Masagana Concrete Products vs. NLRC

An employee who is prevented from returning to work on the basis of an unsubstantiated accusation, without investigation or required notices, is constructively and illegally dismissed and cannot be deemed to have abandoned his employment, entitling him to reinstatement or, if no longer viable, separation pay plus full backwages from dismissal to finality of judgment.

Petitioners Masagana Concrete Products and Kingstone Concrete Products are licensed business establishments owned and managed by petitioner Alfredo Chua, later used interchangeably after a change in business name. Private respondent Ruben Mariñas was hired as a truck helper at P107.00 a day, a rank-and-file employment relationship governed by security-of-tenure protections and the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure on service of summons and ex-parte proceedings. No extrinsic charter, regulatory scheme, or prior related litigation beyond that employment relationship is needed to understand the dispute.

Masagana Concrete Products, later renamed Kingstone Concrete Products, both owned and managed by Alfredo Chua in Bo. Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal, hired Ruben Mariñas in May 1983 as truck helper at P107.00 a day. Mariñas worked continuously for petitioners until November 30, 1990, when Chua accused him of tampering a vale sheet and ordered him to leave the business premises.

When Mariñas returned the next day, he was refused entry. On December 3, 1990, he sent a letter to Chua requesting to be allowed to return to work, which was ignored. He discovered that his time card was no longer in the rack and that he had been replaced by a certain Anton. No investigation was conducted on the tampering accusation and Mariñas was given no opportunity to controvert it. Only on December 15, 1990, after Mariñas had already filed his illegal-dismissal complaint on December 7, 1990, did Chua advise him to report for work on condition that he admit in writing his mistake in the vale sheet.

Before the Labor Arbiter, notification and summons for the January 16, 1991 hearing was sent by registered mail to Chua at the business address and received on January 8, 1991 per the registry return card. Only Mariñas appeared on January 16, 1991 and filed his Sinumpaang Salaysay, and the hearing was reset to February 1, 1991, of which petitioners were notified by registered mail. Petitioners again failed to appear on February 1, 1991 and on February 21, 1991, when Mariñas filed his Position Paper and annexes including the demand letter and affidavit, with registry return receipts signed by Ragayunal, Freddie Tolentino, Jonathan and other illegible signatures at the business address. After another notice for March 11, 1991 warning that failure to attend would result in ex-parte proceedings and submission for resolution, petitioners still did not appear, and the case was submitted for resolution on the evidence of Mariñas alone.

The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal unjustified and ordered reinstatement with backwages, which the NLRC affirmed except for attorney's fees. Petitioners thereafter appealed, maintaining they never received the notices, while Mariñas was found to have later resigned and obtained employment elsewhere, a fact deemed not inconsistent with illegal dismissal.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC decisions were void because petitioners were deprived of constitutional due process, having allegedly never been properly served with notices or summons for the scheduled hearings and having had judgment rendered solely on private respondent's evidence.
• Jurisdiction Over the Person: Petitioner maintained that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because the registered-mail notices and summons, though correctly addressed to their business address, were received by impostors or persons unknown to them.
• Application of NLRC Service Rules: Petitioner argued that the NLRC seriously erred in the application of Sec. 4 (a), Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC governing service of notices and summons.
• Abandonment and Meritorious Defense: Petitioner maintained that they had a meritorious case necessitating setting aside of the Labor Arbiter's decision because Mariñas was not illegally dismissed but abandoned his job by failing to work starting December 1990.

• Service of Summons and Due Process: Whether service of summons and hearing notices by registered mail to petitioners' business address, evidenced by registry return receipts signed at that address, substantially complied with NLRC rules despite petitioners' claim of receipt by impostors.
• Jurisdiction and Ex-Parte Judgment: Whether the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over petitioners and could validly render judgment ex-parte based solely on complainant's evidence after repeated non-appearance despite due notice.
• Abandonment vs. Illegal Dismissal: Whether private respondent abandoned his employment or was constructively and illegally dismissed when barred from work after accusation of tampering a vale sheet without investigation or statutory notices.
• Relief for Illegal Dismissal: Whether reinstatement with full backwages, or in the alternative separation pay if reinstatement is no longer feasible, is proper, including the period and basis for computation.

• Service of Summons and Due Process: No grave abuse. Service by registered mail to the correct business address, completed upon receipt by addressee or agent, substantially complied with NLRC procedure and satisfied due process.
• Jurisdiction and Ex-Parte Judgment: Yes. Jurisdiction was acquired through valid service, and ex-parte presentation followed by submission for resolution was expressly sanctioned after unjustified non-appearance despite due notice and warning.
• Abandonment vs. Illegal Dismissal: Abandonment not established; illegal constructive dismissal found. Absence was justified, no clear intent to sever employment was shown by overt acts, and the prompt complaint and plea to return negated abandonment.
• Relief for Illegal Dismissal: Yes. Reinstatement with full backwages is proper, with separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service as alternative if reinstatement is no longer feasible, backwages running to finality without deduction.

• Service of Summons and Due Process: In quasi-judicial NLRC proceedings, strict construction of service rules is not required; substantial compliance suffices, and due process exacts only service reasonably expected to give the desired notice. Under Secs. 4 and 5, Rule IV of the then Revised NLRC Rules, service shall be personally or by registered mail on the party and is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent, with the return constituting prima facie proof. The registry return receipts showed receipt at Chua's business address by Ragayunal, Freddie Tolentino, Jonathan and others, and registered articles are deliverable only to the addressee or upon written order, supporting regularity. Bare allegation of receipt by impostors, without competent evidence on appeal despite opportunity under Article 223 (d) and Article 221 of the Labor Code, failed to overcome the presumption of regular official duty and regular service.
• Jurisdiction and Ex-Parte Judgment: Because summons and notices reached the business address as evidenced by registry returns, jurisdiction was acquired; whether signatories were employees, impostors or strangers is a factual issue beyond certiorari, which is confined to jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Then Sec. 10 (b & c), Rule VII expressly allowed complainant to present evidence ex-parte upon respondent's non-appearance despite due notice, issuance of another notice for respondent's evidence with warning, and submission for decision upon unjustified non-appearance during respondent's turn. Due process was satisfied by reasonable opportunity to be heard, and petitioners availed of that opportunity by appealing to the NLRC and seeking reconsideration, curing any claimed defect.
• Abandonment vs. Illegal Dismissal: Abandonment requires (1) failure to report for work without valid or justifiable reason and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by overt acts, with deliberate and unjustified intent proved by clear proof. Mariñas' absence was justified: after the November 30, 1990 accusation he was refused entry, his December 3, 1990 plea to return was ignored, no investigation or chance to controvert was given, and the December 15, 1990 conditional offer to return upon written admission came only after the December 7, 1990 complaint. Being prevented from working unless admitting fault without proof constituted constructive dismissal through discrimination, insensibility or disdain foreclosing continued employment, and unsubstantiated accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The filing of the illegal-dismissal complaint six days after alleged abandonment, subsequent employment elsewhere, and incompatibility of abandonment with constructive dismissal negated intent to abandon. Even assuming abandonment as just cause, the two written notices apprising the employee of the acts charged and informing him of dismissal, served at the last known address, were never given, tainting the termination with procedural illegality where strict substantive and procedural due process is a condition sine qua non.
• Relief for Illegal Dismissal: An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, plus backwages as distinct reliefs to alleviate economic damage. Backwages run from illegal dismissal on November 30, 1990 up to finality of the Supreme Court decision without qualification or deduction, while separation pay equivalent to one month's salary per year of service, a fraction of at least six months counted as one year, is computed from commencement of employment up to termination including imputed service for backwages at the salary rate prevailing at the end of putative service. The belated claim of business closure since March 1990 and December 24, 1992, raised only in reply, was a factual issue not timely litigated and could not exculpate petitioners from illegal dismissal consequences.

