Mathay Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

A local sanggunian cannot, by ordinance, direct the automatic absorption of named personnel into a newly created local government department; the power to appoint is vested exclusively in the local chief executive under B.P. 337, and the Civil Service Commission may only approve or disapprove appointments, not compel the appointment or reinstatement of specific individuals. Because Presidential Decree No. 51 never became law, the Civil Service Unit never legally existed and appointments therein were invalid ab initio, conferring no permanent status or security of tenure.

Private respondents were appointed by then Mayor Brigido R. Simon to the Civil Service Unit of the Quezon City government, a unit created under Presidential Decree No. 51, which the Secretary of Justice later opined had never been published in the Official Gazette. The Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30 directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke, and disapprove within one year all appointments in CSUs created under that decree. Quezon City enacted Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, establishing the Department of Public Order and Safety and providing in Section 3 for the absorption of present CSU personnel into the DPOS. The applicable statute was B.P. 337, the old Local Government Code, not the 1992 Local Government Code, which took effect only on January 1, 1992.

During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Brigido R. Simon appointed private respondents to positions in the Civil Service Unit of the local government of Quezon City. The CSUs were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51, which was allegedly signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972. On February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating that Presidential Decree No. 51 had never been published in the Official Gazette; conformably with Tanada vs. Tuvera, the decree was deemed never in force or effect and could not be a basis for establishing the CSUs. On June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke, and disapprove within one year from issuance all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the ground that it never became law. Private respondents were among those affected by the revocation.

For Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the Department of Public Order and Safety. Section 3 of the ordinance provided that the present personnel of the Civil Security Unit, Traffic Management Unit, Anti-Squatting and Surveillance and Enforcement Team, and Disaster Coordinating Council were absorbed into the DPOS, to be given appropriate position titles without reduction in salary, seniority rights, and other benefits; funds provided in the 1990 Budget for the absorbed offices were to be the initial budgetary allocation of the Department. Despite this absorption provision, the regular and permanent positions in the DPOS were not filled due to lack of funds for the new DPOS and the insufficiency of regular and permanent positions created.

Mayor Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents contractual appointments for the period June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991. These appointments were renewed for January 1, 1992 to June 30, 1992. On May 11, 1992, Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On July 1, 1992, Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents effective July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, the appointments were no longer renewed. The non-renewal became the seed of discontent from which these consolidated petitions grew.

After the non-renewal, private respondents in G.R. Nos. 124374 and 126366 appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The CSC issued separate resolutions holding that their reappointment to the DPOS was automatic under Section 3 of Ordinance No. NC-140 and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions in the DPOS. In G.R. No. 126354, the Court of Appeals later overturned CSC Resolution Nos. 955040 and 932732 and held that the CSC had no authority to compel the Mayor of Quezon City to reinstate Jovito C. Labajo to the DPOS; Labajo did not appeal. In the other cases, the Court of Appeals held that private respondents were still holders of de jure appointments as permanent regular employees when Ordinance No. NC-140 was enacted on March 27, 1990, and were therefore automatically absorbed in the DPOS as of that date.

• Mayor Mathay — CSC Authority to Reinstate: Petitioner asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Civil Service Commission has the authority to direct him to reinstate private respondents in the DPOS.
• Mayor Mathay — Invalid CSU Appointments: Petitioner pointed out that the private respondents' appointments in the defunct CSU were invalid ab initio; their seniority and permanent status did not arise because they had no valid appointment; to enter the Civil Service after revocation and cancellation of their invalid appointments, they had to be extended an original appointment subject to the CSC's attesting power; and, not being members of the Civil Service as of June 4, 1991, they could not be automatically absorbed, reappointed, appointed, or reinstated into the newly created DPOS.
• Mayor Mathay — Non-Renewal of Contractual Appointments: Petitioner maintained that the non-renewal of private respondents' appointments could not be taken against him because at most they held temporary and contractual appointments.
• CSC — Appeal in G.R. No. 126354: Petitioner Civil Service Commission sought reversal of the Court of Appeals decision of July 5, 1996, which had overturned its resolutions and held that it had no authority to compel the Mayor of Quezon City to reinstate Jovito C. Labajo to the DPOS.

• CSC — No Substitution of Judgment: Respondent Civil Service Commission argued that it was not substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power and that it was merely implementing Section 3 of Ordinance No. NC-140.
• CSC — No Room for Discretion: Respondent CSC maintained that the ordinance referred to the "personnel of the CSU," whose identities could not be mistaken, and that its resolutions called for the reinstatement of named individuals; because there was no issue as to who were to sit in the newly created DPOS, there was no room left for the exercise of discretion.

• CSC Authority to Reinstate: Whether the Civil Service Commission has the authority to direct the Mayor of Quezon City to reinstate private respondents to positions in the DPOS.
• Validity of Ordinance No. NC-140, Section 3: Whether Section 3 of Quezon City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which directs the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, is valid under B.P. 337.
• Automatic Absorption and Permanent Status: Whether private respondents could be automatically absorbed into the DPOS with permanent status despite Presidential Decree No. 51 never having become law.
• CSC Legal Standing in G.R. No. 126354: Whether the Civil Service Commission has legal standing to prosecute G.R. No. 126354 when Jovito C. Labajo, the person adversely affected, did not appeal.

• CSC Authority to Reinstate: No. The Civil Service Commission's power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment; it cannot direct that a specific individual be appointed or reinstated. The appointing power under B.P. 337 belongs to the local chief executive.
• Validity of Ordinance No. NC-140, Section 3: No. Section 3 is invalid for being inconsistent with B.P. 337 because it directs the absorption of personnel and thereby usurps the local chief executive's exclusive power to appoint.
• Automatic Absorption and Permanent Status: No. Because Presidential Decree No. 51 never became law, the CSU never legally existed and private respondents never held permanent positions; their appointments were invalid ab initio and could not confer security of tenure.
• CSC Legal Standing in G.R. No. 126354: No. The Civil Service Commission lacks legal standing to prosecute G.R. No. 126354; Jovito C. Labajo is the real party in interest and did not appeal.

• CSC Authority to Reinstate: The applicable law was B.P. 337, the old Local Government Code, rather than the Local Government Code of 1992, which became effective only on January 1, 1992. Under Section 1719 of B.P. 337, the city mayor appoints all officers and employees of the city in accordance with Civil Service law, rules and regulations. Section 177 lists the powers of the sanggunian, and the power to appoint is not among them; under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the sanggunian cannot appoint. The Civil Service Commission's power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment; it cannot direct that a specific individual be appointed. Once it attests eligibility, its role in the appointment process ends. The CSC's claim that it merely implemented Section 3 was rejected because the ordinance named the CSU personnel and the resolutions named the individuals to be reinstated, leaving no room for discretion. Ordering reinstatement technically issued a new appointment. Farinas vs. Barba and Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission held that appointment is discretionary and the appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by the sanggunian.
• Validity of Ordinance No. NC-140, Section 3: Section 3 directs absorption of the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. It refers to personnel, not positions, so the city council in effect dictates who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions. B.P. 337 expressly separates and delineates the powers of the city council and city mayor. The city council may create, consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions supported by local funds, but it has no power to appoint. The Court of Appeals' statement that separation of powers is not applicable to local governments was rejected. Because the ordinance conflicts with B.P. 337, Section 3 is invalid.
• Automatic Absorption and Permanent Status: Even assuming Section 3 valid, automatic absorption was impossible. Presidential Decree No. 51 never became law; it could not be a source of rights, impose duties, afford protection, or create an office. The CSU never legally came into existence, so private respondents never held permanent positions; their appointments were invalid ab initio. The right to hold public office is not natural and exists only by virtue of law. Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission held that a void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure. The Court of Appeals' statement that abolition of an office does not invalidate appointments did not apply because the CSU was not abolished; it never existed. At most, private respondents held temporary and contractual appointments; non-renewal cannot be taken against petitioner. Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission held that non-renewal of a temporary appointment gave no cause to demand reinstatement. Automatic absorption was also physically and legally impossible because the DPOS had only two Security Officer II and four Security Agent slots, while the defunct CSU had twenty Security Officers and six Security Agents. Since private respondents did not legally hold valid positions, abandonment or waiver need not be discussed.
• CSC Legal Standing in G.R. No. 126354: Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails. Jovito C. Labajo, not the CSC, is the real party in interest because he would be benefited or injured by reinstatement or non-reinstatement. He did not appeal. Civil Service Commission vs. Pedro Dacoycoy, where the CSC was allowed to appeal in an administrative nepotism case, was distinguished because that case involved serious prejudice to the civil service system, whereas this case involved reinstatement of a reluctant litigant and could not impair government effectiveness. The CSC was only a nominal party in the Court of Appeals; as a quasi-judicial body it should detach itself from cases appealed to a higher court. By instituting G.R. No. 126354, it departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandate is to hear and decide administrative cases, not to litigate.

• Appointing Power of the Local Chief Executive — Under B.P. 337, the city mayor appoints all officers and employees of the city whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, while the sanggunian's power is limited to creating, consolidating, and reorganizing offices and positions. Applied: Section 3 of Ordinance No. NC-140 is invalid because it directs absorption of named personnel and usurps the mayor's appointing power.
• Limited Power of the Civil Service Commission Over Appointments — The CSC's power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment; it cannot direct that a specific individual be appointed or reinstated. Applied: the CSC resolutions ordering reinstatement were set aside.
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The express mention of one thing in a law excludes others not expressly mentioned. Applied: Section 177 of B.P. 337 lists the sanggunian's powers and does not include the power to appoint, so the sanggunian cannot appoint.
• Void Appointments and Security of Tenure — A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure. Applied: because Presidential Decree No. 51 never became law, the CSU never existed and private respondents' appointments were invalid ab initio.
• Right to Public Office Is Not a Natural Right — The right to hold public office exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Applied: Presidential Decree No. 51 never became law and could not create an office or confer rights.
• Temporary and Contractual Appointments — The non-renewal of a temporary appointment cannot be taken against the appointing authority, and the holder has no cause to demand reinstatement. Applied: private respondents at most held temporary and contractual appointments.
• Real Party in Interest — Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, meaning the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails. Applied: Labajo, not the CSC, was the real party in interest in G.R. No. 126354.
• Quasi-Judicial Body Should Not Become an Advocate — A quasi-judicial body should detach itself from cases where its decision is appealed to a higher court and should not litigate. Applied: the CSC lacked standing and improperly became an advocate in G.R. No. 126354.
• Separation of Powers in Local Governments — The powers of the city council and city mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated by B.P. 337; the doctrine is not inapplicable to local governments. Applied: the Court of Appeals' sweeping statement to the contrary was rejected.

• "The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint." — This passage states the core separation of powers between the local executive and the sanggunian under B.P. 337, which supplied the basis for invalidating Section 3 of Ordinance No. NC-140.
• "In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission's power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made." — This is the ratio for rejecting the CSC resolutions ordering reinstatement of private respondents.
• "Since Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it could not be a source of rights. Neither could it impose duties. It could not afford any protection. It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never passed." — This passage explains why the CSU appointments were invalid ab initio and could not confer permanent status or security of tenure.
• "In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate." — This passage supports the dismissal of the CSC's petition for lack of legal standing and its improper assumption of an adversarial role.

• Tanada vs. Tuvera, 148 SCRA 446 (1986) — Cited for the rule that an unpublished presidential decree is deemed never in force or effect; applied to Presidential Decree No. 51, which the Secretary of Justice opined was never published.
• Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396 (1996) — Held that the appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by the sanggunian because appointment is discretionary; relied on to reject the CSC's directive.
• Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission, 227 SCRA 320 (1994) — Held that appointment is essentially a discretionary power to be performed by the officer vested with it; cited in support of the mayor's exclusive appointing power.
• Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, 263 SCRA 184 (1996) — Held that a void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure; applied because private respondents' CSU appointments were invalid ab initio.
• Romualdez III vs. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168 (1991) — Held that non-renewal of a temporary appointment gave the holder no cause to demand reinstatement; applied to private respondents' contractual appointments.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Pedro Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999 — Allowed the CSC to appeal as an aggrieved party in an administrative nepotism case; distinguished because the present case involved reinstatement of a reluctant litigant and did not impair the civil service system.
• Ralla vs. Ralla, 199 SCRA 497 (1991) — Defined real party in interest as one with material interest in issue and to be affected by the decree; applied to hold that Labajo, not the CSC, was the real party in interest.
• Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 234 (1984) — Held that the right to hold public office is not a natural right and exists only by virtue of law; applied because Presidential Decree No. 51 never became law.
• Judge Calderon vs. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 (1992) — Stated that a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed; cited by analogy to the CSC's role as a quasi-judicial body.
• Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, 189 SCRA 459 (1990); Villanueva vs. Balallo, 9 SCRA 407 (1963); Santos vs. Chito, 25 SCRA 343 (1968); Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46 SCRA 728 (1972); Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 (1986); Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 741 (1989) — Cited as the long line of cases holding that the CSC's power is limited to approving or disapproving appointments.

• Section 1719, B.P. 337 (old Local Government Code) — Provides that the city mayor shall appoint in accordance with Civil Service law, rules and regulations all officers and employees of the city whose appointments are not otherwise provided in the Code. Applied to hold that the appointing power belongs exclusively to the local chief executive and cannot be usurped by the sanggunian.
• Section 177, B.P. 337 — Lists the powers of the sanggunian. The power to appoint is not among them; under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the sanggunian cannot appoint or dictate who shall fill positions. Applied to invalidate Section 3 of Ordinance No. NC-140.
• Section 3, Quezon City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990 — Directed the absorption of present CSU personnel into the DPOS without reduction in salary, seniority rights, and other benefits. Held invalid for being inconsistent with B.P. 337.
• Presidential Decree No. 51 — Created the Civil Service Units and was allegedly signed on November 15 or 16, 1972. Because it was never published in the Official Gazette, it never became law and could not create the CSU or confer rights.
• Memorandum Circular No. 30, Civil Service Commission — Directed all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke, and disapprove within one year all appointments in CSUs created under Presidential Decree No. 51. Applied to the private respondents' appointments.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The consolidated petitions were filed under Rule 45. Applied as the procedural vehicle for review.
• Rule 3, Section 2, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure — Requires every action to be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Applied to dismiss G.R. No. 126354 for lack of legal standing.
• Chapter 3, Section 12 (11), Revised Administrative Code of 1987 — Mandates the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases and review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies. Applied to hold that the CSC's role is adjudicatory, not adversarial litigation.
• B.P. 337 and the Local Government Code of 1992 — The old Local Government Code, B.P. 337, was applicable rather than the 1992 Code, which became effective only on January 1, 1992. Applied to assess the validity of Ordinance No. NC-140.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Melo and Vitug, JJ., in the result.