Mariano vs. Court of Appeals

A co-owner who redeems the whole foreclosed property within the redemption period does not become its sole owner; the redemption inures to the benefit of all co-owners, and the period for legal redemption does not begin to run without the written notice required by law.

The parties are the heirs of Francisco Gosiengfiao and the purchasers of a residential lot in Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The case requires distinguishing Article 1088 of the Civil Code, on a co-heir’s legal redemption of hereditary rights, from Article 1620, on a co-owner’s legal redemption of a sold share in a thing owned in common.

Francisco Gosiengfiao owned a residential lot in Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly the eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao Cadastre, after segregation designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416 in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. He mortgaged the lot to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao on several occasions. On August 15, 1958, Francisco died intestate, survived by his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, Severino, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto. The loan being unpaid, the lot was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank, and in the foreclosure sale held on December 27, 1963, the bank was awarded the property as the highest bidder.

On February 7, 1964, Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the property by paying P1,347.89, and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the mortgagee bank. On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao, on her behalf and that of her minor children Emma, Lina, and Norma, together with Carlos and Severino, executed a Deed of Assignment of the Right of Redemption in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra, entered in the notarial register of Pedro Laggui as Doc. No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No. 8, Series of 1965. On August 15, 1966, Amparo sold the entire property to Leonardo Mariano, who subsequently established residence on the lot; the Deed of Sale dated August 15, 1966 showed Amparo, Antonia, Carlos, and Severino as signatories.

Sometime in 1982, Grace Gosiengfiao learned of the sale. She went to the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to the property. On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached, the Barangay Captain issued a certificate to file action. On December 8, 1982, Leonardo Mariano sold the same property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as Doc. No. 143, Page No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.

On December 21, 1982, Grace Gosiengfiao and the other private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and legal redemption with damages against Leonardo and Avelina Mariano. They alleged that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot, they had the right to recover their respective shares because they did not sell them, and the right to redeem the shares of the other co-owners sold to the defendants. In their answer, the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action because the money used to redeem the lot came solely from the personal funds of Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became the sole owner and validly sold the entire property to them; they also alleged that the property had already been sold to Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino and that, even if the plaintiffs were co-owners, their right of redemption was barred by the Statute of Limitations under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches.

Private respondents claimed that sometime in October 1982 they sought to redeem the property from the spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue by tendering the repurchase price of P12,000, which the spouses rejected. Grace Gosiengfiao testified that when she went to Atty. Pedro Laggui, he showed her a Deed of Sale, but she was never given a copy and was never informed in writing of the sale. Petitioners alleged that Grace was given a copy of the questioned deed on October 31, 1982 and shown a copy at the Office of the Barangay Captain on November 18, 1982, but the SC found this unsupported by the evidence. The RTC found that Amparo used her own personal funds in redeeming the property and that private respondents did not redeem from the bank or from Amparo.

• Applicable Redemption Provision: Petitioners argued that the CA incorrectly applied Article 1620 instead of Article 1088 of the Civil Code, because the lot formed part of the unpartitioned intestate estate of Francisco Gosiengfiao and private respondents and third-party defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
• Timeliness of Legal Redemption: Petitioners contended that private respondents did not timely exercise legal redemption under Article 1088, which requires redemption within one month from written notice of the sale by the vendor; they cited Conejero vs. Court of Appeals for the principle that giving a copy of the deed is equivalent to the required notice.
• Consignation of Redemption Price: Petitioners maintained that private respondents could not validly effect redemption because they failed to consign in court the full redemption price after their tender was rejected.

• Effect of Redemption by a Co-Owner: Whether a co-owner who redeems the whole foreclosed property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner and terminates co-ownership.
• Applicable Redemption Provision: Whether the CA erred in applying Article 1620 instead of Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
• Written Notice and Timeliness: Whether private respondents’ right of legal redemption was timely exercised despite the absence of written notice of the sale.
• Consignation After Rejected Tender: Whether failure to consign the full redemption price in court after tender was rejected invalidated the redemption.

• Effect of Redemption by a Co-Owner: No. A co-owner’s redemption of the whole property within the redemption period does not vest sole ownership in her but inures to the benefit of all co-owners; redemption is not a mode of terminating co-ownership.
• Applicable Redemption Provision: No. The SC affirmed the CA; the absence of written notice meant the redemption period had not begun, so private respondents had not lost their right to redeem.
• Written Notice and Timeliness: No. The 30-day period did not begin to run because no written notice of the sale was given; actual knowledge or the showing of a copy was not equivalent under the facts.
• Consignation After Rejected Tender: No. Consignation was not necessary because the tender was made to exercise a right, not to discharge an obligation.

