set aside, the account was still pending approval, and good faith was presumed.
• Validity of Appointment: No. The appointment was void because no hearing was conducted on the petition for appointment, no notices were sent to other heirs, and there was no vacancy since the general administrator remained in charge.
• Validity of Default (L-26085): No. The order of default was a patent nullity because Jose's period to answer had not commenced to run when he was declared in default on April 16, 1966, as he received notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss only on April 25, 1966.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Yes, certiorari was proper. A defendant illegally declared in default may pursue certiorari to have the order and judgment annulled as nullities, especially when execution is imminent and the deprivation of due process taints the proceedings with nullity.
• Finality of Dismissal (L-26106): Yes. The order of dismissal had become final because the intervenors failed to seasonably appeal, and certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal where the lower court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Validity of Default Against Intervenors (L-26106): No. The order of default was void because Matias's answer to the counterclaim inured to the benefit of the jointly-charged intervenors, and the dismissal of the principal complaint had terminated all proceedings, leaving nothing to adjudicate.

• Jurisdictional Amount: The Court applied the ruling in Fernandez vs. Maravilla, which held that in a contest for the administration of an estate, the amount in controversy is deemed to be the value of the whole estate, and this total value is the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount. The Court found that the record—from Carlos's initial petition to remove Matias through Matias's certiorari petition—revealed no pleading, statement, or inference supporting the claim that the controversy was merely about collecting P5,000 monthly rentals. The principal conflict gravitated over the right to co-administer the entire estate. The Court further rejected Matias's contention that a co-administrator's trust is circumscribed by the value of the particular property under his separate administration, relying on Sison vs. Teodoro for the principle that a co-administrator is no less an administrator of the whole estate, as his management of a parcel affects the value of the entire estate. Because the estate exceeded P200,000 in value, the Court of Appeals lacked both appellate jurisdiction over the principal probate proceeding and original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition in incidents thereof.

• Due Process in Removal: The Court acknowledged that removal of an administrator lies within the discretion of the appointing court under Rule 82, Section 2, and that appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere absent positive error or gross abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the removal was nullified on three grounds. First, the probate judge issued the removal order without resolving Matias's demurrer to evidence, which he had filed with leave of court and with an express reservation of the right to present evidence if denied. Under Rule 35, a defendant who files a demurrer does not waive the right to offer evidence if the motion is denied; Rule 72, Section 2 makes this rule applicable to special proceedings. The probate judge's failure to afford Matias his day in court constituted grave abuse of discretion. Second, the removal was based not on the movants' evidence but on the judge's motu proprio findings from the records—grounds never invoked by the movants—without giving Matias an opportunity to controvert them. Third, the specific findings lacked merit: the order disapproving Matias's 1964 account (a principal basis for removal) had been set aside by the same judge on February 19, 1966; the account was still pending approval, making it premature to use its alleged defects as grounds for removal; the decrease in income was not shown to result from willful negligence or dishonesty; the omission of calves born could have been an honest mistake, and good faith must be presumed; the "staggering amount" of advances to heirs in the "Compliance" could have been a cumulative list from all administrators since 1955, not Matias alone; and non-payment of taxes is not per se a compelling reason for removal absent evidence of willful omission, especially since Matias had paid real property taxes for 1954–1966.

• Validity of Appointment: The appointment of Jose was void for two independent reasons. First, since the removal of Matias was void, there was no vacancy to fill. Second, even assuming the removal was valid, no hearing was conducted on the petition for appointment, and no notices were sent to the other heirs and interested parties. The Court cited Eusebio vs. Valmores for the requirement that a hearing and notice are essential to the validity of appointment proceedings, both to satisfy due process and to determine the suitability of the applicant. The provision of Rule 83 allowing appointment of "any suitable person" when no executor or administrator remains could not justify Jose's appointment without hearing, because a general administrator (Carlos V. Matute) remained in charge of the estate.

