Marzalado vs. People

Entry into the dwelling of another is not punishable as qualified trespass when undertaken to prevent imminent danger to property, provided the requisites of a justifying circumstance under Article 11(4) of the Revised Penal Code are met. Where the evidence permits both a culpable and an innocent interpretation of the accused’s act, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. A variance between the date alleged in the information and that proved at trial is not fatal when time is not a material ingredient of the offense.

Cristina N. Albano leased a unit in a house owned by Luz Marzalado, the petitioner’s mother. An ejectment case filed against Albano resulted in a judgment ordering her to vacate and pay unpaid rentals. While Albano’s appeal was pending, the unit’s electricity supply was cut off in September 1993. Albano moved her children to her father’s house nearby, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit on some nights. In early November 1993, Albano discovered that the main door’s padlock had been changed and, later, that her personal belongings had been removed and the unit emptied. She filed a criminal complaint for qualified trespass to dwelling against Salvador Marzalado, Jr.

• Lease and Ejectment: Cristina Albano was the lessee of a unit in a house owned by Luz Marzalado, mother of petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr. In February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano, who was ordered to vacate and pay unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC.

• Vacation and Electricity Disconnection: In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply to the unit was cut off due to non-payment of bills. Albano transferred her children to her father’s house four houses away, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit on some nights.

• Albano’s Account of Entry: Albano claimed that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she visited the unit and noticed a lead pipe missing. When she returned at 8:00 a.m. the following day, November 3, 1993, the main door’s padlock had been changed, preventing entry. On November 4, 1993, she peeked through the window jalousies and saw the unit emptied. She reported the matter to barangay officials and subsequently filed a complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling, and theft.

• Prosecution Eyewitness: Narciso Raniedo, owner of the house fronting the unit, testified that on November 1, 1993, at around 5:00 p.m., he saw Marzalado take a lead pipe and hand it to a woman at the terrace of his house. On November 2, 1993, between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Raniedo witnessed Marzalado forcibly open the unit’s door, remove Albano’s belongings, and take them to his own house.

• Petitioner’s Defense: Marzalado testified that after the MeTC ruled against Albano in the ejectment case and after the electricity was disconnected, Albano had already vacated the unit and moved to her father’s place. On November 3, 1993, on his way home, he saw water streaming out of Albano’s unit. Unable to locate Albano, he reported the situation to barangay officials and, accompanied by two barangay tanods, entered the unit. Inside they found an open faucet flooding the floor. He maintained that Albano filed the criminal case to harass and retaliate against him and his family.

• MeTC and RTC Findings: The MeTC found Marzalado guilty, noting that his defense would have been “a good defense” had the entry occurred on November 2, 1993, as stated in the Information, rather than November 3, 1993, the date he claimed. The RTC affirmed in toto. Both lower courts regarded the date discrepancy as material to the credibility of the defense.

• Barangay Certification: A certification from Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya stated that the unit was “forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet.”

• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner argued that the lower courts gravely misapprehended the facts, because the entry occurred on November 3, 1993, not November 2, 1993, and was undertaken with the assistance of a barangay secretary and two barangay tanods solely to stop flooding.

• Justifying Circumstance: Petitioner invoked paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, maintaining that his entry was justified to prevent imminent danger to property from the flooding caused by the open faucet.

• Defective Information: Petitioner contended that the Information was fatally defective because it alleged the trespass occurred on November 2, 1993, when the actual entry was on November 3, 1993.

• No Justification: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the flooding posed no danger to life or property and that petitioner could have averted it simply by turning off the inlet valve of the water source without entering the unit.

• Unrefuted Entry on November 2: The OSG asserted that petitioner failed to refute the charge that he entered the complainant’s unit on November 2, 1993, thus the prosecution’s timeline stood.

• Date Not Essential: The OSG argued that the exact time of the commission of the crime need not be stated with absolute precision in the Information; it is sufficient that the date alleged is as near as possible to the actual date, especially where time is not an essential element of the offense.

• Date Discrepancy in Information: Whether the variance between the date of the alleged trespass in the Information (November 2, 1993) and the date of entry established by petitioner’s evidence (November 3, 1993) rendered the Information fatally defective.

• Justifying Circumstance: Whether the entry of petitioner into the dwelling was legally justified under Article 11(4) of the Revised Penal Code to prevent imminent danger to property, thereby negating criminal liability for qualified trespass.

• Date Discrepancy in Information: The Information was not defective. The exact date of the trespass is not an essential element of qualified trespass under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code; the elements are (1) the offender is a private person, (2) he enters the dwelling of another, and (3) such entrance is against the latter’s will. Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court allows that the offense may be alleged as committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date. A variance between the date in the indictment and the evidence at trial does not, by itself, warrant reversal of a conviction. The error invoked was thus of no grave import.

• Justifying Circumstance: The entry was legally justified. The evidence established that the unit was vacated, the faucet was left open, and water was flooding the floor. Petitioner acted to avoid further flooding and damage to his mother’s property. The baran¬gay certification confirmed the unit was opened because of strong water pressure from the open faucet. No criminal intent could be imputed for this remedial action; an exigency existed that required immediate response. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Where the accused’s act permits two interpretations — one culpable, one innocent — the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused.

• Elements of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling (Article 280, RPC) — (1) The offender is a private person; (2) he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter’s will. The gravamen is the violation of possession or injury to the right of possession. The exact date of commission is not an essential element.

• Rule on Allegation of Date in Information (Rule 110, Section 11, Rules of Court) — It is not necessary to state the precise date of the offense unless time is a material ingredient. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of commission. A variance between the alleged date and the proof at trial is not fatal if time is not a material element.

• Justifying Circumstance: State of Necessity (Article 11[4], Revised Penal Code) — A person incurs no criminal liability for an act causing damage to another if done to avoid an evil or injury, provided: (a) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (b) the injury feared is greater than that done to avoid it; and (c) there is no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Applied to trespass, entry into a dwelling to stop flooding and prevent property damage satisfies these requisites.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Ambiguity — Criminal conviction requires proof of criminal intent and guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence permits both a culpable and an innocent inference, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused.

• “The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.”

• “The gravamen of the crime is violation of possession or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.”

• “In a situation of ambiguity, where the act of the accused permits of two possible signification, one culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused.”

• “There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.’s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.”

• Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 148468, 148769 & 149116, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 443 — Cited for the rule that facts and circumstances necessary for an information are determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crime.

• People v. Mauro, G.R. Nos. 140786-88, 14 March 2003, 399 SCRA 126 — Cited for the principle that an information need only allege a date as near as possible to the actual date of commission.

• People v. Alvero, G.R. Nos. 134536-38, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA 737 — Cited for the rule that a variance between the date in the indictment and the evidence does not warrant reversal solely on that ground.

• People v. Gomez, G.R. No. 101817, 26 March 1997, 270 SCRA 432 — Cited for the principle that criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense.

• Munsey v. Hanly, 67 A. 217 (1907) and Austin v. Hallstrom, 86 A.2d 549 (1952) — American authorities cited to define the gravamen of trespass as violation of possession or injury to the right of possession.

• Article 280, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes qualified trespass to dwelling. The third paragraph, providing exceptions for entry to prevent serious harm or render service to humanity, was discussed in relation to the justifying circumstance invoked.

• Article 11(4), Revised Penal Code — Justifying circumstance of state of necessity. Applied to hold that petitioner’s entry to stop flooding and prevent property damage negated criminal liability.

• Rule 110, Section 11, Rules of Court — Governs the allegation of the date of commission in a complaint or information. Applied to reject petitioner’s claim that the Information was fatally defective due to a one-day discrepancy.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.