Maria Natividad vda. de Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission

Once a claimant’s status as a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army is established, the Veterans Backpay Commission’s duty to give due course to the backpay claim is ministerial and compellable by mandamus; Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, extends backpay benefits to recognized guerrillas regardless of citizenship.

The dispute concerns the Back Pay Law, Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, which recognizes backpay rights of members of guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States. Maria Natividad vda. de Tan was the widow of Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national who served in the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla organization recognized by the United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army. The Veterans Backpay Commission is the government agency vested with authority to implement the Backpay Law.

Maria Natividad vda. de Tan was the widow of Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national and bona fide member of the 1st Regiment, United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines. That guerrilla organization was duly recognized by the Army of the United States and formed part and parcel of the Philippine Army. Tan Chiat Bee died in the service on April 4, 1945 in the battle at Ipo Dam, Rizal Province, and was duly recognized as a guerrilla veteran and certified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered meritorious military services during the Japanese occupation.

As widow of the recognized deceased veteran, Maria filed an application for back pay under Republic Act No. 897, the resolution of the Veterans Backpay Commission dated November 19, 1953, and the letter of the Commission dated December 9, 1953. On June 18, 1955, the Secretary and Chief of Office Staff of the Commission sent a letter to General Vicente Lopez of the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, apprising him that the Commission had reaffirmed its resolution granting back pay to alien members. The Adjutant of the Armed Forces of the Philippines verified and certified that the deceased veteran had rendered service as a recognized guerrilla for the period indicated in his indorsement to the Chief, Finance Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Chief of Finance Service, Camp Murphy, computed the backpay due the petitioner, and the same was passed in audit by representatives of the Auditor General.

After due liberation, the respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens were not entitled to back pay. On February 13, 1957, the Veterans Backpay Commission, through its Secretary and Chief of Office Staff, made a formal reply to Maria’s claim denying her request on the ground that aliens were not entitled to back pay. Upon that refusal, Maria brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila by way of mandamus, seeking an order to compel the Commission (1) to declare the deceased entitled to backpay rights, privileges, and prerogatives under Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, and (2) to give due course to her claim as widow by issuing the corresponding backpay certificate of indebtedness.

The Commission filed its answer in due time asserting special and affirmative defenses, on the basis of which it unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition. The parties then submitted a stipulation of facts dated July 31, 1957, in which they admitted the existence and authenticity of documents Annex A through Annex M and waived the presentation of further evidence. The lower court found that the deceased was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who had served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla unit recognized by the United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army; it also noted that the Chief of the Finance Service, Camp Murphy, had computed the backpay due and that it had passed audit by representatives of the Auditor General.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Respondent argued that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that this failure barred her action in court, citing Montes vs. The Civil Service Board of Appeals.
• Suit Against the Government Without Consent: Respondent argued that the petition was, in effect, an action to enforce a money claim against the government without its consent.
• Mandamus and Discretion: Respondent argued that mandamus would not lie to compel the exercise of a discretionary function.
• Aliens Not Covered: Respondent argued that Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 were never intended to benefit aliens, because the purpose of the law was to rehabilitate members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and recognized guerrillas by giving them the right to acquire public lands and public property through backpay certificates, and because aliens except American citizens cannot acquire public lands or exploit natural resources.

• Mandamus and Ministerial Duty: Whether mandamus lies to compel the Veterans Backpay Commission to give due course to petitioner’s backpay claim, or whether such action involves a discretionary function.
• Alien Entitlement: Whether Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, extends backpay benefits to a Chinese national who was a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether petitioner’s failure to appeal to the President bars her action in court, or whether the Commission is estopped from invoking the exhaustion rule.
• Suit Against the Government: Whether the petition is an action against the government without its consent.

• Mandamus and Ministerial Duty: Yes. The Commission’s discretion is limited to evaluating evidence of recognized guerrilla membership; once that status is established, giving due course to the claim is a ministerial duty under sections 1 and 6 of Republic Act No. 897.
• Alien Entitlement: Yes. Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, extends benefits to members of guerrilla forces duly recognized by the United States Army without limiting coverage to Filipino citizens; non-Filipino recognized guerrillas are not among the excluded persons.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No. The Commission is estopped from invoking non-exhaustion because it declared that Secretary of Justice opinions are advisory and that an aggrieved party has recourse to court, leading petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling would be accepted.
• Suit Against the Government: No. The relief is recognition under sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 897 and an order directing an agency to perform an act it is bound to perform; the law embodies state consent to such an action.

• Mandamus and Ministerial Duty: The claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy to correct the exercise of discretion of the Commission was rejected. The Commission’s discretion is limited to the facts of the case, meaning merely evaluating the evidence whether the claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army. Nowhere in the law is the Commission given the power to adjudicate or determine rights after such facts are established. Since deceased Tan Chiat Bee was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, having served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla unit recognized by the United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it became the ministerial duty of the respondent to give due course to his widow’s application. The Chief of the Finance Service, Camp Murphy, had also accepted the backpay due and the same was passed in audit by representatives of the Auditor General. Sections 1 and 6 of Republic Act No. 897 were cited.

• Alien Entitlement: The contention that aliens are not included within the purview of the law was rejected. The law contained in Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 is explicit enough and extends its benefits to members of “guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States.” From the plain and clear language thereof, no indication appears that its operation should be limited to citizens of the Philippines only, for all that is required is that the guerrilla unit be duly recognized by the Army of the United States. The Court was in full accord with Opinion No. 213, series of 1956, of the Secretary of Justice, which reasoned that Section 1 of Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, recognizes the right to backpay of members of guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States, among others; that nothing in its provisions may be construed to mean that only Filipino citizens are entitled; that the statute expressly includes persons under contract with the Government of the Commonwealth, which clause was construed to refer to service by the government, a majority of whom were non-citizens; that Opinion No. 30, series of 1949, ruled that a civil service employee of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey rendering service to the Philippine Government when war broke out on December 8, 1941 was entitled to back pay; that as regards guerrillas, all the law requires is that they be duly recognized by the Army of the United States; that Section 1 enumerates those not entitled to its benefits, and recognized guerrillas who were not Filipino citizens are not among those expressly mentioned, so that expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies; and that Executive Order No. 21, dated October 28, 1944, expressly declared that, Sections 22(a) and 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 to the contrary notwithstanding, all persons of any nationality or citizenship actively serving in recognized military forces in the Philippines are considered to be on active service in the Philippine Army. Respondent’s main argument that Congress could not have intended to extend benefits to aliens because the purpose was to help rehabilitate members of the Armed Forces and recognized guerrillas by giving them the right to acquire public lands and public property was not persuasive, because that is just one of the various uses of the certificate; it may also be utilized for the payment of obligations to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, such as taxes and government hospital bills, under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 897. The lower court observed that it is one thing to be entitled to backpay and to receive acknowledgment therefor, and another thing to receive backpay certificates and make use of the same. It was therefore unreasonable, if not arbitrary, for the Commission to deny petitioner’s claim on that basis.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The contention that petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President, and that her failure to do so barred her action in court, was rejected. The respondent Commission was in estoppel to invoke this rule, considering that in its resolution, Annex F of the Stipulation of Facts, reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the Commission declared that the opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and that any aggrieved party has the court for recourse. This led petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

• Suit Against the Government: There was no substance in the contention that the petition was, in effect, a suit against the government without its consent. The relief prayed for was simply the recognition of petitioner-appellee under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 897, and consisted in directing an agency of the government to perform an act it is bound to perform. Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 necessarily embody state consent to an action against the officers entrusted with the implementation of said Acts in case of unjustified refusal to recognize the rights of proper applicants.

• Ministerial Duty and Mandamus — When a statute gives an administrative body discretion only to determine factual qualifications, and once those facts are established the law directs it to act, the duty becomes ministerial and mandamus lies to compel performance. The Commission’s discretion was limited to evaluating whether the claimant was a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army; once Tan Chiat Bee’s recognized status was established, giving due course to the widow’s claim was ministerial.