• Validity of Default (L-26085): Under Rule 11, Section 1, the defendant has fifteen days after service of summons to file an answer. Under Rule 16, Section 4, if a motion to dismiss is denied, the period for filing a responsive pleading runs anew from receipt of notice of denial. Jose was served with summons on February 16, 1966, and filed a motion to dismiss on February 23, 1966. Although the motion was denied on March 31, 1966, Jose's counsel received notice only on April 25, 1966—a delay confirmed by the court a quo's own investigation of the clerk of court. Thus, Jose had until May 10, 1966 to file his answer. The declaration of default on April 16, 1966 was premature, as the period to answer had not even commenced to run. The Court further noted that Jose's motion to dismiss raised issues on the merits and should at least have been considered as an answer, entitling him to notice of hearing.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court distinguished between a defendant validly declared in default and one improvidently declared in default. The former is limited to the remedy of appeal under Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3, and can contest only whether the judgment is contrary to the evidence or the law. The latter retains the right to participate in the trial and may pursue certiorari to annul the void order and judgment. Jose's choice of certiorari was correct because he challenged the judgment not on evidentiary or legal grounds but on the ground that it was intrinsically void, having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order of default. Moreover, the court a quo had already ordered execution, making appeal no longer an adequate and speedy remedy, in consonance with Vda. de Saludes vs. Pajarillo and Bautista. The failure to move for reconsideration did not bar certiorari because the proceedings were a patent nullity and the deprivation of due process tainted them with nullity.

• Finality of Dismissal (L-26106): The order of dismissal was anchored on the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, not on Matias's motion to withdraw, as the dispositive portion expressly stated: "As prayed for in defendants' motion to dismiss and supplementary action to dismiss, the action filed in this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice." The intervenors failed to seasonably appeal: they received the order through counsel on March 3, 1966, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 26, 1966 (still within the appeal period), received the denial on April 16, 1966, and had until April 23, 1966 to perfect an appeal, but filed the notice of appeal and bond only on April 25, 1966 and the record on appeal on May 26, 1966—well beyond the reglementary period. The Court rejected the intervenors' claim of non-receipt, noting their failure to state their addresses as required by Rule 7, Section 5, and that their counsel of record was furnished copies. The Court also held that Judge Bullecer had the power to set aside Judge Cusi's interlocutory order deferring resolution of the motion to dismiss, as interlocutory orders are always under the control of the court and may be modified before final judgment.

• Validity of Default Against Intervenors (L-26106): The order of default was void for two reasons. First, Canlas's counterclaim raised a common cause of action for damages against Matias, Jose, and Luis Matute jointly and severally, all in their personal capacities. Having been jointly charged, they could validly file a common responsive pleading, which Matias did when he filed an answer to the counterclaim on March 1, 1965—a receipt Canlas admitted. The answer denied the charges not only against Matias but also against the intervenors. Second, after the principal complaint was dismissed on the basis of Canlas's own motion to dismiss, the entire proceeding was terminated and there was nothing more to adjudicate. The respondent Judge himself declared all other incidents terminated in his orders of March 12, 1966 and April 11, 1966. Issuing a default judgment after dismissing the main complaint was in excess of jurisdiction, making certiorari available to annul it.

• Jurisdictional Amount in Probate Administration Contests — In a contest for the administration of an estate, the amount in controversy is deemed to be the value of the whole estate, not merely the value of the particular property or portion subject to separate administration. The total value of the estate is the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount for disputes over administration arising as incidents in probate or settlement proceedings. If the principal case falls outside the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals considering the total estate value, the CA likewise lacks original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition in incidental proceedings. Applied: The CA lacked jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R because the Matute estate exceeded P200,000.

• Scope of a Co-Administrator's Trust — A co-administrator designated to administer a portion of an estate is nonetheless an administrator of the whole estate. His judicious management of a parcel enhances the value of the entire estate, while inefficient or corrupt administration diminishes it. Co-administrators must discharge their functions not in isolation but in close cooperation to safeguard and promote the general interests of the entire estate. Applied: The Court rejected Matias's argument that the controversy was limited to P5,000 monthly rentals from five haciendas under his separate administration.

