Mariscal vs. Court of Appeals

The Court held that litis pendencia applies when there is identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for founded on the same facts, and such identity that a judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other; differing specific grounds for annulment do not negate litis pendencia when the ultimate objective is the same and the alternative grounds were already pleaded in the first action.

Bella Catalan and Rogelio Mariscal contracted marriage on 4 April 1988. Catalan later worked as a nurse in the United States and sent Mariscal $32,000.00 purportedly to buy properties for their future. Mariscal had a prior subsisting marriage, prompting Catalan to file criminal complaints for bigamy and perjury against him.

• First Action: On 29 March 1993, Catalan filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against Mariscal in the RTC of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 20983) on the grounds that the marriage was void ab initio for being solemnized without a valid marriage license and for being bigamous. She also sought to recover $32,000.00, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
• Second Action: On 31 March 1993, Mariscal filed his own complaint for annulment of the same marriage in the RTC of Digos (Civil Case No. 2996) on the grounds that he was forced to marry Catalan at gunpoint and that they had no valid license. He likewise prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
• Motion to Dismiss: Catalan moved to dismiss the Digos case on the ground of litis pendencia, citing the pending Iloilo case involving the same parties and cause of action. The RTC of Digos denied the motion.
• Answer with Counterclaim: In his answer filed in the Iloilo case, Mariscal prayed for the dismissal of the complaint or, alternatively, that the marriage be declared void for being performed under force, violence, intimidation, threats, and strategy. He also filed a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, alleging that Catalan filed the suit in bad faith and with malice.
• Supervening Event: During the pendency of the petition, the RTC of Iloilo rendered judgment on 2 October 1996 in Civil Case No. 20983, nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy and awarding Catalan moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, although rejecting her claim for the $32,000.00 for lack of evidence.

Petitioner Mariscal maintained that the judgment in one case would not constitute res judicata in the other because the grounds for nullification differed. He argued that if the RTC of Iloilo dismissed the complaint, the RTC of Digos could still void the marriage based on his specific claim of vitiated consent, a ground not traversed in the Iloilo case. He contended that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the consequences of various possible judgments in the two separate cases.

Respondent Catalan countered that both actions sought the annulment of the same marriage based on the same set of facts, satisfying the requisites of litis pendencia. She argued that her added claim for $32,000.00 did not militate against the identity of the causes of action and reliefs in both cases.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendencia.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the elements of litis pendencia are present notwithstanding the differing specific grounds for annulment invoked by the parties in the two separate suits.

• Procedural: The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision setting aside the trial court's order and dismissing Civil Case No. 2996, holding that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the doctrine of litis pendencia.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that all three requisites of litis pendencia were present. Identity of parties and identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for were evident because both actions sought the ultimate dissolution of the same marriage founded on the same facts. As to the third requisite, the Court found that the identity of issues was present because the core issue was the nullification of the marriage. The Court held that Mariscal's attempt to differentiate the cases by citing vitiated consent as a ground in the Digos case failed, because he had already raised the issue of force, violence, intimidation, and threats in his answer and compulsory counterclaim in the Iloilo case. Any judgment in the Iloilo case would necessarily constitute res judicata in the Digos case. Furthermore, the Court noted that interposing a cause of action as a counterclaim in one suit and invoking it in a separate complaint against the same party constitutes splitting a cause of action.

• Litis Pendencia — Requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that two annulment suits between the same parties possess sufficient identity of issues because the ultimate objective is the same, especially when the petitioner's alternative ground was already raised as a defense and counterclaim in the first suit.
• Splitting a Cause of Action — A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint or cause of action against the plaintiff. Interposing a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoking it in a complaint against the same party constitutes splitting a cause of action, which is not sanctioned by the Rules. The Court applied this principle to Mariscal's act of filing a separate suit in Digos while asserting a compulsory counterclaim in the Iloilo case.

• "In litis pendencia what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration."
• "A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules."

• Victronics Computers, Inc. v. RTC-Br. 63, Makati, G.R. No. 104019, 25 January 1993, 217 SCRA 517 — Followed as controlling precedent for the three requisites of litis pendencia.
• Matela v. Chua Tay, No. L-16407, 30 May 1962, 5 SCRA 163 — Followed regarding the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
• National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112702 and 113613, 26 September 1997, 279 SCRA 506 — Followed regarding the avoidance of duplicity of suits.

• Rules of Court — The Court invoked the Rules in holding that interposing a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoking it in a separate complaint constitutes splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena