Masipequina vs. Court of Appeals

A police officer acting in the performance of duty who is attacked with a deadly weapon may use a firearm to repel the attack, and the reasonable necessity of the means employed is measured by the imminent danger of injury, not by the harm actually done to the accused. The Court applied the rule that a police officer, unlike a private individual, cannot take refuge in flight, and the force he may exert differs from that ordinarily offered in self-defense.

The petitioners were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of San Isidro, Bohol, assigned to apprehend Leopoldo Potane, who had shown signs of recurring insanity since his arrival from Mindanao in 1974 and had threatened his relatives with a bolo. The victim's own father and brother, fearing for their safety, requested police assistance in apprehending Leopoldo so he could be examined and treated by the Provincial Health Officer. The legal backdrop is Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a stranger.

In the afternoon of December 21, 1976, Barangay Captain Nicolas Potane and his father, Pedro Potane, requested assistance from the Police Sub-station Commander of San Isidro, Bohol, in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, son of Pedro and elder brother of Nicolas, who had begun to show signs of recurring insanity. Since his arrival from Mindanao in 1974, Leopoldo had been acting queerly and at times violently. On December 18, 1975, Leopoldo chased the wife of Nicolas with a bolo and almost hacked her. He always carried a bolo and had threatened his own wife, daughter, brothers, and even his parents with death. Fearing for their safety, the family transferred temporarily to the Home Economics building of the barrio school and left Leopoldo alone in the house of his father.

Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, the former armed with a .38 caliber revolver and the latter with a Thompson submachine gun, were ordered by the sub-station commander to arrest Leopoldo. Before proceeding to the house, the policemen passed the store of a certain Ismael Balumia where they had a conference with Barrio Captain Nicolas Potane, his father Pedro, his mother Marganta, and others. In said store, a joint affidavit was prepared and signed by Nicolas Potane, Pedro Potane, Margarita Potane, Clara Potane, Francisca Potane, and Emilia Potane, wife of Leopoldo, authorizing the peace officers to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who was about to run amok. The document stated that if Leopoldo would resist, the policemen had the right to shoot him but not to kill him, and that the family would take no action if something untoward occurred.

Thereafter, the two policemen, accompanied by several persons including Nicolas Potane, went to the house of Pedro Potane where Leopoldo was. Upon arrival, Pat. Masipequina, a childhood friend of Leopoldo, called Leopoldo and urged him to come out. He also asked Leopoldo for a drink, but Leopoldo refused to go down the house. Pat. Masipequina then informed Leopoldo that his father and brother had reported that he had chased his sister-in-law with a bolo and that their officer-in-charge sent him to investigate the report. Leopoldo instead told him to come up. Pat. Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a petromax lamp. Patrolman Alampayan and the rest stayed in the yard, although Alampayan could see what was going on inside the house because it was a single storey house with an elevation of only four feet.

Nicolas stayed on the door landing while Masipequina entered the sala and was about to sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an adjacent room and rushed at him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo. Leopoldo hit Masipequina on the bridge of the nose. As the latter retracted, he lost his balance and was hit on the right side of his face. At this juncture, Masipequina drew his revolver and fired three shots. One shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo on the chest. Leopoldo continued to advance towards him. He pushed the rocking chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house shouting for help. Leopoldo ran after him. Pat. Masipequina jumped from the house and landed on the ground, hitting his shin on a piece of stone in the process. Leopoldo also jumped to the ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his gun hitting Leopoldo once at the thigh. Leopoldo Potane died some thirty minutes later while being brought to the health center for treatment.

The trial court rejected the defense of self-defense, citing: (1) the fact that the accused persisted in their attempts to arrest the victim for almost two hours; (2) the fact that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds, two of which were over the heart and admittedly fatal, and the third on the left thigh; (3) the fact that all three gunshot wounds bore evidence of gunpowder signs, indicative of having been inflicted at close range; (4) the fact that the victim had a 2-inch lacerated wound on his forehead and another lacerated wound on his right leg which were not sufficiently explained; and (5) the fact that the alleged injuries of accused Masipequina could not have been inflicted by a bolo, since they were superficial and located in improbable places. The Court of Appeals adopted these reasons with approval.

• Self-Defense: Petitioners argued that they should be acquitted because they acted in lawful self-defense when they shot and killed Leopoldo Potane, who had attacked Masipequina with a bolo.
• Performance of Official Duty: Petitioners maintained that they were in the performance of their official duties as peace officers when they went to apprehend the deceased upon complaint of his own father and brother.

• Joinder in Prayer for Acquittal: The Solicitor General joined the petitioners in their prayer for acquittal on the theory that petitioners are exempt from liability because they had acted in self-defense when they shot and killed Leopoldo Potane.
• Elements of Self-Defense Present: The Solicitor General argued that all the elements of self-defense were present: (a) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which was a real and imminent threat to the life of Pat. Masipequina; (b) the use of his revolver to repel the aggression was a reasonable necessity, as his life was already exposed to danger and he likely would have been killed had he not shot the victim; and (c) Pat. Masipequina did not provoke the victim into attacking him.

• Self-Defense of Masipequina: Whether petitioner Masipequina had acted in lawful self-defense when he shot and killed Leopoldo Potane.
• Defense of a Stranger by Alampayan: Whether petitioner Alampayan could be separately convicted of a lesser offense for the gunshot wound he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane's thigh, or whether he acted in defense of a stranger.

• Self-Defense of Masipequina: Yes. All the elements of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code were present: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• Defense of a Stranger by Alampayan: No. Alampayan acted in defense of a stranger under Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and in the fulfillment of a duty under Article 11, paragraph 5, and thus incurred no criminal liability.

• Self-Defense of Masipequina: The Court found that unlawful aggression was evident from the established facts: Leopoldo Potane, who had shown signs of mental illness and had threatened his immediate relatives with a bolo, suddenly and without provocation attacked Masipequina with a bolo after asking him to enter the house. The Court applied the rule from U.S. vs. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), that a police officer in the performance of his duty must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Tested by this standard, the means employed by Masipequina were both reasonable and necessary. He initially tried to defend himself by pushing the rocking chair toward Leopoldo, but when that proved futile and he was caught in a very precarious position with his back on the floor while Leopoldo kept flailing at him with the bolo, he had no other choice but to use his revolver. The Court also cited the rule from U.S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907), that the reasonable necessity of the means employed depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to the accused. Thus, that Masipequina escaped serious injuries does not necessarily imply that the means he used were unreasonable and excessive. The lack of sufficient provocation was plain: Masipequina was in the performance of his official duties, tried to coax Leopoldo into coming out, and was about to take a seat—definitely a non-provocative act—when he was suddenly attacked. The Court also accorded special significance to the wounds inflicted on the deceased, noting that the trajectory of the two chest wounds indicated that the person who fired the shots was in a lying and lower position while the deceased was standing, corroborating Masipequina's testimony.

• Defense of a Stranger by Alampayan: The Court applied Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, which exempts from liability anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites of self-defense are present and that the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The Court found that unlawful aggression was adequately established, that the means employed by Alampayan were reasonable as he only shot at Leopoldo's thigh to prevent him from further pursuing Masipequina, and that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive, as he and Masipequina only proceeded to the place because they had been ordered to apprehend Leopoldo. The Court further held that the performance of duties brings to fore another justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 5, which exempts any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, citing U.S. vs. Resaba, 1 Phil. 311 (1902). The small lacerated wounds on Leopoldo's forehead and right leg were explained by the fact that he dropped to the ground after being shot on the thigh by Alampayan.

• Self-Defense (Article 11, paragraph 1, RPC) — The justifying circumstance of self-defense requires the concurrence of: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court found all three elements present in this case, with the victim's sudden bolo attack constituting unlawful aggression, the use of a revolver being a reasonable necessity given the circumstances, and the accused having committed no provocative act.

• Police Officer's Duty to Stand Ground (U.S. vs. Mojica rule) — A police officer in the performance of his duty must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. The Court applied this rule to hold that Masipequina's use of his revolver against the bolo-wielding victim was reasonable and necessary.

• Reasonable Necessity Measured by Imminent Danger (U.S. vs. Paras rule) — The reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent an attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to the accused. Thus, that Masipequina escaped serious injuries did not imply that the means he used were unreasonable and excessive, as the bolo attack posed a very real danger to his life.

• Defense of a Stranger (Article 11, paragraph 3, RPC) — The elements of defense of a stranger are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The Court found all elements present with respect to Alampayan's shooting of Leopoldo to prevent further attack on Masipequina.

• Fulfillment of Duty (Article 11, paragraph 5, RPC) — Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office incurs no criminal liability. The Court held that the petitioners, being in the performance of their official and lawful duties as peace officers, were covered by this justifying circumstance.

• "A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense." — This is the controlling rule from U.S. vs. Mojica that the Court applied to determine the reasonableness of the means employed by the police officers in repelling the attack.

• "It must also be borne in mind that the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to the accused." — This states the standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the means employed in self-defense, which the Court applied to reject the lower courts' finding that the means were excessive.

• "The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person and rights from impending danger and peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being." — This articulates the philosophical foundation of the self-defense doctrine, cited from People vs. Boholst-Caballero.

• U.S. vs. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922) — Controlling precedent establishing the rule that a police officer in the performance of his duty must stand his ground and cannot take refuge in flight, and that the force he may exert differs from that ordinarily offered in self-defense. The Court applied this rule to find that Masipequina's use of his revolver was reasonable and necessary.

• People vs. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180 — Cited for the proposition that he who invokes self-defense must prove it by clear and convincing evidence, and for the principle that special significance is accorded to the wounds inflicted on the deceased in finding that the elements of self-defense had been established.

• U.S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907) — Cited for the rule that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent an attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to the accused.

• U.S. vs. Resaba, 1 Phil. 311 (1902) — Cited for the proposition that police officers acting in the performance of their official duties are exempt from liability even if their acts constituted crimes, because they were in the fulfillment of a duty.

• U.S. vs. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 (1915) — Cited for the settled rule that he who invokes the exempting circumstance of self-defense must prove it during the trial.

• Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court found all three elements present in favor of Masipequina.

• Article 11, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The Court found all elements present in favor of Alampayan.

• Article 11, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of acting in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. The Court held that the petitioners, being in the performance of their official duties as peace officers, were covered by this provision.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Bidin, JJ., concurred.