Masbate vs. Relucio

In custody cases involving minors under seven years of age, the tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code applies regardless of the child's legitimacy, and may only be overcome by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness established through proper trial; temporary custody may not be granted to a non-custodial parent before trial under Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which only allows temporary visitation rights pending determination of the custody issue.

Queenie Angel M. Relucio was born on May 3, 2012 to petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate and respondent Ricky James Relucio, who lived together without the benefit of marriage. When the relationship ended in April 2015, Renalyn left for Manila to study dentistry, leaving Queenie in Ricky James' care and custody. On November 7, 2015, Renalyn's parents (Spouses Renato and Marlyn Masbate) took Queenie from the school where Ricky James had enrolled her, refused to return her, and presented a Special Power of Attorney executed by Renalyn granting them full parental rights, authority, and custody over the child.

• Queenie Angel M. Relucio was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn A. Masbate (mother) and Ricky James Relucio (father), who had been living together without the benefit of marriage.
• The couple resided with Renalyn's parents (Spouses Renato and Marlyn Masbate) before the relationship ended in April 2015.
• Upon separation, Renalyn went to Manila to pursue dental studies, leaving Queenie in the care and custody of Ricky James, who enrolled her in school.
• On November 7, 2015, Spouses Masbate took Queenie from her school and refused to return her to Ricky James, presenting a Special Power of Attorney executed by Renalyn purportedly granting them full parental rights, authority, and custody over the child.
• During the hearing conducted on December 3, 2015, Renalyn appeared with Queenie and expressed her desire for the child to remain in her custody.
• Renalyn admitted that she went to Manila to study but claimed she comes home every week for Queenie and whenever there is a problem.
• Ricky James had actual physical custody of Queenie from April 2015 until November 7, 2015 when the grandparents took her.
• At the time of the proceedings, Queenie was three (3) years old, falling under the tender-age presumption.

• The RTC correctly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus because Ricky James, as the illegitimate father, has absolutely no legal basis for custodial rights over Queenie under Article 176 of the Family Code.
• Article 213 of the Family Code does not apply to illegitimate children because it presupposes a situation where the parents are married to each other but separated; thus, the tender-age presumption should not apply to overcome the mother's sole parental authority.
• The petition for habeas corpus failed to comply with the requisites for such petitions involving custody of minors, and there were no factual issues to resolve as Renalyn admitted her circumstances during the hearing.
• Renalyn did not abandon Queenie; she merely temporarily entrusted the child to her parents while she adjusted to her studies, which she undertook to improve their lives.
• The CA erred in granting temporary custody to Ricky James before trial and without any proof of Renalyn's unfitness, effectively overturning the tender-age presumption based on bare allegations.

• The RTC violated A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC by conducting a summary hearing instead of a full-blown trial to determine custody, and by refusing to give further due course to the petition without receiving evidence.
• The tender-age presumption under Article 213 is rebuttable by evidence of the mother's neglect, abandonment, and unemployment; Renalyn abandoned Queenie when she went to live in Manila and failed to seek employment to support her.
• As the actual custodian of Queenie prior to the controversy, he has the right to file a petition for habeas corpus to regain custody of the child.
• The CA correctly ordered a remand for trial to determine whether Renalyn had been neglecting Queenie, which would constitute compelling reasons to separate the child from the mother.
• He is entitled to shared custody or visitation rights, and the CA properly granted temporary custody of 24 hours monthly in addition to visitation rights based on humane and practical considerations and the best interest of the child.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court should excuse the one-day delay in filing the petition for review on certiorari, which was filed on November 6, 2017 instead of the computed deadline of November 3, 2017
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Article 213 of the Family Code (tender-age presumption) applies to illegitimate children or only to legitimate children of married parents
  • Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the remand of the case for trial to determine who should exercise custody over Queenie
  • Whether the Court of Appeals properly granted temporary custody (24 hours monthly) to Ricky James pending trial, in addition to visitation rights

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court excused the one-day delay in filing the petition for review, holding that rules on the perfection of appeals must occasionally yield to the loftier ends of substantial justice and equity, especially in cases involving the welfare of children where the State has a constitutional mandate to provide protection to those of tender years.
• Substantive:
  • Article 213 of the Family Code applies to both legitimate and illegitimate children because the law makes no distinction between them; the second paragraph thereof stating that no child under seven shall be separated from the mother applies regardless of the parents' marital status.
  • The remand was proper because the issue of whether Renalyn neglected or abandoned Queenie, which would constitute compelling reasons to overcome the tender-age presumption, requires a full trial for the reception of evidence.
  • The grant of temporary custody (24 hours monthly) was erroneous and deleted; Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC only allows temporary visitation rights, not temporary custody, before trial; temporary custody may only be granted after trial under Section 18 of the same Rule.
  • Ricky James, as the actual custodian prior to the controversy, has standing to file habeas corpus, but pending trial, he is only entitled to visitation rights of two days per week; he may take Queenie out only with the written consent of Renalyn, consistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under Article 213.

• Tender-Age Presumption — Under Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise; this presumption applies to both legitimate and illegitimate children as the law makes no distinction ("Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos").
• Parental Authority over Illegitimate Children — Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother, who is entitled to custody unless shown to be unfit or unsuitable to exercise such authority.
• Best Interest of the Child — In all questions relating to the care and custody of children, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration; courts are not bound by any mere legal right of a parent or guardian when the child's welfare is at stake.
• Habeas Corpus in Custody Cases — The writ may be resorted to when the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto; the actual custodian of a child has a cause of action to file for habeas corpus to regain custody.
• Substitute Parental Authority — Under Articles 214 and 216 of the Family Code, in default of parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent, then the oldest sibling over twenty-one, then the actual custodian over twenty-one, subject to the best interest of the child and the fitness of the substitute custodian.

• "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
• "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction."
• "The State is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, it safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony."
• "The child's welfare is the supreme consideration."
• "Rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not override – substantial justice."

• Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V — Cited by petitioners to argue that Article 213 applies only to married parents; distinguished by the Court as referring only to the child's choice of parent under the first paragraph of Article 213 and Section 6 of Rule 99, not the tender-age presumption under the second paragraph.
• Briones v. Miguel — Explained as the basis for the statement in Pablo-Gualberto; clarified that the reference to married parents was in the context of the child's right to choose which parent to live with, not the tender-age presumption.
• Bagtas v. Santos — Applied to support the rule that a trial is necessary to determine custody issues despite the production of the child in court; the preference for grandparents under Article 216 is conditioned upon their fitness to take care of the grandchild.
• Sombong v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that in custody cases, the court deals with a matter of equitable nature and the child's welfare is the supreme consideration, not bound by legal rights of parents.
• Grande v. Antonio — Referenced regarding the requirement of written consent from the mother before the father can take the child out during visitation periods.
• Tonog v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the definition of parental authority as a mass of rights and obligations granted to parents for the physical preservation and development of the child.

• Article 213, Family Code — Provides for the tender-age presumption that no child under seven shall be separated from the mother unless compelling reasons exist; the Court held this applies to both legitimate and illegitimate children.
• Article 176, Family Code — States that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother, notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child.
• Article 214, Family Code — Mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of parents.
• Article 216, Family Code — Establishes the order of preference for substitute parental authority: grandparents, then oldest sibling over twenty-one, then the actual custodian over twenty-one, unless unfit or disqualified.
• Article 363, Civil Code — Provides that in all questions relating to care, custody, education, and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount.
• Section 13, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC — Establishes the order of preference for provisional custody awards, including the actual custodian over twenty-one years of age.
• Section 15, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC — Provides for temporary visitation rights, not temporary custody, before trial; mandates that the temporary custodian give notice for changing residence or taking the child out.
• Section 18, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC — Allows the court after trial to issue orders permitting the parent deprived of custody to visit or have temporary custody.