Marquez vs. People of the Philippines

The uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator is sufficient for conviction if given in a straightforward manner and contains details that could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. Furthermore, a store not used as a dwelling and where the owner resides elsewhere is an uninhabited place under Article 302 of the Revised Penal Code, not an inhabited house under Article 299.

At approximately 2:30 a.m. on April 6, 2002, a group comprising Ricky "Totsie" Marquez, Roy Bernardo, Jomer Magalong, Ryan Benzon, and Marlon Mallari stood in front of the University of the East in Caloocan City. Marquez proposed robbing the nearby Rice-in-a-Box store, to which the group acceded. Marquez handed a lead pipe to Magalong, who, together with Bernardo, used it to destroy the store's padlock and break the door. Mallari was designated as the look-out while Marquez, Benzon, Magalong, and Bernardo entered the premises and took various items—including rice cookers, a blender, food items, and kitchen utensils—totaling approximately P42,000.00 in value. The stolen goods were brought to the house of Benzon's uncle. Mallari confessed his involvement to his brother the following day and subsequently reported the incident to the store owner, Sonia Valderosa, who had only learned of the burglary from the building owner's daughter, as she did not reside in the store.

• The Robbery: On April 6, 2002, at around 2:30 a.m., petitioners and their companions staged a robbery at the Rice-in-a-Box store in Caloocan City. Marquez initiated the plan and provided the lead pipe. Magalong and Bernardo destroyed the padlock and door. Marquez and Benzon entered the store and took the items, while Bernardo and Magalong carried the stolen goods away. Mallari served as the look-out.
• The Discovery: At 9:30 a.m. that same day, Valderosa was informed by the building owner's daughter that her store had been forcibly opened. Upon arrival, Valderosa discovered the missing items valued at P42,000.00. She did not reside in the store and only utilized it as a business premises.
• The Confession: On April 7, 2002, Mallari confessed his involvement to his older brother. The following day, he confessed directly to Valderosa, revealing the identities of his companions.
• The Defense: Petitioners claimed they were having a videoke session near the university from 11:00 p.m. of April 5 to 2:00 a.m. of April 6. On their way to eat lugaw, they passed by Mallari standing in front of the store. They later boarded a jeepney home and saw the store already opened, but did not report it to authorities. Their claimed location was approximately 15 meters away from the crime scene.

• Credibility of Co-Conspirator: Petitioners argued that the uncorroborated testimony of Mallari should not have been given credence. Because Mallari was a co-conspirator who was not charged in the Information and was instead utilized as a state witness, his testimony was allegedly concocted to save himself and escape criminal liability.
• Failure to Prove Conspiracy: Petitioners contended that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy, pointing out that Bernardo’s participation in the alleged robbery was vague.
• Validity of Defense: Petitioners maintained that their defenses of denial and alibi should not have been disregarded, especially given the alleged weakness of the prosecution's sole witness.

• Credibility of Witness: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that Mallari is a credible witness whose testimony suffices to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mallari's immediate confession to the crime resulted in the petitioners' arrests prior to the filing of the Information, which justified his non-inclusion as an accused and his use as a prosecution witness.
• Sufficiency of Uncorroborated Testimony: Respondent argued that Mallari’s testimony, though uncorroborated, stands on its own because it was given in a straightforward manner and contained details that could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.
• Positive Identification vs. Alibi: Respondent emphasized that Mallari’s positive identification of the petitioners, without any ill motive on his part, prevails over the weak defenses of denial and alibi.

• Credibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: Whether the uncorroborated testimony of an uncharged co-conspirator is sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery.
• Existence of Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was adequately proven among the petitioners.
• Proper Characterization of the Offended Party's Property: Whether the crime falls under Article 299 (robbery in an inhabited house) or Article 302 (robbery in an uninhabited place or private building) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Credibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: The uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator is sufficient for conviction if given in a straightforward manner and contains details that could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. Mallari’s testimony met this exception; his narration was detailed, candid, and given without hesitation, demonstrating it could not have originated from a polluted mind. His non-inclusion in the Information did not impair his credibility, as the prosecution merely availed of its legal option to utilize him as a state witness immediately, rather than undergoing the judicial procedure of charging and subsequently discharging him.
• Existence of Conspiracy: Conspiracy was adequately established. The coordinated acts of the petitioners—Marquez proposing the robbery and providing the lead pipe, Magalong and Bernardo destroying the padlock, and all entering the store to take and carry away items with intent to share the proceeds—demonstrated an unmistakably common purpose or design, rendering them collectively liable regardless of the extent of their individual participation.
• Proper Characterization of the Offended Party's Property: The crime falls under Article 302 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA erred in applying Article 299, as the store was not an inhabited house, public building, or edifice devoted to worship. Valderosa did not reside in the store, and a place not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and not used as a dwelling is punished under Article 302. Petitioners' failure to prove physical impossibility of presence at the scene—given they were only 15 meters away—rendered their alibi ineffective against Mallari's positive identification.

• Exception to the Rule on Co-Conspirator Testimony — As a general rule, the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for conviction unless supported by evidence. The exception is that the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. The Court applied this exception to uphold the conviction based solely on Mallari's testimony.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It is established by the performance of specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design. The responsibility of conspirators is collective, rendering all equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations.
• Inhabited House vs. Uninhabited Place — Under Article 301 of the RPC, an inhabited house includes any shelter constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even if temporarily absent. If a store is not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and is not used as a dwelling, since the owner lives in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302 (robbery in an uninhabited place or private building), not Article 299 (robbery in an inhabited house).

• "The testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought."
• "If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302."
• "What is important in conspiracy is that all conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to commit the crime."

• People v. Sala — Cited as the controlling precedent for the exception to the rule on co-conspirator testimony, establishing that uncorroborated testimony is sufficient if straightforward and detailed.
• People v. Caraang — Followed for the principle that conspiracy is indicated by specific acts performed with closeness and coordination reflecting a common purpose or design.
• People v. Castro — Followed for the doctrine that the responsibility of conspirators is collective, making all conspirators equally liable regardless of their individual participation.
• People v. Alcantara — Cited for the definition of robbery and the distinction between robbery with violence/intimidation and robbery with force upon things.

• Article 293, Revised Penal Code — Defines robbery as the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. Applied as the foundational definition of the crime committed.
• Article 299, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes robbery in an inhabited house or public building. The Court ruled this was erroneously applied by the CA, as the victim's store was not an inhabited dwelling.
• Article 301, Revised Penal Code — Defines an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship and their dependencies. Used to determine that the store did not qualify as an inhabited house.
• Article 302, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. Applied as the correct provision for the crime, given that the store was not used as a dwelling and the entrance was effected by breaking the outside door, resulting in the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the proper imposable penalty, reducing the sentence to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and eight (8) months to four (4) years, nine (9) months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional.

Carpio, A.T. (Chairperson), Brion, A.D., Perez, J.P., and Perlas-Bernabe, E.M.