Marquez vs. Alejo

The Secretary (Minister) of Justice may affirm, modify, or reverse the fiscal's resolution on preliminary investigation and direct reinvestigation, the filing of the corresponding information without another preliminary investigation, or the dismissal of the complaint or information.

Felimon C. Marquez and Ricardo Suarez were the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Obando, Bulacan, while Anastacio Roxas was impleaded with them in criminal complaints initiated by private respondents Gavino R. Alejo and Luis Cruz. Provincial Fiscal Pedro D. Ofiana of Bulacan conducted the preliminary investigation under the supervision and review authority of the Secretary of Justice. The governing framework at the time of the dispute was the 1964 Rules on criminal procedure, later superseded by Section 4, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure taken from Presidential Decree No. 911.

At the instance of Gavino R. Alejo and Luis Cruz, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan investigated a complaint for falsification of public documents by public officers against Felimon C. Marquez and Ricardo Suarez, then municipal mayor and treasurer of Obando, Bulacan, docketed as I.S. No. 2389, and a complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Anastacio Roxas, docketed as I.S. No. 2390. After conducting an investigation, the provincial fiscal issued a resolution dated December 15, 1965 dismissing the cases for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant criminal prosecution.

Thereafter private respondents filed a petition for review and/or appeal with the Secretary of Justice. Acting through the Chief State Prosecutor, the Secretary issued a 3rd Indorsement dated July 14, 1966 requesting the investigating fiscal to make a thorough reinvestigation in view of an apparent inconsistency in the dismissal resolution. In his 4th Indorsement dated August 1, 1966, the fiscal disclaimed any inconsistency but nonetheless conducted several hearings on the requested reinvestigation.

Prior to the hearing set for May 10, 1967, petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the provincial fiscal from proceeding with the reinvestigation. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the respondent court issued on May 9, 1967 a temporary restraining order enjoining the provincial fiscal from continuing with the reinvestigation. After trial, the respondent court issued on December 6, 1968 an order dismissing the petition and dissolving its restraining order, prompting petitioners' appeal raising only questions of law regarding the Secretary's authority and the validity of the reinvestigation.

• Necessary and Indispensable Party: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in holding that the Secretary of Justice is a necessary and indispensable party to the certiorari and prohibition case.
• Nature of the 3rd Indorsement: Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in treating the 3rd Indorsement dated July 14, 1966, taken as a whole, as a request for reinvestigation rather than an order to reinvestigate based on an alleged finding of apparent inconsistency.
• Maintenance of Dismissal Resolution: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in not maintaining the provincial fiscal's resolution dated December 15, 1965 in I.S. Nos. 2306, 2389 and 2390 dismissing the cases.
• Encroachment on Fiscal's Duty: Petitioner maintained that the Secretary of Justice, through his State Prosecutor, encroached upon the performance by Provincial Fiscal Pedro D. Ofiana of his duty, which is not administrative in nature.
• Due Process and Notice: Petitioner argued that, even assuming the remedies taken by Alejo and Cruz were proper, the same were null and void for lack of notice to petitioners, depriving them of due process and their day in court and contrary to the orderly administration of justice.
• Oppressive Prosecution and Nullity of Indorsement: Petitioner maintained that Alejo and Cruz, with the aid of the Secretary of Justice, were using the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, rendering the July 14, 1966 indorsement null and void and warranting a permanent injunction against proceeding thereunder.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to ask a fiscal to reinvestigate a case after the fiscal has found insufficiency of evidence to warrant criminal prosecution.
• Restraint of Reinvestigation and Prosecution: Whether certiorari, prohibition, or injunction lies to restrain the provincial fiscal from proceeding with the reinvestigation directed by the Secretary of Justice.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: Yes. Under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, taken from Presidential Decree No. 911, the Minister (now Secretary) of Justice may affirm, modify, or reverse the fiscal's action and direct the filing or dismissal of the charge.
• Restraint of Reinvestigation and Prosecution: No. Criminal prosecution remains under the direction and control of the fiscal, courts cannot interfere with that discretion, and injunction or prohibition against prosecution is unavailable except in the extreme case necessary for orderly administration of justice or to prevent oppressive use of the law.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: Section 4, Rule 112 squarely covers the dispute by requiring the investigating fiscal to forward the records to the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor for appropriate action, prohibiting filing or dismissal without prior written authority or approval, and providing that if upon petition by a proper party the Minister of Justice reverses the resolution, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal. Because that Rule was taken from Presidential Decree No. 911 and supported by prior rulings, the very acts questioned — review at the instance of the complainants and direction to thoroughly reinvestigate — were held to be within the Secretary's power to affirm, modify, or reverse the fiscal's action or opinion.
• Restraint of Reinvestigation and Prosecution: Prosecution was placed under the direction and control of the fiscal to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons, with institution of the action depending on the fiscal's sound discretion whether evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Because the fiscal determines through preliminary investigation the existence of a prima facie case, courts cannot compel prosecution, order filing within a period, or restrain reinvestigation and subsequent motion to dismiss where re-investigation shows innocence or insufficiency; in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or defendant, the fiscal's views normally prevail. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, complete jurisdiction passes to the court as sole judge of disposition, with the fiscal's motion to dismiss, even upon instructions of the Secretary after review, subject to grant or denial by the court.

• Direction and control of criminal prosecution by the fiscal — All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal, whose sound discretion determines whether to file or not file according to sufficiency of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, in order to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. Applied to sustain the fiscal's authority to investigate, reinvestigate, and move for dismissal for insufficiency of evidence.
• Non-interference with prosecutorial discretion; injunction against prosecution as extraordinary remedy — Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control, compel prosecution, or order filing within a certain period; neither injunction nor prohibition may issue to restrain criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where necessary for orderly administration of justice or to prevent oppressive and vindictive use of the strong arm of the law. Applied to deny permanent restraint of the reinvestigation directed in this case.
• Review power of the Secretary of Justice over fiscals — The fiscal's action is subject to approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor and may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice, who has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the action or opinion and consequently direct that a motion to dismiss be filed or that an information be filed. Applied to uphold the 3rd Indorsement requesting thorough reinvestigation and any consequent direction to file or dismiss.
• Exclusive judicial jurisdiction once charge is filed in court — Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition such as dismissal, conviction, or acquittal rests in the sound discretion of the court; although the fiscal retains direction and control of prosecution, the fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the trial court, and a motion to dismiss, whether before or after arraignment or upon instructions of the Secretary, is addressed to the court for grant or denial. Stated to delimit fiscal and Secretarial authority after court acquisition of jurisdiction.

• "It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." — States the foundational rule on prosecutorial authority that bars complainant control and judicial compulsion of prosecution.
• "Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court." — Defines the scope of the Secretary's review power over the fiscal's resolution as affirmance, modification, or reversal.
• "The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court." — Delineates the limit of fiscal and Secretarial control after filing, reserving disposition to the trial court.

• Crespo vs. Hon. Mogul, G.R. No. 53373, 30 June 1987 — Followed as controlling authority on the fiscal's direction and control of prosecution, the courts' non-interference, the Secretary of Justice's power to affirm, modify, or reverse, and the court's exclusive jurisdiction once the charge is filed.
• Estrella vs. Orendain, Jr., G.R. No. L-19611, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 640; Oliveros vs. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327; Caeg vs. Abad Santos, G.R. No. L-40044, March 10, 1975, 63 SCRA 96; Noblejas vs. Salas, G.R. Nos. L-31788 & L-31792, September 15, 1975, 67 SCRA 47; Vda. de Jacob vs. Puno, G.R. No. L-61554-55, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 144 — Cited as previous rulings supporting the Rule taken from Presidential Decree No. 911 on the investigating fiscal's duty and review hierarchy.
• Uytiepo vs. Aggabao, L-28671, Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 186, 192 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving only questions of law, as basis for certification.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, taken from Presidential Decree No. 911 (1976)) — Governs the duty of the investigating fiscal to resolve and certify, forward records within five days, obtain prior written authority or approval before filing or dismissing, and obey the Minister of Justice's reversal directing filing without another preliminary investigation or dismissal; applied to validate the Secretary's reinvestigation directive.
• Section 17 in connection with Section 31 of Republic Act No. 296, and Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court — Governs certification to the Supreme Court of appeals involving only questions of law; applied by the Court of Appeals to certify the case.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.