• Citizenship-Neutral Coverage of the Backpay Law — Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897, extends backpay benefits to members of guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States regardless of citizenship. The law does not limit coverage to Filipino citizens; non-Filipino recognized guerrillas are not among the persons expressly excluded; and Executive Order No. 21 treats all persons of any nationality or citizenship actively serving in recognized military forces in the Philippines as on active service in the Philippine Army.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The express enumeration of persons not entitled to backpay excludes non-Filipino recognized guerrillas from the disqualification. Section 1 of the Back Pay Law lists those not entitled to its benefits, and recognized guerrillas who were not Filipino citizens are not among those expressly mentioned.

• Estoppel Against Invoking Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — An agency may be estopped from asserting non-exhaustion when its own resolution or conduct leads a claimant to believe that only judicial recourse remains. The Commission declared that Secretary of Justice opinions are advisory and that an aggrieved party has the court for recourse, leading petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted.

• State Consent to Suit Under the Backpay Law — Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 embody consent to an action against the officers entrusted with implementing the law for unjustified refusal to recognize the rights of proper applicants. A petition seeking recognition under sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 897 and directing an agency to perform an act it is bound to perform is not a suit against the government without consent.

• Backpay Entitlement Distinguished from Certificate Use — Entitlement to backpay and acknowledgment thereof is distinct from receipt and use of backpay certificates. The certificate’s use is not limited to acquiring public lands; it may also be used to pay obligations to the Government or its branches or instrumentalities, such as taxes and government hospital bills. This defeated the argument that aliens cannot benefit because they cannot acquire public lands.

• "Having been satisfied that deceased Tan Chiat Bee was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, having served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla unit recognized by the United States army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial duty of the respondent to give due course to his widow's application." — This states the ratio for the mandamus issue: once recognized guerrilla status is established, the Commission’s duty is ministerial and compellable.

• 'The law is contained in Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 is explicit enough, and it extends its benefits to members of "guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States." From the plain and clear language thereof, we fail to see any indication that its operation should be limited to citizens of the Philippines only, for all that is required is that the guerrilla unit be duly recognized by the Army of the United States.' — This is the core holding on alien entitlement, rejecting a citizenship limitation in the Back Pay Law.

• "The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule, considering that in its resolution (Annex F of the Stipulation of Facts) reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the Commission declared that — The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse, (Annex F) thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission." — This defines the estoppel that barred the Commission from invoking non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

• 'Neither is there substance in the contention that the petition is, in effect, a suit against the government without its consent. the relief prayed for is simply "the recognition of the petitioner-appellee" under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 897, and consists in "directing an agency of the government to perform an act . . . it is bound to perform." Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 necessarily embody state consent to an action against the officers entrusted with the implementation of said Acts in case of unjustified refusal to recognize the rights of proper applicants.' — This articulates the state-consent rationale and distinguishes the mandamus action from an unconsented money claim against the government.

• Montes vs. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490; 54 Off. Gaz. [7] 2174 — Cited by respondent in support of its contention that petitioner should have first exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the President. The Court did not apply the rule because the Commission was estopped from invoking it, having advised that aggrieved parties could seek court recourse.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897 — Recognizes backpay rights of members of guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States; the Court read it as not limiting benefits to Filipino citizens and noted that non-Filipino recognized guerrillas are not among the persons expressly excluded.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 897 — Provides uses of the backpay certificate, including payment of obligations to the Government or any of its branches or instrumentalities, such as taxes and government hospital bills; the Court used this to reject the argument that aliens cannot benefit because they cannot acquire public lands.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 897 — Cited with Section 1 as basis for the Commission’s ministerial duty to give due course to the widow’s application once the deceased’s recognized guerrilla status was established.
• Executive Order No. 21 dated October 28, 1944 — Declared that, notwithstanding Sections 22(a) and 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, all persons of any nationality or citizenship actively serving in recognized military forces in the Philippines are considered on active service in the Philippine Army; relied on to support citizenship-neutral coverage.
• Sections 22(a) and 27, Commonwealth Act No. 1 — Mentioned as provisions overridden by Executive Order No. 21 in the context of service in recognized military forces.

Paras, C.J.; Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ.