Mateo vs. Romulo

Failure to disclose in a personal data sheet a final conviction for a crime punishable with reclusion temporal constitutes dishonesty punishable by dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. The accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification continued because the pardon invoked did not expressly remit it and was neither timely pleaded nor proved, and the repeated false denials negated good faith.

Atty. Rodolfo D. Mateo served as Attorney IV and later Executive Director of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), the agency deputized under Article 80 of the Water Code of the Philippines to act on water appropriation and related permits, subject to Board resolutions delegating limited authority to the Executive Director. Civil Service rules classified dishonesty and grave misconduct as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, while Articles 30 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code attached perpetual absolute disqualification to reclusion temporal unless expressly remitted in a pardon. Administrative discipline over presidential appointees proceeded through investigation by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission with final action by the Office of the President, reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

Mateo entered government service on May 28, 1990 as Attorney IV of the National Water Resources Board and later became its Executive Director, taking his oath on January 29, 2002. Long before that employment, he had been charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 93594 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, convicted on August 10, 1976 and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day to a maximum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of imprisonment with indemnity of P12,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 12, 1979 and discharged from the New Bilibid Prison in July 1979.

Thereafter, in two personal data sheets on file with the NWRB, one dated March 12, 1997 and another dated November 6, 2000, Mateo marked with an [x] the box for the NO answer to whether he had been or had ever been convicted of any crime or violation of law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court or tribunal. During his tenure as Executive Director, the Board adopted resolutions on March 11, 2002 authorizing him to grant temporary permits under Section 26, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 1067, to sign Board decisions, to pass upon power cost adjustments within limits, and under Resolution No. 02-0499-A to approve water permit applications for 0.05 lps and below except golf courses, industrial purposes, big projects and opposed or protested applications. On September 11, 2002 he issued Office Order No. 26 stating that the Executive Director would approve all Water Rights Permits and Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity while the Board failed to convene, with the same effect as Board approval subject to confirmation. From September 2002 to January 2003 he signed and approved 324 water permit applications on various dates including September 5, 16 and 23, October 17, November 12, December 3, 12 and 18, 2002, and January 2 and 15, 2003, many exceeding the 0.05 lps limit. He also issued Office Orders dated February 6, 2002 and February 23, 2003 and a Memorandum dated February 3, 2003 reassigning and transferring personnel ostensibly as reorganization, and suspended two employees for insubordination, all without Board approval.

On April 4, 2003, 38 NWRB employees lodged a complaint affidavit with the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission charging dishonesty for nondisclosure of the homicide conviction, usurpation of authority in issuing permits and certificates without or in excess of authority, indiscriminate reassignment of personnel, and disciplinary actions without due process. After requiring and receiving his counter-affidavit or answer on May 26, 2003 and conducting formal hearings, the PAGC ordered memoranda by June 9, 2003, with only complainants complying. The PAGC and the Office of the President factually found the double false denial in the 1997 and 2000 data sheets, the conditional pardon without express restoration of eligibility, the approval of 324 applications beyond delegated limits, and the unauthorized reassignments and suspensions, warranting dismissal.

• Administrative Due Process: Petitioner maintained that due process included the right to confront his accusers through a formal trial-type hearing, that he invoked that right in the Office of the President, and that violation rendered the evidence against him inadmissible.
• Good Faith and Absolute Pardon: Petitioner argued that he relied in good faith on an absolute pardon granted May 27, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino as completely erasing his criminal conviction, removing the need to disclose it, supported by photocopies of National Bureau of Investigation clearances showing no criminal record.
• Lack of Formal Hearing and Evidence: Petitioner claimed that no evidence was presented because the PAGC did not conduct formal hearings and that the findings lacked valid factual, legal and evidentiary basis.
• Usurpation of Authority: Petitioner contended that absolutely no evidence showed he acted without Board authority, that the Board never declared his acts unauthorized and no Board member complained, and that his approvals were authorized by NWRB Resolution No. 02-0499-A.
• Harshness of Penalty: Petitioner argued that dismissal was too harsh where a lesser penalty would suffice, invoking 13 years of public service, absence of graft charges, and impending retirement in April 2004.

• Administrative Due Process: Whether dismissal without a formal trial-type confrontation of accusers violated petitioner's constitutional and administrative due process.
• Dishonesty and Pardon: Whether failure to disclose the homicide conviction in two personal data sheets constituted dishonesty despite claimed good-faith reliance on an absolute pardon and NBI clearances.
• Usurpation of Authority: Whether petitioner exceeded delegated authority in approving 324 water permit applications and in reassigning personnel and suspending employees.
• Penalty: Whether dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits was too harsh and without basis for first-time dishonesty and misconduct.

• Administrative Due Process: No. Due process was satisfied by notice, answer, participation in formal hearings, and opportunity to submit a memorandum and seek reconsideration; trial-type confrontation was not indispensable.
• Dishonesty and Pardon: Yes. The two false denials constituted dishonesty; the belatedly alleged absolute pardon was unproved, inadmissible, and, even if considered, did not show express remission of perpetual absolute disqualification, negating good faith.
• Usurpation of Authority: Yes. Approval of 324 applications exceeding the 0.05 lps limit and unauthorized reassignments and suspensions amounted to misconduct beyond the Board's express delegation.
• Penalty: No. Dishonesty and grave misconduct are grave offenses punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time, revealing defects affecting continuance in office.

• Administrative Due Process: The essence of administrative due process is the opportunity to be heard or to explain one's side or to seek reconsideration, not necessarily a judicial trial with face-to-face confrontation. Because petitioner was notified of the complaint, filed his verified answer, participated in PAGC formal hearings, was ordered to file a memorandum or position paper but failed to do so, and later sought reconsideration in the Office of the President, resolution on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence was permitted and no grave abuse of discretion attended the quasi-judicial findings generally accorded respect.
• Dishonesty and Pardon: The 1997 and 2000 data sheets each bore an [x] for NO to conviction, while the 1976 homicide conviction with reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties was established; petitioner did not raise the May 27, 1987 absolute pardon in his answer, hearings, memorandum, or elevation to the Office of the President, raising it only on reconsideration. Being at fault for the omission, he could not charge the gap against the PAGC, and the pardon, as the private act of the President, had to be pleaded and proved, which mere photocopies of NBI clearances did not accomplish. Moreover, reclusion temporal carried civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification suffered even though pardoned as to the principal penalty unless expressly remitted, with effects including deprivation of offices, disqualification from offices and voting or being elected, and loss of retirement rights; the shown conditional pardon contained no express restoration, and this Court, not being a trier of facts, could not consider the unestablished absolute pardon or require the Court of Appeals to do so.
• Usurpation of Authority: The Board's delegation was expressly bounded, particularly the 0.05 lps ceiling with stated exceptions under Resolution No. 02-0499-A, alongside limited authorities on temporary permits, signing decisions, and power cost adjustments. The concurrent findings established approvals of 324 applications on specified dates from September 2002 to January 2003 exceeding that limit, plus Office Order No. 26 arrogating plenary approval power, and reorganization-pretext reassignments and suspensions without Board approval in violation of Civil Service laws and Republic Act No. 6656. Absence of a Board declaration of unauthorized action or a Board member complaint did not overcome the documented excess of express authority, constituting misconduct.
• Penalty: Under CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, Rule IV, Section 52, and CSC Resolution No. 1101502, Rule 10, Section 46, dishonesty and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal. Such offenses reveal character defects affecting the right to continue in office and are punishable by dismissal even on first commission, so length of service, absence of graft charges, and nearness to retirement did not compel mitigation, and insinuations of political machination were immaterial to the propriety of disposition.

• Administrative due process — Administrative due process simply requires the opportunity to be heard or to explain one's side or to seek reconsideration; trial-type hearing with confrontation is not indispensable and an agency may resolve issues on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence once parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. Applied to deny the claim of denial of due process where petitioner answered, participated in hearings, and could have filed a memorandum and sought reconsideration.
• Dishonesty as grave offense — Dishonesty and grave misconduct are grave offenses punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time because they reveal defects in character affecting continuance in office. Applied to sustain dismissal based on dishonesty alone, with usurpation and prejudicial conduct as additional bases, in Mateo vs. Romulo.
• Pardon must be pleaded and proved; accessory penalties persist unless expressly remitted — A pardon being the private act of the Chief Executive must be pleaded and proved by the claimant, and under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual absolute disqualification is suffered even though pardoned as to the principal penalty unless expressly remitted in the pardon, with effects under Article 30 including deprivation and disqualification from offices and loss of retirement rights. Applied to reject good faith where the absolute pardon was raised only on reconsideration, supported only by photocopies, and no express remission or restoration of eligibility was shown.
• Substantial evidence and respect for quasi-judicial findings; Supreme Court not a trier of facts — Factual findings of the Office of the President in quasi-judicial functions supported by substantial evidence are generally accorded respect, and the Supreme Court takes cognizance only of questions of law and cannot consider unestablished factual issues. Applied to decline consideration of the alleged absolute pardon and to uphold the findings on false disclosures and excess approvals.

• "The failure of a public servant to disclose in his personal data sheet (PDS) the fact of his conviction by final judgment of a crime punished with reclusion temporal is guilty of dishonesty, and may be dismissed from the service even if the charge is committed for the first time." — States the controlling ratio on dishonesty by nondisclosure and the first-offense dismissal rule.
• "administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be heard or to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of" — Defines the due-process standard applied to reject the demand for trial-type confrontation.
• "The administrative agency could resolve the issues based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties." — Articulates the procedural rule justifying resolution without face-to-face hearing after opportunity to be heard.
• "even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon." — Quotes the statutory qualification preserving perpetual absolute disqualification despite pardon, central to rejecting eligibility and good faith.

• Samalio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 472-473 — Cited as authority that trial-type hearing is not indispensable in administrative cases and due process is satisfied by fair opportunity to explain one's side and resolution on papers and evidence.
• Barroquinto vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil 642, 646 (1949) — Cited for the rule that pardon, being the private act of the President, must be pleaded and proved by the person claiming it.
• Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, August 2, 2001, 362 SCRA 304, 313 — Cited for the rule that dishonesty and grave misconduct reveal defects affecting continuance in office and are punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time.

• Article 41, Revised Penal Code — Provides that reclusion temporal carries accessory penalties of civil interdiction during sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification suffered even though pardoned as to principal penalty unless expressly remitted; applied to hold petitioner ineligible and his nondisclosure dishonest.
• Article 30, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates effects of perpetual absolute disqualification including deprivation of offices held, deprivation of right to vote or be elected, disqualification for offices and rights, and loss of retirement pay or pension; applied to describe the continuing disqualification.
• Article 80, Water Code of the Philippines — Authorizes the NWRB to deputize officials or agencies for specific functions; applied with Board resolutions to delimit the Executive Director's delegated authority over permits.
• Section 26, Rule 1, Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Water Code (P.D. 1067) and NWRB Resolutions Nos. 1313-A, 1424-A, 01-0593-A, 02-0499-A — Defined the limited delegations including approval only of water applications for 0.05 lps and below with exceptions; applied to find 324 approvals in excess of authority.
• CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, Rule IV, Section 52, and CSC Resolution No. 1101502, Rule 10, Section 46 — Classify dishonesty and grave misconduct as grave offenses punishable by dismissal; applied to affirm dismissal with forfeiture even for first offense.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.