Marquez vs. Sandiganbayan

An accused who raises the defense of forgery has the right to refer the questioned documents to an expert for examination, and a trial court’s denial of such a request, absent any valid justification, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and a denial of due process. The discretion of a court to examine handwriting under Section 22 of Rule 132 does not authorize it to preclude the accused from adducing expert evidence, for that discretion may be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.

A special audit by the Commission on Audit of selected transactions of the City of Parañaque for the years 1996 to 1998 uncovered anomalies involving petitioner Joey P. Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee, and Ofelia C. Caunan, Head of the General Services Office. Through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan procured several thousand rounds of ammunition of different calibers from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunition dealer with the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police or the Department of Trade and Industry. The ammunition was grossly overpriced. The COA Special Audit Team issued Notices of Disallowances. Marquez and Caunan sought reconsideration, and later appealed to the COA, but were denied. The Office of the Ombudsman thereafter found probable cause and, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed three informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against Marquez and Caunan before the Sandiganbayan.

The COA Audit and Anomalous Ammunition Procurement:
The COA Special Audit Team discovered that petitioner Joey P. Marquez, then City Mayor of Parañaque and Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee, and Ofelia C. Caunan, Head of the General Services Office, procured several thousand rounds of ammunition of various calibers through personal canvass and without public bidding from VMY Trading. VMY Trading was not registered as an arms and ammunition dealer with either the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division or the DTI. The ammunition was found to be grossly overpriced. The COA issued Notices of Disallowances, and Marquez and Caunan’s motion for reconsideration and subsequent appeal to the COA were denied.

Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019:
The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed three informations against Marquez and Caunan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27903-27905 and raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Marquez’s Claim of Forgery and Requests for NBI Examination:
Even before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, Marquez alleged that his signatures on the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests, and authorization requests were forged and sought referral of the documents to the NBI and reinvestigation. The OSP denied the request. During trial, after the prosecution had rested, Marquez in his Omnibus Motion dated April 1, 2008 again moved for referral of the questioned documents to the NBI, which was not acted upon. When the cases were re-raffled to the Fifth Division, he filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI on July 4, 2008, reiterating his defense of forgery.

Prosecution’s Evidence and Opposition:
The prosecution presented five witnesses and formally offered documentary evidence, including the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests, and authorization requests. All exhibits were admitted by the Sandiganbayan on March 22, 2006. Caunan, in her testimony, identified Marquez’s signatures on the disputed vouchers. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that Marquez never raised forgery during the COA audit or in his Joint Counter-Affidavit; that his pleadings indicated he relied on his subordinates, which estopped him from claiming forgery under Section 4, Rule 129; that the documentary evidence had long been admitted; and that the motion was a dilatory tactic filed two and a half years after the formal offer.

The Sandiganbayan’s Denial:
The Sandiganbayan Fifth Division denied the motion, citing Section 22 of Rule 132. It took the view that resort to handwriting experts was neither mandatory nor indispensable because the court itself could determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documents. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

• Denial of Right to Present Evidence and Due Process: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to allow referral of the questioned documents to the NBI prevented him from proving his defense of forgery, thereby violating his constitutional right to present evidence and his rights to due process and equal protection of law. He contended that he bore the burden of proving forgery and could not discharge it without an expert examination of the original documents, which were in the custody of the prosecution or the court.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the trial court’s reliance on its own authority to examine handwriting under Section 22 of Rule 132 was no justification for depriving him of expert evidence. He insisted that the court’s discretion could be exercised only after the evidence was submitted, and that the NBI findings would not be binding and would remain subject to judicial evaluation.

• Discretion of the Sandiganbayan: Respondents countered that no grave abuse of discretion attended the denial because Section 22, Rule 132 permits the court to determine forgery by its own comparison, and expert examination is not mandatory or indispensable.

• Belated Forgery Claim and Delay: Respondents argued that Marquez never raised the defense of forgery during the COA audit or in his Joint Counter-Affidavit, and that his motion was a mere afterthought intended to delay the proceedings, having been filed only after the prosecution had rested and two and a half years after the formal offer of evidence.

• Estoppel and Judicial Admissions: Respondents maintained that Marquez’s prior pleadings admitted reliance on his subordinates, which was inconsistent with a claim of forgery, and that he was estopped from contradicting those admissions under Section 4, Rule 129, as no palpable mistake was shown.

• Evidence Already Admitted and Identified: Respondents pointed out that the documentary evidence had already been formally offered and admitted, and that Caunan had already identified Marquez’s signatures on the documents during her testimony.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Due Process: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion to refer the prosecution’s documentary evidence to the NBI Questioned Documents Section for examination, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due process and to present evidence.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Due Process: The Sandiganbayan’s denial constituted grave abuse of discretion, as it deprived Marquez of a reasonable opportunity to present evidence essential to his defense. The constitutional right to due process in criminal proceedings includes the right to a fair trial and to present evidence. An accused who raises the defense of forgery bears the burden of proving it by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. To discharge that burden, the accused must be afforded the means to examine the original documents in the court’s custody. Denying referral to the NBI left Marquez with only negative testimonial evidence, which is generally considered weak. Section 22 of Rule 132, which allows the court to compare handwriting, does not authorize the court to preclude the accused from adducing expert evidence before the evidence is received; the discretion to evaluate evidence may be exercised only after the evidence is submitted at the hearing. Marquez’s request was not a dilatory tactic, as he had sought referral as early as November 2003, prior to arraignment, and had consistently pursued it. The fact that he did not raise forgery before the COA or in his counter-affidavit affects only the weight, not the admissibility, of his defense. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion.

• Right to Present Evidence as an Element of Due Process — The constitutional guarantee of due process in criminal cases encompasses the right of the accused to a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present his defense, which necessarily includes the right to adduce evidence of his own choice, provided it does not violate the rules. A trial court’s failure to accord such opportunity warrants the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, as it amounts to a denial of due process.

• Burden of Proving Forgery — Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence; the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.

• Discretion under Section 22, Rule 132 — While a court may determine the genuineness of handwriting by its own comparison, this discretion may be exercised only after the evidence is submitted at the hearing. It does not empower the court to deny an accused the opportunity to obtain and present expert evidence on questioned documents. Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Denying Examination of Questioned Documents — A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion when it denies an accused’s timely and consistently asserted motion to refer disputed documents to an expert for examination, where such denial effectively prevents the accused from proving his defense, the prosecution’s case is built on the very documents alleged to be forged, and the original documents are in the court’s custody, absent any other valid justification.

• “One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one's defense.” (Emphasizes the constitutional foundation of the right to present evidence.)

• “While it is true that the appreciation of whether the signatures of Marquez are genuine or not is subject to the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court.” (Articulates the limits of the court’s discretion under Rule 132 and the requirement that evidence be first presented.)

• “Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.” (Establishes the direct link between denial of the opportunity to present evidence and the availability of certiorari.)

• Salma v. Hon. Miro, G.R. No. 168362, January 25, 2007 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

• Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550 (1994) — Cited for the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence.

• Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. CA, 360 Phil. 753 (1998) — Cited for the principle that the burden of proving forgery lies on the party alleging it.

• Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214 (1997), citing Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362 (1923) — Cited for the principle that evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court.

• Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to due process in criminal prosecutions and the right to compulsory process to secure the production of evidence in the accused’s behalf. The Court applied this provision to hold that the accused must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, including expert examination of questioned documents.

• Section 22, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court — Allows the genuineness of handwriting to be proved by comparison made by the witness or the court. The Court clarified that this discretion does not vest the court with the power to deprive the accused of the opportunity to adduce expert evidence before the evidence is submitted.

• Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court — Governs judicial admissions and their contradiction only upon a showing of palpable mistake. The prosecution invoked this provision, but the Court did not find it a bar to the defense of forgery.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provision under which Marquez was charged.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Nachura, J., Peralta, J., and Abad, J., concurred.