• Due Process in Removal of Administrators — While removal of an administrator lies within the discretion of the appointing court under Rule 82, Section 2, the administrator must be afforded the full benefit of a day in court before removal. If the probate judge removes an administrator on grounds discovered motu proprio—grounds not raised by the movants—the administrator must be informed of such findings and given the opportunity to controvert them. Removal on motu proprio findings without hearing renders the order void. Applied: Matias's removal was nullified because the probate judge removed him on grounds he never raised and without a hearing.

• Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceedings — A motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence filed after the movants' presentation of evidence, with express reservation of the right to present evidence in the event of denial, carries the same procedural protections as in ordinary civil actions by virtue of Rule 72, Section 2, which makes ordinary civil action rules applicable to special proceedings in the absence of special provisions. The court must resolve the demurrer before disposing of the case on the merits; if denied, the movant must be allowed to present evidence. Applied: The probate judge's failure to resolve Matias's demurrer and instead issuing the removal order constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Effect of Motion to Dismiss on Period to Answer — Under Rule 16, Section 4, the period for filing a responsive pleading commences to run anew from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial of the motion to dismiss. A defendant cannot be declared in default before he receives such notice. Applied: Jose could not be declared in default on April 16, 1966 because he received notice of denial only on April 25, 1966.

• Certiorari Against Void Default Judgments — A defendant improvidently declared in default is differently situated from one validly declared in default. The former retains the right to participate in the trial and may pursue certiorari to annul the void order of default and judgment by default as nullities, rather than being limited to the remedy of appeal under Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3. Certiorari is especially proper when execution is imminent, making appeal no longer adequate and speedy. The rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration does not apply when the proceedings are a patent nullity or when due process has been denied. Applied: Jose's petition for certiorari was proper because the default order was void and execution had been ordered.

• Interlocutory Orders Subject to Modification — An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded before final judgment. A judge may revoke the interlocutory order of another judge in the same litigation subsequently assigned to him. This power derives from the court's inherent authority under Rule 135, Section 5(g) to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Applied: Judge Bullecer could set aside Judge Cusi's order deferring resolution of the motion to dismiss.

• Non-Payment of Taxes Not Per Se Ground for Removal — Failure to pay taxes due from an estate is not by itself a compelling reason for removal of an administrator, as the failure may be due to lack of funds and not willful omission. Absent evidence of willful non-payment, removal on this ground is unwarranted. Applied: The Court rejected the probate judge's reliance on Matias's alleged failure to pay taxes, noting Matias had paid real property taxes for 1954–1966.

• "In a contest for the administration of an estate, the amount in controversy is deemed to be the value of the whole estate, which total value should be the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the jurisdictional issue, establishing the controlling rule that total estate value—not the value of a portion under separate administration—determines jurisdiction in probate administration contests.

• "Although a co-administrator is designated to administer a portion of the estate, he is no less an administrator of the whole because his judicious management of a mere parcel enhances the value of the entire estate, while his inefficient or corrupt administration thereof necessarily diminishes the value of the whole estate." — This defines the doctrinal scope of a co-administrator's trust and is the canonical formulation relied upon to reject the argument that a co-administrator's responsibility is limited to the property under his separate charge.

• "The period for filing a responsive pleading commence to run all over again from the time the defendant received notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss." — This states the rule under Rule 16, Section 4 as applied to the facts, establishing that the default was premature because the period to answer had not yet begun to run.

• "A defendant who is properly declared in default is differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former irreparably loses his right to participate in the trial, while the latter retains such right and may exercise the same after having the order of default and the subsequent judgment by default annulled and the case remanded to the court of origin." — This articulates the distinction between valid and invalid defaults and the availability of certiorari for the latter, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on default proceedings.

• Fernandez vs. Maravilla, L-18799, March 31, 1964 — Controlling precedent. Held that in a contest for administration of an estate, the jurisdictional amount is the total value of the estate, not a fraction thereof; the CA cannot exercise original jurisdiction over certiorari in an incident of a probate proceeding over which it lacks appellate jurisdiction. Directly applied to hold the CA lacked jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R.

• Sison vs. Teodoro, L-8039, January 28, 1957 — Followed. Held that an administrator appointed to represent designated heirs is nonetheless an administrator of the entire estate, and co-administrators must work in harmony for the best interests of the estate. Applied to reject the argument that the controversy was limited to P5,000 monthly rentals from properties under Matias's separate administration.

• Degala vs. Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791 — Cited for the proposition that the sufficiency of grounds for removal of an administrator should be determined by the appointing court, whose discretion appellate tribunals are disinclined to disturb absent positive error or gross abuse.

• Borromeo vs. Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549 — Cited for the principle that appellate tribunals will not interfere with probate court actions on removal of executors or administrators unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.

• Vda. de Saludes vs. Pajarillo and Bautista, 78 Phil. 754 — Followed. Held that certiorari lies when appeal is not an adequate remedy, particularly when execution has been ordered by the lower court. Applied to uphold the propriety of certiorari in L-26085.

• Eusebio vs. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163 — Cited for the requirement that a hearing and notice to all known heirs and interested parties are essential to the validity of proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, to ensure due process and allow determination of the applicant's suitability.

• Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 42 Phil. 557 — Followed. Held that a trial court may correct errors in its interlocutory orders before final judgment, and a judge may revoke the interlocutory order of another judge in the same litigation. Applied to uphold Judge Bullecer's authority to set aside Judge Cusi's order deferring resolution of the motion to dismiss.

• Manila Electric Co. vs. Artiaga and Greene, 50 Phil. 144 — Cited for the principle that interlocutory orders are always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded before final judgment.

• Testamentaria de Don Amadeo Matute Olave vs. Canlas, G.R. L-12709, February 28, 1962 — Cited in a footnote for the prior ruling upholding the jurisdiction of the CFI Manila (Branch X) over Canlas's claim for attorney's fees secured by a charging lien, relevant to the res judicata issue in L-26106.

• Rule 82, Section 2, Rules of Court — Governs removal of executors and administrators, providing that removal lies within the discretion of the court appointing them. Applied to establish the standard for reviewing the probate court's removal of Matias, while emphasizing that discretion must be exercised with due process.

• Rule 83, Rules of Court — Governs appointment of administrators, providing that if no executor or administrator remains, administration may be granted to any suitable person. The Court held this provision could not justify Jose's appointment without hearing because a general administrator remained in charge, and the provision envisions a situation where no one is left to administer the estate.

• Rule 35, Rules of Court — Governs demurrer to evidence, providing that a defendant who moves for dismissal after the plaintiff's presentation of evidence does not waive the right to offer evidence if the motion is denied. Applied to the probate proceeding via Rule 72, Section 2, to hold that Matias's demurrer with reservation entitled him to present evidence if denied.

• Rule 72, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides that in the absence of special provisions, rules for ordinary civil actions shall be applicable in special proceedings as far as practicable. Applied to make Rule 35 (demurrer to evidence) applicable in the probate proceeding for Matias's removal.

• Rule 11, Section 1, Rules of Court — Gives the defendant fifteen days after service of summons to file an answer. Applied to determine when Jose's period to answer in civil case 4968 commenced and expired.

• Rule 16, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that if a motion to dismiss is denied or its resolution deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from receipt of notice of the denial. Applied to hold that Jose's period to answer ran anew from April 25, 1966 (receipt of notice), making the April 16, 1966 default premature.

• Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3, Rules of Court — Allows a defendant declared in default to appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or the law. The Court held this remedy is available to a defendant validly declared in default but does not preclude certiorari for one illegally declared in default.

• Rule 135, Section 5(g), Rules of Court — Enumerates inherent powers of the court, including the power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Applied to uphold the trial court's authority to modify interlocutory orders before final judgment.

• Rule 7, Section 5, Rules of Court — Requires a party not represented by an attorney to sign pleadings and state his address. Applied to explain why the intervenors in L-26106 did not receive copies of orders—they failed to disclose their mailing addresses when they filed their motion to intervene without counsel.

• Rule 22, Section 7, Rules of Court — Governs reshuffle of cases. Applied when civil case 4252 was transferred from the sala of Judge Cusi to that of Judge Bullecer.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concurred.