Marquez vs. Board of Medical Examiners

No vested right attaches to existing regulatory standards governing admission to professional licensure examinations, such that a professional board is precluded from revising its recognition of an educational institution's standing; an applicant for examination is governed by the law and regulations in force at the time of application, not those in force at the time of enrollment or graduation.

Felix Marquez was a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received his M.D. degree on June 8, 1922. The Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands administered physicians' licensure examinations in Manila and determined eligibility for admission to those examinations based on the standing of the applicant's medical school. Act No. 3111 governed the Board's authority, and the Board had promulgated regulations classifying medical institutions and prescribing which classifications qualified graduates for examination. The National Medical State Board of the United States had classified the Chicago Medical College as a Class C institution, a classification the Philippine Board adopted as a basis for denying recognition.

Felix Marquez was a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received the degree of M.D. from that institution on June 8, 1922. He sought admission to the physicians' examinations conducted by the Board of Medical Examiners in the City of Manila and, on or about September 26, 1924, submitted his application for that purpose. No question was raised by the Board regarding Marquez's qualifications in other respects, but admission was denied on the ground that the Chicago Medical College had been classified as a Class C medical college by the National Medical State Board of the United States. Pursuant to the Board's regulations then in effect, a Class C classification denied the institution the requisite standing to qualify its graduates for examination in the Philippine Islands.

Prior to the adoption of the present regulations, and prior to the date when the Chicago Medical College was classified as Class C, the Board of Medical Examiners had accepted diplomas from that institution as sufficient proof of proficiency in medical knowledge to admit graduates to the examinations. As late as October 29, 1923, the Board favorably accepted the application of one Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, who had graduated from the same school in 1921. At the time Lazatin was admitted, however, the revised regulations withholding recognition from the Chicago Medical College had not yet been made effective. Those regulations had been made effective by proper authority before Marquez submitted his own application.

Marquez instituted an original proceeding in the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to admit him to the examinations. The respondents answered, and a demurrer was interposed on behalf of the petitioner. In argument, petitioner admitted that under Act No. 3111 and the regulations then in force, he was disqualified to take the examinations, but contended that his case should be governed by the law and regulations in force at the time of his enrollment in and graduation from the Chicago Medical College, when the institution was still recognized as reputable. The Board maintained that the applicable law was that in force at the time the application was filed.

• Non-Retroactivity: Petitioner argued that his case should be governed by the law and regulations in force at the time he enrolled in and graduated from the Chicago Medical College, when the institution was still recognized as a reputable medical school, rather than by those in force at the time he filed his application.
• Vested Right and Good Faith: Petitioner insisted that applying the current regulations would make the law retroactive in effect and cause irreparable damage, he having pursued his medical education in good faith, believing the school had the status necessary to qualify him for examination.

• Applicable Law: Whether the petitioner's eligibility to take the physicians' examinations should be governed by the law and regulations in force at the time of his enrollment and graduation from the Chicago Medical College, or by those in force at the time he filed his application for admission.
• Vested Right: Whether a student who matriculates in a medical institution acquires a vested right in the existing regulatory standards such that subsequent changes in the institution's classification cannot be applied to him.

• Applicable Law: No. The petitioner's eligibility is governed by the law and regulations in force at the time he filed his application, not those in effect when he enrolled or graduated.
• Vested Right: No. No vested right attaches to an existing law or regulation that would preclude its change or repeal, and a student who matriculates in a particular institution assumes the risk of changes in that institution's standing.

• Applicable Law: The determination of whether a medical institution is a "reputable medical school" within the meaning of the law is vested in the Board of Medical Examiners. The Board must be free to exercise its judgment and discretion without reference to the effect of its determination on particular individuals. The interests of the public require that the Board's regulatory authority remain responsive to current information about the standing of medical schools. Petitioner himself admitted that under Act No. 3111 and the regulations in force at the time of his application, he was disqualified. The regulations denying recognition to the Chicago Medical College had been duly made effective before he filed his application, distinguishing his situation from that of Dr. Lazatin, who was admitted before the revised regulations took effect.

• Vested Right: There can be no vested right in an existing law that would preclude its change or repeal. No person who has commenced preparation in a particular institution acquires any inchoate right by virtue of that fact alone. If the law were otherwise, the Board would be unable to give effect to the knowledge it acquires from time to time regarding the standing of medical schools. An intending physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the risk of changes that may be made in the standing of the institution by the Board. While the application of revised standards may result in hardship in isolated cases, the public interest requires that the Board retain the flexibility to adjust its recognition of institutions.

• No Vested Right in Existing Regulatory Standards — No vested right attaches to an existing law or regulation that would preclude its amendment or repeal. A person who begins preparation in a particular educational institution acquires no inchoate right by virtue of that enrollment, and assumes the risk of subsequent changes in the institution's standing as determined by the competent regulatory authority. The Court applied this principle to hold that the Board of Medical Examiners could lawfully deny Marquez admission to the physicians' examinations based on regulations in force at the time of application, even though the Chicago Medical College had been recognized when he enrolled and graduated.

• Discretion of Professional Boards — The determination of whether a medical institution is a "reputable medical school" is vested in the Board of Medical Examiners, which must be free to exercise its judgment and discretion without reference to the effect of its determination on particular individuals. The public interest requires that the Board remain able to adjust its recognition of institutions based on updated information about their standing.

• "There can in the nature of things be no vested right in an existing law, which would preclude its change or repeal. No one who has commenced preparation in a particular institution has any inchoate right on account of that fact." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: that regulatory standards governing professional licensure admission can be revised without violating vested rights, and matriculation in an institution confers no protection against subsequent changes in its classification.

• "An intending physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the risk of changes that may be made in the standing of the institution by the board." — This formulation is frequently cited for the proposition that a student bears the risk of regulatory changes affecting institutional recognition, establishing the allocation of risk between the individual and the regulatory authority.

• Act No. 3111 — The statute governing the Board of Medical Examiners and the physicians' licensure examinations. The Court noted that petitioner himself admitted he was disqualified under this Act and the regulations in force at the time of his application.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred.