Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, et al.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal/community property under Article 1407 of the Civil Code, and registration in the husband's name alone is not conclusive evidence of his exclusive ownership. The surviving spouse, as coowner of the community property, may alienate the property; annulment of the sale as to the deceased spouse's share requires proof, in a proper action, that another coowner/heir exists.

Narciso Marigsa acted as administrator of the intestate estate of Esteban Marigsa. Ildefonsa Macabuntoc was Esteban's surviving widow, and the other defendants were purchasers of carabaos from her. The governing law included the Civil Code's presumptions on conjugal partnership property and the Code of Civil Procedure's provisions on inventorying community property in intestate estates.

Narciso Marigsa, as administrator of the intestate estate of Esteban Marigsa, demanded from Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, the widow of Esteban, certain property for administration on the ground that it belonged exclusively to the deceased. The property consisted of six carabaos. After Esteban's death, Ildefonsa sold the animals: two to Anatalia Isidro for P120 each; one to Agapito Mercado for P150; one to Agustin Deliso for P150; one to Sabas Doro for P150; and one to Gaspar Umipig for P120. The buyers were among the defendants in the case.

To prove that the carabaos had belonged exclusively to Esteban, the plaintiff presented certificates of transfer issued in the municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija. The certificates, dated July 12, 1906, recorded Esteban Marigsa, represented by his wife Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, as owner transferring carabaos by sale to the named purchasers for the stated prices. The plaintiff relied on these records as evidence of Esteban's exclusive ownership.

The defendants, for their part, attempted to prove that the carabaos belonged exclusively to the widow as paraphernal property brought to her second marriage to Esteban Marigsa, whom she had married thirty years before, and that Esteban had brought nothing to the conjugal partnership. The widow and two other witnesses averred these facts. The widow further testified that there was no issue from her marriage to Marigsa; that she no longer had any ascendants and knew of no collateral relative of her deceased husband; that the plaintiff himself was named Marigsa only as a nickname, his father's family name being Magcuayan; and that the carabaos had been registered in Esteban's name because he was her husband.

The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija declared that the six animals belonged exclusively to the intestate estate of Esteban Marigsa and were subject to the plaintiff's administration. It ordered the defendants to return them to Narciso Marigsa as administrator and declared the sales made by Ildefonsa Macabuntoc to her codefendants rescinded and invalid. The court imposed one-sixth of the costs of the trial against each defendant. The defendants appealed, assigning as errors the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had fully proved his complaint through the certificates of ownership, its finding that the carabaos belonged exclusively to the intestate estate and should be returned, and its declaration that the sales were rescinded and invalid.

The decision does not recount arguments by Narciso Marigsa as plaintiff-appellee. The following are the assignments of error pressed by the defendants-appellants, who are the petitioners in this appeal.

• Proof of Ownership: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff had fully proved the allegations of his complaint by means of the certificates of ownership issued by the municipality of Cuyapo.
• Exclusive Ownership and Return: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that the carabaos sued for belonged exclusively to the intestate Esteban Marigsa, formed part of his estate under administration, and in adjudging their return to the defendants.
• Rescission of Sales: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in declaring the sales made by the defendant Ildefonsa Macabuntoc to her codefendants rescinded and invalid.

• Proof of Exclusive Ownership: Whether the certificates of transfer issued in the name of the deceased husband were sufficient to prove that the six carabaos belonged exclusively to him.
• Character of the Carabaos: Whether the carabaos were the exclusive property of the deceased husband, the paraphernal property of the widow, or the conjugal/community property of the marriage.
• Rescission of Sales: Whether the sales made by the widow to her codefendants could be rescinded and invalidated in the intestate proceeding.
• Possession in Intestate Proceedings: Whether the initiation of intestate proceedings may disturb the possession of the surviving spouse or third parties.

• Proof of Exclusive Ownership: No. Certificates of transfer or registration in the husband's name are not conclusive evidence of exclusive ownership; the legal presumption under Article 1407 of the Civil Code is that all property of the marriage is partnership/community property until proven otherwise.
• Character of the Carabaos: The carabaos are presumed community property. The evidence did not overcome the presumption; they were neither paraphernal property of the widow nor the private property of the deceased husband. Only the deceased husband's presumptive one-half interest may be subject to the intestate estate.
• Rescission of Sales: No. The rescission was premature. The widow, as surviving spouse and coowner, could alienate the property; annulment of the sale with respect to the deceased husband's share requires proof in a proper action that there is another coowner/heir.
• Possession in Intestate Proceedings: No. The initiation of intestate proceedings must not disturb the possession of the surviving spouse, legitimate heirs, or third parties.

• Proof of Exclusive Ownership: In the registration of animals belonging to husband and wife, the record is often made out only in the name of the husband because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the registration or certificates of transfer in Esteban Marigsa's name were not conclusive evidence of his exclusive ownership. To destroy the presumption under Article 1407 of the Civil Code—that all property of the marriage is partnership property until proven to belong exclusively to the husband or wife—other proof was necessary. The plaintiff presented no such other proof. The trial court's finding of exclusive ownership was therefore improper and was reversed.

• Character of the Carabaos: Under Article 1401, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, property appearing registered in the husband's name but acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage has the inherent character of partnership property, whether acquired for the partnership or for one spouse only. The marriage of Marigsa and Macabuntoc lasted more than thirty years according to the testimony, and some of the carabaos were offspring of others purchased during the marriage. Under Article 1401, paragraph 3, even such offspring is considered community property. Hence, the animals were not the paraphernal property of the widow, as she claimed, nor were they the private property of the deceased husband. The legal presumption that they were community property prevailed, and only the deceased husband's presumptive one-half interest could be considered subject to the intestate estate until proof to the contrary.

• Rescission of Sales: Upon dissolution of the marriage by the death of one spouse, the community property ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes a community by operation of law between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the surviving spouse if he or she is the sole heir. In this case, no proof was adduced to show what right the plaintiff had to call himself coowner with the widow. The only action that could appertain to him would be one to interfere with the acts of a person who, in the exercise of her rights as a coowner, or perhaps an absolute owner, disposed of the property without need of authorization. Even on the basis of coownership, which the evidence irrefutably showed, the surviving widow acted within her rights in transferring the property. Whenever it is shown that there is another coowner as heir of the deceased husband, an action for annulment of the sale with respect to one-half of the property may be prosecuted so that it may be inventoried as belonging to the estate. Article 399 of the Civil Code provides that every coowner has full ownership of his part and may alienate it, but the effect of the alienation with regard to the coowners is limited to the share awarded to him in the division upon dissolution of the community. Section 6845 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that one-half of the community property belonging to the deceased spouse shall be inventoried and distributed as part of the estate. The rescission of the sales was therefore premature and was reversed.

• Possession in Intestate Proceedings: The Court stated that it had already decided that the initiation of intestate proceedings must not disturb the possession of the surviving spouse, or of the legitimate heirs, much less that of a third party. This principle reinforced the conclusion that the administrator could not, in this proceeding, recover all the carabaos from the widow and the purchasers. The trial court's order for return of the animals was accordingly improper.

• Conjugal Partnership Property Presumption — Under Article 1407 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is considered partnership property until it is proven to belong exclusively to the husband or wife. The Court applied this presumption to the six carabaos, holding that the certificates of transfer in the husband's name did not overcome it.
• Registration in Husband's Name Not Conclusive — Registration of animals belonging to husband and wife in the husband's name is often done merely because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership; it is not conclusive evidence of his exclusive ownership. Other proof is necessary to destroy the Article 1407 presumption. Applied: the Cuyapo certificates were insufficient.
• Property Acquired During Marriage — Under Article 1401, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage has the inherent character of partnership property, whether acquired for the partnership or for one spouse only. Applied: the carabaos acquired during the marriage were community property.
• Offspring as Community Property — Under Article 1401, paragraph 3, of the Civil Code, the offspring of animals acquired during the marriage is considered community property. Applied: some of the carabaos were offspring of animals purchased during the marriage, so they were not paraphernal property of the widow.
• Community Property at Dissolution — Upon dissolution of the marriage by death, community property ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes a community by operation of law between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the surviving spouse if he or she is the sole heir. Applied: the widow had rights as coowner or possibly absolute owner.
• Co-owner's Power to Alienate — Under Article 399 of the Civil Code, every coowner has full ownership of his part and may alienate it, but the effect of the alienation as to the coowners is limited to the share awarded to him in the division upon dissolution of the community. Applied: the widow could transfer the property; annulment could affect only the deceased husband's share.
• Inventory of Community Property — Under Section 6845 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one-half of the community property belonging to the deceased spouse is inventoried and distributed as part of the estate. Applied: only the deceased husband's presumptive one-half interest could be subject to the intestate estate.
• Intestate Proceedings Do Not Disturb Possession — The initiation of intestate proceedings must not disturb the possession of the surviving spouse, the legitimate heirs, or third parties. Applied: the administrator could not recover all the carabaos from the widow and purchasers in this proceeding.

• "All the property of the marriage shall be considered as partnership property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife." — This is the Article 1407 presumption, which the Court used to reject the trial court's finding that the carabaos belonged exclusively to the deceased husband.
• "In the registration of animals belonging to husband and wife, the record thereof is often made out only in the name of the husband on account of his being the administrator of the conjugal partnership; so that registration herein concerned is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband." — This passage defines why the certificates of transfer in Esteban's name were insufficient to prove exclusive ownership.
• "The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow if he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse." — This states the post-dissolution regime and supports the widow's right to alienate the property.
• "Although it were upon no other basis than that of coownership, which coownership is irrefutably shown to have existed by the evidence in this case, the surviving widow acted perfectly within her rights in transferring the property in question." — This is the ratio for reversing the rescission of the sales made by the widow.

• Article 1407, Civil Code — All property of the marriage is considered partnership property until proven to belong exclusively to the husband or wife. Applied to presume the carabaos community property and to reject the certificates as conclusive proof.
• Article 1401, paragraph 1, Civil Code — Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage has the inherent character of partnership property, whether acquired for the partnership or for one spouse only. Applied to the carabaos acquired during the marriage.
• Article 1401, paragraph 3, Civil Code — Offspring of animals acquired during the marriage is considered community property. Applied to the carabaos that were offspring of animals purchased during the marriage.
• Article 399, Civil Code — Every coowner has full ownership of his part and may alienate it, but the effect of the alienation as to the coowners is limited to the share awarded to him in the division upon dissolution of the community. Applied to the widow's sales.
• Section 6845, Code of Civil Procedure — One-half of the community property belonging to the deceased husband or wife shall be inventoried and distributed as part of the estate. Applied to limit the estate's claim to the deceased husband's presumptive one-half interest.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.