Martinez vs. People of the Philippines

The failure of a public officer to liquidate cash advances after demand by a duly authorized officer gives rise to a prima facie presumption of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, sufficient to charge an offense and sustain the denial of a motion to quash. Entry of a plea after denial of a motion to quash waives all objections available under such motion.

Petitioner Antonio C. Martinez served as Officer-in-Charge and Acting City Mayor of Caloocan City from December 1986 to January 1988. In that capacity, he was an accountable public officer who received cash advances from the city government earmarked for specific projects. The statutory framework governing his obligation is Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which presumes malversation when a public officer fails to account for public funds after demand.

From December 1986 to January 1988, Antonio C. Martinez served as Officer-in-Charge and Acting City Mayor of Caloocan City. In that capacity, he received cash advances from the city government earmarked for specific projects. On or about December 24, 1986, he received ₱100,000.00 under Disbursement Voucher No. 32734; on or about January 27, 1987, ₱145,000.00 under Disbursement Voucher No. 201; on or about January 29, 1987, ₱300,000.00 under Disbursement Voucher No. 223; and on or about July 23, 1987, ₱200,000.00 under Disbursement Voucher No. 1877.

Petitioner failed to liquidate these cash advances despite demands by the City Treasurer, Norberto E. Azarcon, who directed him to settle and liquidate the amounts received. On June 1, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Francisco L. Ilustre, Jr. filed with the Sandiganbayan four separate informations for malversation of public funds against petitioner. The informations were similarly worded, differing only in the dates, voucher numbers, amounts, and specific projects involved. Each information charged that petitioner, as a public officer and accountable officer having received cash advances, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriated and converted the amounts for his personal use and benefit, and failed to liquidate despite demand.

On March 25, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations, alleging that the facts charged did not constitute an offense under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and that there was no prima facie evidence against him. The Ombudsman opposed the motion on April 18, 1996, maintaining that the failure of a public officer to liquidate cash advances after demand by a duly authorized officer constitutes malversation under a legal presumption, and that probable cause existed for the filing of the informations. Petitioner filed a reply on May 27, 1996, refuting the Ombudsman's arguments. On June 10, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion to quash "for obvious lack of merit." On July 26, 1996, petitioner was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty, without any showing that he objected to entering the plea in order to question the denial of the motion to quash before a superior court. On September 26, 1996, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: Petitioner argued that the facts charged in the informations do not constitute an offense under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash.
• Absence of Prima Facie Case: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution had not established a prima facie case against him, and consequently the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the informations.

• Presumption of Malversation: The Ombudsman countered that the law presumes that a public officer's failure to liquidate cash advances after demand by a duly authorized officer constitutes malversation of public funds, and that probable cause therefore existed for the filing of the informations.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash the informations on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that there was no prima facie case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Sandiganbayan correctly denied the motion to quash, the informations sufficiently charging malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the presumption arising from petitioner's admitted failure to liquidate after demand. The appropriate remedy from denial of a motion to quash is to proceed to trial and appeal any adverse judgment, not certiorari. Furthermore, petitioner's entry of a plea of not guilty after denial of the motion to quash waived all objections available under such motion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: It was admitted that petitioner, as acting mayor of Caloocan City from 1986 to 1988, received cash advances in the amounts of ₱100,000.00, ₱145,000.00, ₱300,000.00, and ₱200,000.00 for specific projects, and that the City Treasurer subsequently demanded liquidation, which petitioner failed to accomplish. Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, a prima facie presumption of malversation arises from such failure to account for public funds after demand. The informations therefore charged a valid offense, and the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash. The proper remedy from such denial is not appeal or certiorari to a higher court, but to proceed to trial on the merits and, if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. In addition, petitioner had already been arraigned on July 26, 1996, after the denial of his motion to quash, and entered a plea of not guilty without objection. By entering his plea, petitioner waived all objections which are grounds of a motion to quash. The exceptions to this rule had no application.

• Presumption of Malversation under Article 217, Revised Penal Code — The failure of a public officer to have duly rendered any public funds or property with which he is accountable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal use. In this case, petitioner's admitted receipt of cash advances and failure to liquidate after demand by the City Treasurer gave rise to the presumption, sufficient to sustain the denial of the motion to quash.

• Waiver of Objections by Pleading — By entering a plea after the denial of a motion to quash, an accused waives all objections which are grounds of a motion to quash. Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty without indicating any intention to question the denial of his motion to quash before a superior court, thus waiving his objections.

• Remedy from Denial of Motion to Quash — The appropriate remedy from the denial of a motion to quash is not appeal or certiorari to a higher court, but to go to trial on the merits and, if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

• "Petitioner failed to do so, and hence, there is a prima facie presumption under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that he had malversed the funds to his personal use and benefit." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the admitted failure to liquidate after demand triggers the statutory presumption of malversation, which suffices to charge an offense and defeat the motion to quash.

• "By entering his plea, petitioner waived all objections which are grounds of a motion to quash." — This articulates the waiver doctrine applied as an additional ground for dismissal, underscoring that arraignment after denial of a motion to quash forecloses certiorari review of the denial.

• Tanggote vs. Sandiganbayan, 236 SCRA 273 (1994) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that failure to liquidate cash advances after demand gives rise to a prima facie presumption of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 236 (1988) — Cited for the rule that the remedy from a denial of a motion to quash is not appeal.

• Bulaong vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 618 (1990) — Followed for the proposition that the proper remedy from denial of a motion to quash is to proceed to trial and appeal any adverse judgment.

• Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988) — Cited both for the proper remedy from denial of a motion to quash and for the doctrine that entry of a plea waives objections available in a motion to quash.

• People vs. Casiano, 111 Phil 73, 100 (1961) — Cited in support of the waiver doctrine, that pleading to the charge waives all grounds of a motion to quash.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes malversation of public funds. The provision establishes a prima facie presumption that a public officer who fails to render account of public funds after demand has put such funds to personal use. Applied to sustain the denial of the motion to quash, petitioner's admitted failure to liquidate cash advances after demand by the City Treasurer triggering the presumption.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.