Matubis vs. Praxedes

A spouse who expressly consents to or condones the other spouse’s concubinage in a written separation agreement is not the innocent spouse entitled to legal separation under Article 100 of the New Civil Code; and an action for legal separation filed more than one year after the plaintiff became cognizant of the concubinage is barred under Article 102.

Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. Their marital dispute implicated the New Civil Code’s provisions on legal separation, particularly Article 100, which limits the remedy to the innocent spouse and requires the absence of condonation or consent to adultery or concubinage, and Article 102, which prescribes the periods for filing the action.

Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed on May 30, 1944 to live separately from each other, and that status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, they entered into an agreement, Exhibit B, in which they relinquished their right over the other as legal husband and wife; agreed that neither could prosecute the other for adultery, concubinage, or any other crime or suit arising from their separation; provided that the wife was no longer entitled to support or benefits from the husband and the husband was not entitled to anything from the wife; and stated that neither could claim anything from the other from the verbal separation on May 30, 1944 to the time they put it in writing.

In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado. On September 1, 1955, Asuncion gave birth to a child who was recorded as Zoilo’s child (Exh. C). Zoilo and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.

On April 24, 1956, Socorro filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a complaint for legal separation and change of surname against Zoilo, alleging abandonment and concubinage. Zoilo denied the allegations and interposed the defense that it was Socorro who left the conjugal home. During the trial, Socorro alone introduced oral and documentary evidence; Zoilo adduced no evidence.

The trial court held that Zoilo’s acts constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation, but dismissed the complaint. It found the action time-barred under Article 102 of the New Civil Code because Socorro became aware of the illegal cohabitation in January 1955 and filed the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It also found that Socorro had consented to the concubinage under Article 100, citing Exhibit B’s stipulation that each was free to get any mate and live as husband and wife without interference and that neither could prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their separation. The trial court characterized that stipulation as an unbridled license to commit concubinage, barring Socorro from claiming legal separation. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the appealed decision in accordance with the evidence and the law.

• Prescription: Socorro Matubis argued that the lower court erred in considering that the period to bring the action for legal separation had already elapsed.
• Consent/Condonation: She argued that the lower court erred in finding that she had consented to the concubinage; her counsel submitted that Exhibit B was divided into two parts—the first concerning the act of living separately, which he claimed to be legal, and the second being a license to commit the ground for legal separation, which is admittedly illegal.
• Alternative Dismissal Ground: Her counsel agreed that the complaint should be dismissed but argued that the ground should not be those stated by the lower court; instead, dismissal should rest on the ground that the parties had already been legally separated from each other, without the marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the New Civil Code.

• Abandonment by Plaintiff: Zoilo Praxedes denied the allegations and interposed the defense that it was Socorro Matubis who left the conjugal home.

• Prescription: Whether the action for legal separation was barred under Article 102 of the New Civil Code because it was filed more than one year after Socorro Matubis became cognizant of the concubinage.
• Consent/Condonation: Whether Socorro Matubis’s consent to or condonation of the concubinage, as expressed in Exhibit B, disqualified her from claiming legal separation under Article 100 of the New Civil Code.
• Alternative Dismissal Ground: Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that the parties had already been legally separated from each other, without the marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the New Civil Code.

• Prescription: Yes. The complaint was filed outside the one-year period under Article 102; Socorro Matubis admitted learning of the concubinage in January 1955 but filed only on April 24, 1956.
• Consent/Condonation: Yes. Article 100 allows legal separation only by the innocent spouse and only where there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage; Exhibit B expressly gave such consent.
• Alternative Dismissal Ground: No. The contention that the parties had already been legally separated before the New Civil Code is contrary to the evidence.

• Prescription: Article 102 of the New Civil Code provides that an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from the date the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from the date the cause occurred. The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by that article. By Socorro Matubis’s own admission, she came to know the concubinage in January 1955, but she instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. The appellant did not even press this matter in her brief. The lower court’s dismissal on the ground of prescription was therefore correct.
• Consent/Condonation: Article 100 of the New Civil Code provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. The wording of Exhibit B gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Socorro Matubis’s counsel submitted that the agreement was divided into two parts—the first concerning the act of living separately, which he claimed to be legal, and the second being a license to commit the ground for legal separation, which is admittedly illegal. The Court did not share that view. Condonation and consent on the part of Socorro Matubis are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement; the condonation and consent are not only implied but expressed. The stipulation was an unbridled license to commit concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, Socorro Matubis was undeserving of the court’s sympathy, as held in People vs. Scheneckenburger. She could not claim legal separation.
• Alternative Dismissal Ground: Socorro Matubis’s counsel contended that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that the parties had already been legally separated from each other, without the marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the New Civil Code. This contention cannot be subscribed to because it is contrary to the evidence.

• Legal Separation — Prescriptive Periods — Under Article 102 of the New Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from the date the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from the date the cause occurred. The Court applied this rule and held the action barred because Socorro Matubis knew of the concubinage in January 1955 but filed only on April 24, 1956.
• Legal Separation — Innocent Spouse Requirement — Article 100 of the New Civil Code permits legal separation to be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. The Court applied this rule to disqualify Socorro Matubis because Exhibit B expressly allowed the spouses to take other mates and barred prosecution for concubinage.
• Condonation and Consent May Be Express — Condonation of or consent to adultery or concubinage need not be implied; it may be express. The Court found that paragraph 6(b) of Exhibit B was not merely a separation agreement but an express consent and condonation, described as an unbridled license to commit concubinage.
• Separation Agreement as License to Concubinage — A stipulation in a separation agreement authorizing each spouse to live with another as husband and wife without interference, and prohibiting prosecution for adultery or concubinage, is an express license to commit concubinage and bars the consenting spouse from seeking legal separation.

• "An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred." — This passage states the prescriptive periods under Article 102 of the New Civil Code, which the Court applied to bar the complaint.
• "Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed." — This is the Court’s core interpretation of Exhibit B, holding that the separation agreement expressly condoned and consented to the concubinage.
• "The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413)." — This passage states the controlling rule under Article 100 and applies it to disqualify the plaintiff from legal separation.
• "This stipulation is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented to the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation." — This passage, quoted from the trial court’s decision and affirmed on appeal, characterizes the agreement as an express license to commit concubinage.

• People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413 — Cited by the Court for the principle that a spouse who has condoned and/or consented in writing to adultery or concubinage is undeserving of the court’s sympathy and cannot claim legal separation.

• Article 102, New Civil Code — Provides that an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from the date the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from the date the cause occurred. Applied to bar Socorro Matubis’s complaint, filed more than one year after she learned of the concubinage.
• Article 100, New Civil Code — Provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Applied to disqualify Socorro Matubis because Exhibit B contained her express consent to the concubinage.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.