Martinez y Festin vs. Morfe

The constitutional privilege from arrest granted to members of Congress applies only to civil cases and does not exempt them from criminal prosecution; any statute purporting to expand that immunity to cover criminal arrests is inoperative for inconsistency with the Constitution.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132 (the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act), delegates to the Convention were entitled to the parliamentary immunities of senators and representatives, including the protections of Articles 143, 144, and 145 of the Revised Penal Code. The constitutional provision at issue—Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution—provides that senators and representatives "shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same." Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, which took effect on January 1, 1932, penalizes any public officer or employee who, while Congress is in session, arrests or searches any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor—language that arguably expanded the immunity beyond what the Constitution's exceptions allowed.

Petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. On June 10, 1971, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against him, based on his having stated under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was born on June 20, 1945, when he knew he was in fact born on June 20, 1946. The offense is punishable by prision mayor under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. On July 9, 1971, he made a special appearance questioning the power of the respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking to quash the information. The lower court suspended the release of the warrant pending resolution. On July 22, 1971, he filed an omnibus motion to quash the information, to quash the warrant of arrest, or to hold proceedings in abeyance. Respondent Judge Jesus P. Morfe denied the motion on August 21, 1971. Believing the information and warrant null and void, Martinez y Festin did not post the required bond and was arrested by the City Sheriff on the afternoon of September 6, 1971, while on his way to attend a plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971, and his motion for reconsideration was denied in open court. He filed a petition for certiorari and habeas corpus that same day, but after posting bail on September 11, 1971, the petition was reduced to one for certiorari.

Petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. was a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, having taken his oath and assumed office on June 1, 1971. Two criminal complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet by Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant, charging Bautista, Sr. and co-accused with violation of Section 51 of the Revised Election Code for distributing free food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meetings in Sablan and Tuba, Benguet. The penalty for each offense was not higher than prision mayor. Respondent Judge Francisco Ma. Chanco conducted the preliminary investigation and, on August 7, 1971, ordered the filing of corresponding informations. Before a warrant could issue, Bautista, Sr. invoked on August 14, 1971 the privilege of immunity from arrest and search under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, in relation to Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge held the warrant in abeyance and set a hearing for August 23, 1971. On that date, after hearing, the claim of immunity was rejected and a warrant of arrest was ordered. A motion to quash the arrest order was filed on September 11, 1971, but respondent Judge ordered his immediate arrest. Bautista, Sr. filed his petition for certiorari and prohibition on September 15, 1971.

Both petitioners sought to have their respective warrants of arrest quashed on the ground that, as delegates to the Constitutional Convention entitled to parliamentary immunities under Republic Act No. 6132, they were immune from arrest during sessions of the Convention and in going to and returning from the same. They relied on Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution, as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes a public officer who arrests a member of Congress during session except where the member has committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor. The Solicitor General, representing the respondent Judges, disputed this contention, arguing that the constitutional provision covers only civil cases and does not exempt legislators from criminal prosecution, and that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as it expanded the immunity, was unconstitutional or inoperative.

• Scope of Parliamentary Immunity: Petitioners maintained that the constitutional privilege from arrest, as supplemented by Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, shielded them from criminal arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Constitutional Convention and in going to and returning from the same, since as delegates under Republic Act No. 6132 they were entitled to the parliamentary immunities of senators and representatives.
• Effect of Article 145, Revised Penal Code: Petitioners argued that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits the arrest of a member of Congress during session except for crimes punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor, expanded the scope of the immunity and should be read together with the constitutional provision to determine the extent of their protection.
• Application to Bautista, Sr.: Petitioner Bautista, Sr. contended that since the penalty for each of the election code offenses charged against him was not higher than prision mayor, his arrest was barred under Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Constitutional Immunity Limited to Civil Cases: Respondent countered that the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal prosecution, being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, and that the phrase "treason, felony, and breach of the peace" excepts all criminal offenses from the privilege.
• Inoperativeness of Article 145: Respondent argued that insofar as Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code would expand the constitutional immunity to cover criminal arrests, it was unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative, having become inconsistent with the Constitution upon its effectivity on November 15, 1935.

• Scope of Constitutional Immunity: Whether the constitutional privilege from arrest of members of Congress under Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution exempts them from criminal prosecution or applies only to civil cases.
• Validity of Article 145, Revised Penal Code: Whether Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as it expanded the parliamentary immunity to prohibit arrest of a member of Congress except for crimes punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor, survived the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
• Availability of Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies to quash the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners.

• Scope of Constitutional Immunity: No. The privilege from arrest applies only to civil cases; the exceptions "treason, felony, and breach of the peace" exclude all criminal offenses from the immunity, as deliberately adopted from American constitutional law by the 1934 Constitutional Convention.
• Validity of Article 145, Revised Penal Code: No. Article 145, insofar as it expanded the immunity beyond what the Constitution allowed, was rendered inoperative upon the effectivity of the Constitution on November 15, 1935, for inconsistency with its explicit command.
• Availability of Certiorari: No. Certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants of arrest, there being no legal basis for the petitioners' claim to immunity.

• Scope of Constitutional Immunity: The Court examined the text of Section 15, Article VI, which provides that senators and representatives "shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest." Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies; a felony is any act or omission punishable by law; and breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. The phrase thus excepts all criminal offenses from the privilege. This interpretation was confirmed by the proceedings of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, where Delegate Aldeguer proposed the amendment to retain the phraseology of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, identical to the American Constitution, expressly stating that "the history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest." Delegate Manuel Roxas endorsed the amendment, and the Convention approved it by acclamation. The authoritative American interpretation was supplied by Williamson vs. United States (1908), where Justice White held that the phrase "treason, felony and breach of the peace" excepts from the privilege all criminal offenses, leaving it applicable only to prosecutions of a civil nature. Story's treatise, Cooley's constitutional limitations, and other American authorities confirmed that the privilege was never intended to cover criminal arrests.

• Validity of Article 145, Revised Penal Code: Article 145 took effect on January 1, 1932, before the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. The Constitution provides that laws in force prior to its effectivity shall remain operative unless inconsistent with it. The expanded immunity under Article 145—prohibiting arrest of a member of Congress except for crimes punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor—was repugnant to the Constitution's explicit command that the privilege does not cover treason, felony, or breach of the peace. Following People vs. Linsangan, where Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizing imprisonment for non-payment of cedula tax was held inoperative for inconsistency with the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and De los Santos vs. Mallare, where the President's power to remove appointive officials at pleasure under the Revised Administrative Code was held superseded by the Constitution's civil service protection, the Court held that the offending portion of Article 145 was declared inoperative by the Constitution itself. No positive declaration of nullity was needed; the inconsistent provision was "non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate."

• Availability of Certiorari: Since the petitioners' claim to immunity was legally untenable—both because the constitutional privilege does not cover criminal prosecutions and because Article 145 could not supplement it—there was no justification for granting the writs of certiorari sought. The petitions were therefore dismissed. Policy considerations reinforced this conclusion: while legislators and delegates must enjoy utmost freedom and latitude in free speech to discharge their responsibilities, immunity from criminal arrest would create a privileged class without justification, as a legislator can perform his functions efficiently without transgressing criminal law. The safeguards of the Constitution protecting the rights of the accused, including an independent judiciary, suffice to guard against potential abuse of prosecutorial power against minority legislators.

• Parliamentary Immunity from Arrest — The constitutional privilege from arrest granted to members of Congress under Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution applies only to civil cases and does not exempt them from criminal prosecution. The exceptions "treason, felony, and breach of the peace" exclude all criminal offenses from the privilege. This interpretation was deliberately adopted by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, which modeled the provision on the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 and the American Constitution, following the well-settled principle in American law as articulated in Williamson vs. United States (1908).

• Inoperativeness of Prior Statutes Inconsistent with the Constitution — Laws in force before the Constitution took effect remain operative only if not inconsistent with the Constitution. A prior statute that conflicts with the Constitution need not be judicially declared null; it is rendered inoperative by the Constitution itself, being "non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by express mandate." This doctrine was applied to Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, which expanded parliamentary immunity beyond constitutional limits and was thus inoperative upon the Constitution's effectivity in 1935.

• "the term 'treason, felony and breach of the peace,' as used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses" — This quotation from Williamson vs. United States, adopted by the Court, establishes the authoritative interpretation that the constitutional privilege from arrest covers only civil cases and excludes all criminal prosecutions.

• "the history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest" — Delegate Aldeguer's statement during the 1934 Constitutional Convention debates, cited by the Court to confirm that the framers deliberately adopted the American understanding of the privilege as limited to civil arrest.

• "To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." — This formulation from De los Santos vs. Mallare, quoted in the decision, articulates the doctrine that a prior statute inconsistent with the Constitution is automatically rendered inoperative without need for a judicial declaration of nullity.

• Williamson vs. United States, 207 US 425 (1908) — Controlling American precedent followed. The Court relied on Justice White's opinion holding that the phrase "treason, felony and breach of the peace" excepts all criminal offenses from the parliamentary privilege, leaving it applicable only to civil cases. This interpretation was adopted by the 1934 Constitutional Convention as the intended meaning of the Philippine provision.

• People vs. Linsangan, 62 Phil. 646 (1935) — Followed. Held that Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code, authorizing imprisonment for non-payment of cedula tax, became inoperative upon the Constitution's effectivity for inconsistency with the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Used as precedent for the proposition that prior laws inconsistent with the Constitution are automatically rendered inoperative.

• De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950) — Followed. Held that the President's power under the Revised Administrative Code to remove appointive city officials at pleasure was superseded by the Constitution's civil service protection. The Court quoted its formulation that an inconsistent statute is "non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself."

• Section 15, Article VI, 1935 Constitution — Provides that senators and representatives "shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same." Applied as the primary constitutional text defining the scope of parliamentary immunity, held to exclude all criminal offenses from the privilege.

• Article 145, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes any public officer or employee who, while Congress is in session, arrests or searches any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable by a penalty higher than prision mayor. Held inoperative insofar as it expanded the immunity beyond constitutional limits, for inconsistency with the Constitution.

• Section 15, Republic Act No. 6132 (1971 Constitutional Convention Act) — Extends to delegates of the Constitutional Convention the parliamentary immunities of members of Congress and the penalties under Articles 143, 144, and 145 of the Revised Penal Code. Applied to establish that petitioners, as delegates, were entitled to the same immunities as legislators—but those immunities did not extend to criminal arrest.

• Article XVI, Section 2, 1935 Constitution — Provides that laws in force prior to the Commonwealth shall remain operative unless inconsistent with the Constitution. Applied as the constitutional basis for holding Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code inoperative upon the Constitution's effectivity.

• Article III, Section 1, clause 12, 1935 Constitution — Prohibits imprisonment for debt or non-payment of poll tax. Cited in People vs. Linsangan as the basis for rendering Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code inoperative, which precedent was applied by analogy to Article 145.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.