Mari vs. Gonzales

A trial court properly dismisses a criminal case for failure to prosecute when the prosecution's repeated absences breach the 30-day period to commence trial under Rule 119, thereby violating the accused's right to speedy trial, especially when the accused is detained.

Petitioner AAA accused PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres of rape committed on October 10, 2004. A preliminary investigation was conducted before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), resulting in the accused's temporary incarceration and subsequent release on bail. Following the divestment of first-level courts' authority to conduct preliminary investigations, the records were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor, who found probable cause and filed an Information for Rape in 2008. The accused was arrested and detained, as rape is a non-bailable offense.

• The Charge: Petitioner AAA accused PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres of rape committed on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house in Sogod, Southern Leyte.
• Preliminary Investigation and Bail: The MCTC conducted the preliminary investigation. The accused surrendered on November 18, 2004, and was incarcerated. On March 16, 2005, the MCTC allowed the accused to post bail, and he was released after posting a surety bond.
• Filing of Information and Detention: The Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause on May 26, 2008, and an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. The accused was committed to detention on June 27, 2008. Because rape is non-bailable, the accused remained incarcerated.
• Prosecution's Absences and Delay Tactics: The prosecution repeatedly failed to appear at scheduled hearings. On August 20, 2008, the RTC warned that failure of the public prosecutor to appear would result in dismissal. On October 31, 2008, the private prosecutor filed a motion for cancellation due to a pending petition for transfer of venue; the RTC denied the motion and proceeded with arraignment. On November 24, 2008, the private prosecutor again failed to appear and filed another motion for cancellation; the RTC denied the motion and terminated pre-trial, setting the initial trial for December 12, 2008. The prosecution was absent on December 12, 2008, and the hearing was reset to January 16, 2009.
• Dismissal: On January 16, 2009, the private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to reset on the very day of the hearing, citing short notice and a prior scheduling conflict. The RTC denied the motion for violating the three-day rule and dismissed the case for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial, noting the accused had been detained since June 2008. The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 16, 2009.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the trial court rashly and precipitately dismissed the rape case.
• Exclusion of Time: Petitioners insisted that under Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court), the delay resulting from the pending petition for transfer of venue should be excluded from the time limit within which trial must commence.
• Suspension of Proceedings: Petitioners maintained that the mere pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt the proceedings before the trial court.

• No Grave Abuse: Respondents countered that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.
• Double Jeopardy: Respondents argued that setting aside the dismissal would place the accused in double jeopardy.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the petition should be dismissed outright for failure to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Exclusion of Time: Whether the time during which a petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending should be excluded from the 30-day period to commence trial under Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
• Speedy Trial: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for violation of the accused's constitutional right to speedy trial.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts was relaxed because the case involves the issue of double jeopardy, a fundamental constitutional right, necessitating a review of the merits.
• Exclusion of Time: The delay resulting from a petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from the time limit if the accused instituted the petition. Because the private complainant filed the petition, the time is not excluded. Furthermore, the mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue does not suspend the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
• Speedy Trial: No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The 30-day time limit from receipt of the pre-trial order was already breached, as the pre-trial order was received in early December 2008, but trial was reset to January 16, 2009. The prosecution's repeated unexplained absences and same-day motions for postponement constituted recalcitrant behavior and vexatious delays. The accused had been incarcerated for over six months on a non-bailable charge, rendering any delay highly prejudicial and oppressive. Dismissal was proper under the Speedy Trial Act.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions before the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Courts; however, the doctrine may be relaxed when the issue involves double jeopardy or other fundamental constitutional rights.
• Right to Speedy Trial — The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. Determination requires a balancing test of four factors: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is insufficient; particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

• "A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case."
• "[P]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."

• Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009 — Followed regarding the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 — Followed regarding the relaxation of the hierarchy of courts rule when double jeopardy is involved.
• People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006 — Followed regarding the rule that a petition for certiorari does not interrupt the principal case absent a restraining writ.
• Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009 — Followed regarding the definition and factors of the right to speedy trial.
• Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan — Followed regarding the four-factor balancing test for speedy trial and the principle that constitutional rights are shields, not weapons.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to a speedy, impartial, and public trial; applied to justify the dismissal of the case due to vexatious and oppressive delays.
• Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) — Limits the trial period and mandates dismissal for failure to prosecute; applied to support the trial court's dismissal.
• Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court — Provides the exclusions in computing the time within which trial must commence; interpreted to exclude delays from transfer of venue only if the proceedings concern the accused.
• Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — States that a petition for certiorari does not interrupt the principal case unless a TRO or injunction is issued; applied to hold that the pending petition for transfer of venue did not suspend the trial.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno