Mark Darwin Camara vs. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan

A court's power to punish for contempt is a drastic and extraordinary attribute to be exercised in the interest of justice and only upon a clear and contumacious refusal to obey its orders; where the order is silent as to the specific manner of compliance and the party has attempted to comply, the continuation of the party's detention under a prior contempt citation constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Leticia Lourdes A. Camara served as Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines, while Teresita V. Tengco headed LBP's Bonds Servicing Department. The underlying litigation, Civil Case No. R-1390, was an appeal by LBP from the ruling of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, fixing the just compensation for a parcel of land in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro that the Department of Agrarian Reform had expropriated under Presidential Decree No. 27; Josefina Lubrica figured in that case as assignee of Federico Suntay. Payment of just compensation to agrarian reform claimants is governed by Republic Act No. 6657 and the Department of Agrarian Reform's regulations on the release of payment.

Leticia Lourdes A. Camara was the Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines, while Teresita V. Tengco headed LBP's Bonds Servicing Department. The controversy traced back to Civil Case No. R-1390, an agrarian case involving the just compensation for a parcel of land in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform under Presidential Decree No. 27, in which Josefina Lubrica appeared as assignee of Federico Suntay.

On 4 March 2005, respondent Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, issued an Order in Civil Case No. R-1390 directing LBP to "deposit the preliminary compensation as determined by the PARAD, in cash and bonds[,] in the total amount of Php 71,634,027.30 with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila, within seven (7) days from receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period." LBP questioned the Order in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 93206), which the appellate court dismissed on 17 August 2006; LBP moved for reconsideration.

While LBP's motion for reconsideration remained pending, Lubrica filed a petition in the trial court to hold Camara and Tengco liable for indirect contempt for LBP's non-compliance with the 4 March 2005 Order. Overruling LBP's objection that a contempt citation was premature because the Court of Appeals had yet to act on its motion for reconsideration, the trial court, in its Order of 9 February 2007, found Camara and Tengco guilty of indirect contempt and ordered their arrest "until they comply with the order to deposit [dated 4 March 2005]." Camara was arrested on 12 February 2007 and detained at the Provincial Jail, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; Tengco eluded arrest.

On 14 February 2007, LBP filed with the trial court a Compliance stating that it had deposited in its head office in Manila the amount of ₱71,634,027.30 — ₱7,163,402.73 in cash and ₱64,470,624.57 in bond — in cash under its account "in trust for," and in bond payable to, "The Clerk of Court, RTC Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, in the Matter of Agrarian Case No. 1390." LBP submitted a copy of a manager's check for the cash deposit payable to the same clerk of court, and moved for Camara's release from detention and the quashal of the arrest warrant. On 15 February 2007, LBP sought clarification from the trial court on whose name the cash and bond deposit should be made. At the hearing on 19 February 2007, the trial court suggested that LBP change the account and payee's name for the cash and bond deposit to "Office of Clerk of Court, RTC San Jose Occidental Mindoro, for the account of Josefina S. Lubrica, as assignee of Federico Suntay, in the matter of Agrarian Case No. 1390," and LBP complied and made the corresponding change on the same day.

Notwithstanding that compliance, respondent judge in his Order of 21 February 2007 found LBP's Compliance insufficient because the deposit was not made "in such form that the Respondent Josefina S. Lubrica may immediately withdraw the same without any difficulty." He accordingly ordered that the "cash and bond payments be placed in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily withdrawable," and let the warrant of arrest of 9 February 2007 stand, thereby requiring Camara to remain in detention until LBP complied with the new directive.

On 23 February 2007, LBP, Camara, and Tengco filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the 9 February 2007 and 21 February 2007 Orders, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 98032, praying for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to secure Camara's release from detention pending resolution of the petition. On 27 February 2007, petitioner Mark Darwin Camara, Camara's son, filed the present petition for habeas corpus. The Court issued the writ on 2 March 2007, directing respondent judge to bring Camara before it on 5 March 2007, when the parties were also heard in oral arguments. Meanwhile, on 1 March 2007, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 98032 issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering respondent judge to release Camara from detention; after receiving that writ in the afternoon of 2 March 2007, respondent judge ordered Camara's release on the same day.

• Refusal to Release Despite Compliance: Petitioner did not question the trial court's jurisdiction to issue the Order of 9 February 2007 citing Camara and Tengco in contempt of court, but assailed respondent judge's refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBP's deposit with its head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of the preliminary compensation provided in respondent judge's 4 March 2005 Order, which refusal petitioner maintained amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

• Insufficiency of Compliance: Respondent judge maintained that LBP's Compliance was insufficient because the deposit was not made "in such form that the Respondent Josefina S. Lubrica may immediately withdraw the same without any difficulty," and accordingly ordered that the cash and bond payments be placed in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee in a form that is readily withdrawable, while letting the warrant of arrest stand.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Refusing Release: Whether respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to release Camara from detention despite LBP's deposit with its head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of the preliminary compensation provided in the 4 March 2005 Order.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Refusing Release: Yes. Respondent judge gravely abused his contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in refusing to release Camara despite LBP's substantial compliance with the 4 March 2005 Order, which was silent as to the name in which the deposit should be made.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Refusing Release: The 4 March 2005 Order directed LBP to "deposit the preliminary compensation as determined by the PARAD, in cash and bonds[,] in the total amount of Php 71,634,027.30 with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila, within seven (7) days from receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period." Nothing in that Order required the deposit to be placed in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee in a readily withdrawable form. LBP complied on 14 February 2007 by depositing the full amount in its head office, in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial court's clerk of court. That manner of deposit was not a contumacious disregard of the Order, not only because the Order was silent as to the name in which the deposit should be made but also because the branch clerk of court is under respondent judge's control. Had LBP's supposed transgression been the failure to place the deposit under Lubrica's name, respondent judge could have readily remedied the matter by directing LBP to turn over the manager's check and LBP bond to the branch clerk of court for disposal of the check's proceeds and the bond to Lubrica, subject to Lubrica's compliance with the Department of Agrarian Reform's regulations on the release of payment to claimants under Republic Act No. 6657. LBP even went out of its way to accommodate respondent judge by changing the account name for the cash deposit and the payee's name for the bond deposit following his suggestion at the 19 February 2007 hearing, and Lubrica's counsel admitted during oral arguments that even if the deposit were made under Lubrica's name, she would still be bound by, and willing to comply with, the DAR regulations on the release of payment. Respondent judge thus failed to appreciate in full measure the nature of his power to cite litigants in contempt, which is a drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts to be exercised in the interest of justice and only when there is a clear and contumacious refusal to obey orders. If a bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings, with more reason it should not serve as a basis to prolong a litigant's detention under a prior contempt citation where, as here, there had been an attempt to comply with the order. The detention of Camara was therefore unlawful, and to ensure that she would not be detained again for the same cause, respondent judge was ordered to desist from doing so irrespective of the outcome of CA G.R. SP No. 98032, without prejudice to Camara's availment of administrative reliefs.

• Contempt of Court — Nature and Exercise of the Power — The power to cite litigants in contempt is a drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts, to be exercised in the interest of justice and only when there is a clear and contumacious refusal to obey orders. In this case, respondent judge's continued detention of Camara despite LBP's deposit of the full preliminary compensation was held to be grave abuse of his contempt powers amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Bona Fide Misunderstanding of a Court Order — A bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings; with more reason, it should not serve as a basis to prolong a litigant's detention under a prior contempt citation when there has been an attempt to comply with the order. The Court applied this principle to hold that LBP's manner of deposit, made in a form the 4 March 2005 Order did not prescribe, could not support the prolongation of Camara's detention.
• Office of the Writ of Habeas Corpus — The office of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of deprivation of liberty, and it is on this narrow ground that the Court resolved the petition. The writ reaches jurisdictional matters but not the record, and it is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court.
• Habeas Corpus Distinguished from Certiorari — A writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari. Habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; certiorari reaches the record, while habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record.
• Person Discharged Not to Be Again Imprisoned — A person set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense. The Court invoked this rule to order respondent judge to desist from detaining Camara again for the same cause.

• "It is a drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts, to be exercised in the interest of justice and only when there is clear and contumacious refusal to obey orders." — This passage states the controlling standard for the exercise of the contempt power, which the Court found respondent judge had failed to appreciate in full measure.
• "If a bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings, with more reason that it should not serve as basis to prolong a litigant's detention under a prior contempt citation when, as here, there has been an attempt to comply with the order." — This is the ratio decidendi for the finding that Camara's continued detention was unlawful notwithstanding the trial court's dissatisfaction with the form of LBP's deposit.
• "The office of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of deprivation of liberty." — This defines the narrow scope of the Court's inquiry and explains why the petition was resolved on the ground of grave abuse of discretion rather than on the merits of the underlying agrarian case.
• "That the cash deposit was made under its account in trust for, and the bond made payable to, respondent judge's clerk of court is not a contumacious disregard of the 4 March 2005 Order not only because that Order is silent in whose name the deposit should be made but also because the branch clerk of court is under respondent judge's control." — This passage applies the substantial-compliance analysis to the specific manner in which LBP made its deposit.

• Gamboa vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270 (1952) — Cited twice as the authority for the rule that a bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings; the Court relied on it to hold that Camara's detention could not be prolonged on the basis of a dispute over the form of the deposit.
• Sombong vs. CA, 322 Phil. 737 (1996) — Cited, together with Villavicencio, as authority for the office of the writ of habeas corpus as an inquiry into the legality of deprivation of liberty.
• Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919) — Cited as authority for the office of the writ of habeas corpus.
• Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163108, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 312 — Quoted at length for the distinction between a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari, explaining that habeas corpus is a collateral attack reaching the body but not the record, while certiorari is a direct attack reaching the record.

• Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Provides that a writ of habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person restrained of liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. The Court cited the provision as the general rule but found that respondent judge's refusal to release Camara despite LBP's compliance constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Cited for the office of the writ of habeas corpus as an inquiry into the legality of deprivation of liberty.
• Section 15, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Cited as the basis for the Court's finding that Camara's detention was unlawful.
• Section 17, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Provides that a person set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction, and penalizes recommitment. The Court invoked this provision to order respondent judge to desist from detaining Camara again for the same cause.
• Republic Act No. 6657 — Cited in connection with the Department of Agrarian Reform's regulations on the release of payment to claimants; the Court noted that Lubrica would remain bound by these regulations regardless of the name in which the deposit was made.
• Presidential Decree No. 27 — Cited as the law under which the Department of Agrarian Reform expropriated the parcel of land in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro that gave rise to Civil Case No. R-1390.
• Administrative Order No. 2, series of 2005 (DAR AO No. 2) — Cited as listing the documents which the claimant or landowner must present as a precondition for the release of payment.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice's certification that the conclusions in the Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson)
• Conchita Carpio Morales
• Dante O. Tinga
• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.