Matudan vs. Republic of the Philippines and Matudan

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and the burden of proving these requisites lies with the petitioner. A psychological evaluation based solely on information supplied by the petitioning spouse, without personal examination of the respondent, is insufficient to establish psychological incapacity, and abandonment of the family, without more, does not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner Nicolas S. Matudan and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan were married on October 26, 1976, in Laoang, Northern Samar, and had four children. In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad and was never seen or heard from again. Twenty-three years later, on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that Marilyn was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition. The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between the parties, and trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence.

Petitioner Nicolas S. Matudan and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan were married on October 26, 1976, in Laoang, Northern Samar, and had four children. In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad, and from then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she was never seen nor heard from again. Twenty-three years later, on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, she was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to provide petitioner and her children with emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance; that based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and permanent commitment like marriage" as she "never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support" and for being selfish through their six years of cohabitation.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition. The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between the parties, and trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence. Apart from the testimonies of petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan, and Dr. Tayag, the following documents were submitted in evidence: petitioner's Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit "A"); the Judicial Affidavit of Maricel (Exhibit "D"); the Sworn Affidavit of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"); Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-MATUDAN" (Exhibit "C"); and other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate, birth certificates of his children, and a Letter/Notice sent by Dr. Tayag to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview (Exhibits "E" to "G").

Dr. Tayag testified that she subjected petitioner to psychological tests and interviews, and likewise interviewed Maricel. She came up with findings that petitioner suffers from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and that respondent has Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The root cause of petitioner's personality condition was attributed to his being an abandoned child, while respondent's personality condition was rooted in her unhealthy familial environment, coming from an impoverished family whose parents failed to give adequate attention and emotional support to their children. Dr. Tayag further testified that the psychological conditions of the parties are grave, characterized by juridical antecedence as they existed before the marriage, and are permanent and severe.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and respondent had a happy married life and never had a fight, and that the only reason he filed the case was because respondent abandoned him and their children. Maricel, who was only two years old when respondent left, corroborated that respondent never provided financial support and never communicated with them. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that petitioner's testimony contained only general statements on the supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity, and that he contradicted his own allegations by testifying that he had a happy marital relationship. The RTC held that abandonment of a spouse is not psychological incapacity but only a ground for legal separation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the clinical psychologist's evaluation of Marilyn's condition was based mainly on information supplied by petitioner and Maricel, who was only two years old when Marilyn left and could not be expected to know her mother well. The CA found that Dr. Tayag's report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor showed that Marilyn was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. The CA further held that even assuming Marilyn is afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits, in the absence of any showing that the same actually incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid basis for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity, which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that existed even before their marriage and continued to subsist thereafter.
• Grave and Incurable Nature: Petitioner maintained that Marilyn's illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations.
• Protection of Marriage Institution: Petitioner argued that the nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and family but will actually protect the sanctity thereof because it will discourage individuals with psychological disorders from remaining in the sacred bond.
• Legal Question: Petitioner contended that the issue of whether psychological incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal question.
• Totality of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the same despite due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

• Factual Issue Beyond Review: The Republic argued that the Petition calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal questions, citing Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris which states that the issue of whether psychological incapacity exists depends crucially on the facts of the case and is beyond the province of the Court to review.
• Insufficient Grounds: The Republic added that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Failure to Show Incapacitating Effect: The Republic argued that petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits affected her ability to perform her essential marital obligations.
• Unreliable Expert Evaluation: The Republic maintained that the supposed psychological evaluation of Marilyn was based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner and Maricel, which renders the same unreliable and without credibility.
• Failure to Prove Requisites: The Republic argued that petitioner's real reason for seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family, and that all in all, petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

• Psychological Incapacity: Whether petitioner was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

• Psychological Incapacity: No. The petition was denied. Petitioner failed to establish the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's alleged psychological incapacity. The totality of evidence, including Dr. Tayag's expert evaluation, was insufficient because the evaluation was based solely on the one-sided account of petitioner, and abandonment of the family, by itself, does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Psychological Incapacity: The Court applied the doctrine established in Santos vs. Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic vs. Court of Appeals (the Molina case).

The Court found that petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial failed to show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and moral ethics," and that she was irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This was compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight, which is why they begot four children, and that the only reason for his filing the case was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work abroad.

The Court further held that Maricel could not help establish the psychological incapacity because she was only two years old when Marilyn left the family, and while she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment, she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof. Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they were based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion, but since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well.

The Court cited Viñas vs. Parel-Viñas and Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua for the proposition that a psychological evaluation based on information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. The Court also noted that the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and finality, as the Court is not a trier of facts. The issue of whether psychological incapacity exists in a given case depends crucially on the facts of the case, and factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.

• Psychological Incapacity (Article 36, Family Code) — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner failed to prove the requisites, particularly because his testimony contained only general statements and he contradicted his own claims by testifying that he had a happy married life.

• Burden of Proof in Nullity Cases — The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the dismissal of the petition, holding that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof.

• Evaluation of Expert Testimony in Article 36 Cases — A psychological evaluation based solely on information supplied by the petitioning spouse, without personal examination of the respondent, is insufficient to establish psychological incapacity. The Court, citing Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua, held that to make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. The report must identify the root cause of the disorder, prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage, and explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder.

• Abandonment Distinguished from Psychological Incapacity — Abandonment of a spouse, by itself, does not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes the spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner's real reason for seeking nullification was Marilyn's abandonment of the family, which is only a ground for legal separation, not for declaration of nullity.

• "Psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity 'must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.'" — This passage articulates the canonical three-fold test for psychological incapacity under Article 36, which is the controlling doctrine in all nullity-of-marriage cases grounded on psychological incapacity.

• "To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence." — This passage, quoted from Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, establishes the standard for evaluating expert testimony in Article 36 cases where the psychologist did not personally examine the respondent spouse.

• "If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity." — This passage summarizes the Court's finding that petitioner's evidence was insufficient to establish the gravity and juridical antecedence of Marilyn's alleged psychological incapacity.

• "The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review." — This passage, quoted from Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, establishes the principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court in Article 36 cases.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Controlling precedent that established the three-fold test for psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner failed to prove the requisites.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina), 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Controlling precedent that laid down the definitive guidelines for resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36, including the burden of proof on the plaintiff and the requirement that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision.

• Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris, 527 Phil. 722 (2006) — Followed for the principle that the issue of whether psychological incapacity exists depends crucially on the facts of the case and is beyond the province of the Court to review, and that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court.

• Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061 (2009) — Followed for the principle that a psychological evaluation based on information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence, and that the report must identify the root cause of the disorder, prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage, and explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder.

• Viñas vs. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 508 — Followed for the proposition that where the respondent was not personally examined by the psychologist, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the former's condition.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 698 Phil. 257 (2012) — Cited for the principle that the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.

• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Cited for the principle that what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.

• Republic vs. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (2011) — Cited for the principle that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

• Republic vs. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) — Cited for the principle that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

• Ngo Te vs. Gutierrez Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) — Cited by petitioner for the argument that nullification of marriage will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court applied this provision in determining whether Marilyn's alleged psychological incapacity was sufficiently proven.

• Article 68, Family Code — Provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. The Court cited this provision in defining the essential marital obligations that a psychologically incapacitated spouse would be unable to discharge.

• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Referenced in the Molina guidelines as provisions embracing the essential marital obligations in regard to parents and their children. The Court applied these provisions in the context of the Molina guidelines for resolving Article 36 petitions.

• Carpio, J. (Chairperson)
• Brion, J. (on official leave)
• Mendoza, J. (see dissent)
• Leonen, J. (see dissent)

• _Leonen, J._ — Justice Leonen filed a Dissenting Opinion, as indicated in the decision. The specific grounds of the dissent are not detailed in the majority opinion text provided.