• Substantial compliance with service in quasi-judicial proceedings — Procedural rules on service of summons before the NLRC and its arbitration branch are not strictly construed; service personally or by registered mail that may reasonably be expected to give the desired notice satisfies due process. Applied to uphold service sent to the correct business address and evidenced by registry return receipts despite claims of receipt by unknown persons.
• Presumption of regularity and prima facie return — Official duty is presumed regularly performed and judicial proceedings regularly conducted, including service of summons, with the sheriff's or serving officer's return constituting prima facie proof of facts indicated. Applied to place the burden on petitioners to prove irregularity by competent evidence, which bare allegation of impostors failed to discharge.
• Due process as opportunity to be heard — In administrative proceedings, due process means reasonable opportunity to explain one's side or seek reconsideration, not necessarily full trial participation; availment of appeal cures claimed denial. Applied where petitioners lost by default but timely appealed to the NLRC and moved for reconsideration.
• Ex-parte proceedings upon non-appearance — Under NLRC rules, non-appearance by respondent despite due notice permits complainant to present evidence ex-parte and, after warning and unjustified non-appearance during respondent's turn, submission for decision on evidence presented. Applied to validate the Labor Arbiter's judgment based solely on Mariñas' evidence.
• Abandonment as just cause — Abandonment requires concurrence of (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, the latter being more determinative and manifested by overt acts with deliberate, unjustified intent shown by clear proof; mere absence after notice to return is insufficient. Applied to reject abandonment where absence was caused by being barred from work and intent was negated by plea to return and prompt complaint.
• Constructive dismissal — Constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit and privileges; an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain rendering continued employment unbearable forecloses choice except to forego employment. Applied where Mariñas was accused without investigation and conditioned to admit fault in writing to return.
• Twin-notice requirement in termination — Before termination can be legally effected, the employer must furnish (1) notice apprising the employee of particular acts or omissions for which dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice informing the employee of the decision to dismiss, served at the last known address. Applied to taint the dismissal with illegality even assuming abandonment, for complete absence of written termination notices.
• Reliefs for illegal dismissal — An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement if viable or separation pay if not, plus full backwages; the two are distinct and cumulative, with backwages from dismissal to finality without deduction and separation pay at one month per year of service including imputed backwage period at the final salary rate. Applied to modify the NLRC award to allow separation pay alternative and define computation periods in Masagana Concrete Products vs. National Labor Relations Commission.

• "The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense." — States the controlling due process standard for administrative labor proceedings and why default after notice plus appeal defeats the due process claim.
• "To our mind, all the foregoing notices were duly received by respondents or their representatives but they wittingly or unwittingly chose to ignore the same and they now complain of lack of due process after they lost the case below by their own default." — Adopts the NLRC's factual conclusion that valid service at the business address conferred jurisdiction and that neglect to participate cannot later be recast as denial of due process.
• "It is highly illogical for an employee to "abandon" his employment and thereafter file a complaint for illegal dismissal." — Articulates the rationale for rejecting abandonment where the employee promptly sought return to work and filed an illegal-dismissal complaint.

• Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA 312 — Cited for the rule that procedural rules on service of summons in quasi-judicial NLRC proceedings are not strictly construed and substantial compliance suffices.
• Santos vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 673 — Cited alongside Pison-Arceo and Eden to support liberal construction of NLRC service rules.
• Toyota Cubao, Inc. vs. CA, 281 SCRA 198 — Cited for the due process standard that service of summons need only be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired.
• Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 — Cited for the definition of due process as opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration in administrative proceedings.
• Naguiat vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564 — Cited for the rule that a party who availed of opportunity to present his position cannot claim denial of due process.
• Premier Development Bank, et al. vs. NLRC and Teodoro Labanda, G.R. No. 114695, July 23, 1998 — Followed as instructive that even assuming abandonment, notice must still be served at the last known address and arbitrary exercise of termination power violates security of tenure.
• Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 395 — Cited for constructive dismissal doctrine and incompatibility of abandonment with constructive dismissal.
• Bustamante vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 — Cited with De Guzman vs. NLRC and Cañete vs. NLRC for backwages from illegal dismissal to finality without qualification or deduction.
• Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 713 — Cited for computation of separation pay from commencement including imputed service at the prevailing end-period salary rate.

• Sec. 4, Rule IV, Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC — Requires service of notices, summons, orders, resolutions or decisions personally by bailiff or authorized officer or by registered mail within five days, on the party or counsel/representative if represented; applied to validate registered-mail service to Chua's business address.
• Sec. 5, Rule IV, Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC — Provides the return is prima facie proof of facts indicated and service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by addressee or agent; applied to deem service completed via receipts signed at petitioners' address.
• Sec. 10 (b & c), Rule VII, Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC — Authorizes ex-parte presentation by complainant upon respondent's non-appearance despite due notice and submission for decision upon unjustified non-appearance during respondent's turn after warning; applied to sustain the Labor Arbiter's ex-parte judgment.
• Article 223 (d), Labor Code — Allows appeal from Labor Arbiter decision if serious errors in findings of fact causing grave or irreparable injury are raised, with NLRC empowered to correct errors; applied to note petitioners' failure to substantiate impostor claim with evidence on appeal.
• Article 221, Labor Code — Allows the Commission to use every reasonable means to ascertain facts speedily and objectively without regard to technicalities in the interest of due process; applied to permit evidence on appeal and excuse strict technical rules.
• Section 2, Implementing Rules on termination — Requires service of dismissal notices at the employee's last known address and observance of two-notice procedural due process; applied to find illegality for total absence of written notices.

Melo, J., Vitug, J., Panganiban, J. and Purisima, J., concur.