Martinez vs. Van Buskirk

An act that has been acquiesced in by society for so long that it has ripened into custom, and which has not proved destructive or injurious, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent, and thus does not constitute negligence. Where the circumstances surrounding an accident are fully explained and show no negligence, the prima facie presumption of res ipsa loquitur is destroyed.

The defendant, William Van Buskirk, owned a delivery wagon used for transporting fodder, operated by a cochero as his employee. The plaintiffs, S. D. Martinez and his wife Carmen Ong de Martinez, were members of the public using the streets of Manila. At the relevant time, there was no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Spanish Civil Code, particularly Articles 1902 and 1903, which governed civil liability for damages caused by fault or negligence and the vicarious liability of employers for the acts of their employees.

On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, along the left-hand side of the street. A delivery wagon belonging to the defendant, William Van Buskirk, used for the transportation of fodder and drawn by a pair of horses, came along the same street from the opposite direction at great speed. The driver of the plaintiff's carromata, observing the approaching wagon, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side and stopped to allow the wagon to pass. Instead of passing by, the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by Carmen Ong de Martinez and her child, overturning it and causing a serious cut upon her head, as well as damage to the carromata and its harness.

These facts were undisputed. The defendant presented evidence showing that his cochero was considered a good, safe, and reliable servant. On the day in question, the cochero had been sent to deliver forage at the Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran. Upon arrival, the cochero tied the driving lines to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the forage. While he was in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made other noises, frightening the horses. The horses bolted, the cochero was thrown from the wagon onto the ground, and he was unable to stop them. The horses then ran up the street and collided with the carromata in which Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding. The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on that day.

The undisputed evidence further showed that the horses were gentle and tractable, that the cochero was experienced and capable, having driven one of the horses for several years and the other for five or six months, and that he had been in the habit of leaving them in the same condition during all that time. The horses had never run away before, and no accident had ever resulted from such practice. Leaving the horses unhitched while unloading merchandise was the custom of all cocheros who delivered merchandise of that character, a custom sanctioned by their employers.

• Negligence of the Cochero: Whether the cochero's act of leaving the horses unhitched and unattended while unloading forage constituted negligence.
• Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur: Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to create a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.
• Employer's Liability: Whether the defendant employer is liable for the damages caused by his cochero under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

• Negligence of the Cochero: No. The cochero was not negligent in leaving the horses unhitched, as the horses were gentle and tractable, the driver was experienced, the practice was a long-standing custom sanctioned by employers, and no prior accidents had occurred.
• Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur: No. The prima facie case, if any, was destroyed because the circumstances surrounding the accident were fully explained by the evidence, showing no negligence on the part of the cochero.
• Employer's Liability: No. Since the cochero was not negligent, the employer could not be held vicariously liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer being derivative of the employee's negligence.

• Negligence of the Cochero: The duty whose violation constitutes negligence is the duty to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage, there is no liability even if damage in fact ensues. The act of leaving the horses unhitched was not itself negligent; whether it constitutes negligence depends on the disposition of the horse, whether the horse was under observation and control, and other circumstances. Here, the horses were gentle and tractable, the cochero was experienced and capable, he had driven them for months or years without incident, and leaving horses unhitched during deliveries was a universal custom among merchants, sanctioned by employers and acquiesced in by the public for decades without producing accidents. Acts that have not proved destructive or injurious and have been permitted by society for so long that they have ripened into custom cannot be held unreasonable or imprudent. The Court relied on numerous American and English precedents supporting the proposition that leaving a quiet, gentle horse unhitched while loading or unloading goods is not negligence as a matter of law.

• Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur at most creates a prima facie case, and only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act was performed. Once the defendant's evidence shows the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the rationale for the doctrine disappears. In this case, the plaintiffs themselves presented not only the fact of the runaway and the resulting accident but also the conditions under which it occurred — namely, the frightening of the horses by an external vehicle's whip crack. Those conditions showed that the cochero was not negligent, thereby destroying any prima facie case in the plaintiffs' favor.

• Employer's Liability: Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which they are employed or on account of their duties, but this liability ceases when the persons mentioned prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. The Court expressly declined to decide whether an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is liable under the last paragraph of Article 1903, because the judgment was reversed on the narrower ground that the cochero himself was not negligent. Without negligence on the part of the employee, there was no basis for imposing vicarious liability on the employer.

• Custom as Negation of Negligence — Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have been acquiesced in by society for so long that they have ripened into custom cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. The Court applied this by holding that the universal practice of leaving horses unhitched during deliveries, which had never produced accidents and was sanctioned by employers and the public, could not be deemed negligent.

• Res Ipsa Loquitur — Scope and Limitations — The maxim of res ipsa loquitur at most creates a prima facie case, and only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. Once the circumstances surrounding the injury are shown and demonstrate no negligence, the prima facie case is destroyed. The Court applied this by finding that the plaintiffs' own evidence explained the conditions of the runaway, thereby negating any inference of negligence.

• Reasonable Care Standard for Negligence — The duty whose violation constitutes negligence is the duty to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there is no liability, although damage in fact ensues.

• "Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that long-standing customary practices, absent a history of harm, cannot be adjudged negligent, forming the central basis for reversing the trial court's judgment.

• "The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was rebutted." — This quotation from Inland and Seaboard Coasting Co. vs. Tolson was cited by the Court to illustrate the limited function of res ipsa loquitur: it creates only a rebuttable prima facie presumption that disappears once the full circumstances are shown.

• "Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not." — This rhetorical passage underscores the Court's reluctance to judicially criminalize or penalize a customary practice without prior notice or objection, reinforcing the doctrine that custom negates negligence.

• Hayman vs. Hewitt — Cited for Lord Kenyon's proposition that requiring a person to employ another to watch horses while unloading goods would make the business of the metropolis impossible; supported the holding that leaving horses unattended during deliveries is not negligent.
• Griggs vs. Fleckenstein — Cited for the rule that leaving a horse unhitched is not negligence per se; whether it constitutes negligence depends on the disposition of the horse, whether it was under observation and control, and other circumstances, to be determined from the facts of each case.
• Belles vs. Kellner — Cited for the holding that it is not negligence for the driver of a quiet, gentle horse to leave it unhitched and unattended on a public highway while loading goods on the wagon, particularly where the horse had been used for years in that manner without accident.
• Southworth vs. Ry. Co. — Cited for the proposition that a servant's leaving a horse unfastened for several minutes while delivering a parcel, knowing the horse was not afraid of cars and having used it without incident for months, is not conclusive of want of due care.
• Inland and Seaboard Coasting Co. vs. Tolson — Cited to demonstrate the limited scope of res ipsa loquitur: it creates only a prima facie case that is rebutted when the full evidence explains the circumstances of the accident.
• Lynch vs. Nurdin — Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that the cochero's conduct was not negligent under Anglo-American jurisprudence.

• Article 1902, Spanish Civil Code — Provides that a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage. The Court noted this as the general provision on civil liability for negligence in the Philippines.
• Article 1903, Spanish Civil Code — Imposes vicarious liability on employers for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which they are employed or on account of their duties, with liability ceasing when the employer proves all the diligence of a good father of a family was employed to avoid the damage. The Court declined to rule on the employer's due diligence defense, reversing instead on the ground that the employee was not negligent.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concurred.

• Torres, J. — Dissented, stating that the judgment should be affirmed, but provided no elaborated reasoning beyond this bare conclusion.