• Effect of Redemption by a Co-Owner: The SC quoted the CA: “Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.” It held that this was supported by Annie Tan vs. CA, Adille vs. CA, and De Guzman vs. CA. The CA’s qualification was that if Amparo had purchased from the mortgagee bank after the redemption period and after the bank had consolidated title, there would be no co-ownership; here, Amparo redeemed within the one-year redemption period.
• Applicable Redemption Provision: Petitioners argued that Article 1088, not Article 1620, governed because the lot remained part of the unpartitioned estate. The SC cited Tolentino’s distinction: when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property of the inheritance, the right of redemption is that under Article 1620; when the hereditary right itself is sold in the abstract, Article 1088 applies. The SC then held that, absent written notice of the sale, private respondents had not lost their right to redeem and the 30-day period had not begun.
• Written Notice and Timeliness: The SC held written notice indispensable. It distinguished Conejero vs. Court of Appeals because there the redemptioner was shown and given a copy of the deed; here the records showed no written notice. Petitioners’ claim that Grace was given a copy on October 31, 1982 and shown a copy on November 18, 1982 was unsupported; Grace testified she was never given a copy. Under Castillo vs. Samonte and Garcia vs. Calaliman, actual knowledge acquired in some other manner does not dispense with written notice; the one-month period runs only from written notice. Since no written notice was given, the period had not begun. Private respondents tendered P12,000 in October 1982, which was rejected; the complaint was filed to assert their rights.
• Consignation After Rejected Tender: The SC held that consignation was not necessary because the tender of payment was not made to discharge an obligation but to enforce or exercise a right. It cited Francisco vs. Bautista for the rule that a mere tender of payment is enough as a basis for an action to compel reconveyance; no subsequent consignation is needed.

• Redemption by a co-owner inures to the benefit of all co-owners — A co-owner who redeems the whole foreclosed property within the redemption period does not become sole owner; the redemption preserves the property for all co-owners and does not terminate co-ownership. The SC applied this to Amparo’s redemption within the one-year period; it noted that a purchase after the redemption period and after consolidation of title in the bank would have produced a different result.
• Written notice is indispensable to start the legal redemption period — Under Article 1088, the one-month period for a co-heir to redeem runs only from written notice by the vendor. Actual knowledge, verbal notice, registration, or the showing of a copy is not enough unless it amounts to the written notice required by law. The SC found no written notice, so the period never began.
• Tender suffices; consignation is not required when exercising a right — When a tender of the redemption price is rejected, the redemptioner need not consign the amount in court if the tender was made to enforce or exercise a right rather than to discharge an obligation. The SC applied this to the rejected P12,000 tender.
• Distinction between Articles 1088 and 1620 — Article 1620 applies when the sale covers an interest in a particular property of the inheritance; Article 1088 applies when the hereditary right itself is sold in the abstract. The SC cited this distinction in addressing petitioners’ argument but affirmed on the written-notice ground.

• “Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.” — The CA’s ruling, quoted and affirmed by the SC, states the core co-ownership doctrine.
• “Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration.” — The SC quotes Castillo vs. Samonte and Hernaez vs. Hernaez to hold that the written notice requirement is exclusive.
• “Consignation is not necessary, because the tender of payment was not made to discharge an obligation, but to enforce or exercise a right.” — The SC uses this to reject petitioners’ argument that failure to consign the full redemption price invalidated the redemption.
• “Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.” — The SC’s final holding ties the absence of written notice to the timeliness of the legal redemption.

• Conejero vs. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 775 (1966) — Distinguished; the principle on notice was not disputed, but the facts differed because the redemptioner there was shown and given a copy of the deed.
• Castillo vs. Samonte, 106 Phil. 1023 (1960) — Followed; written notice is required, and reimbursement within one month from written notice is a condition precedent to legal redemption.
• Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 32 Phil. 214 — Quoted in Castillo vs. Samonte; the written notice requirement under Article 1088 cannot be widened to include verbal notice or registration.
• Garcia vs. Calaliman, G.R. No. 26855, 172 SCRA 201 (1989) — Followed; written notice is indispensable, and actual knowledge acquired in some other manner does not dispense with it.
• Francisco vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 192 SCRA 388 (1991) — Followed; consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase because a mere tender of payment is sufficient as a basis for an action to compel reconveyance.
• Annie Tan vs. CA, G.R. No. 79899, 172 SCRA 660 (1989) — Cited as support for the rule that redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law inures to the benefit of all co-owners.
• Adille vs. CA, G.R. No. 44546, 157 SCRA 445 (1988) — Cited as support for the same co-owner redemption rule.
• De Guzman vs. CA, G.R. No. 47378, 148 SCRA 75 (1987) — Cited as support for the same co-owner redemption rule.

• Article 1088, Civil Code — A co-heir may redeem hereditary rights sold to a stranger before partition within one month from written notice of the sale by the vendor. The SC applied the written-notice requirement and held that, absent such notice, the 30-day period had not begun.
• Article 1620, Civil Code — A co-owner may exercise the right of redemption when the shares of all or any co-owners are sold to a third person. The CA’s application of this article was challenged by petitioners; the SC cited the Tolentino distinction between Articles 1088 and 1620 and affirmed on the written-notice ground.