Mari vs. Court of Appeals

The sex of the offended party is not per se an aggravating circumstance absent proof that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the victim's sex or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood. Consequently, absent any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty must be fixed within the medium period of the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term must be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree without regard to its periods.

Petitioner Quirico Mari and complainant Norma Capintoy were co-employees at the Department of Agriculture in Digos, Davao del Sur, with complainant holding a higher position. After petitioner returned his 201 file with missing documents, complainant sent him a memorandum asking for an explanation. Petitioner confronted complainant, shouted invectives at her, banged a chair, and choked her until a security guard intervened. Petitioner claimed he borrowed only his service record and that complainant provoked him.

• The Confrontation: Petitioner Quirico Mari borrowed his 201 file from complainant Norma Capintoy, a higher-ranking co-worker. Upon its return three days later, complainant noticed missing documents, including official communications and a bank complaint against petitioner. Instructed by her superior, complainant sent petitioner a memorandum demanding an explanation for the missing documents.
• The Incident: Instead of acknowledging the memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant, shouted "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo," banged a chair in front of her, and choked her. A security guard intervened to stop the attack.
• Petitioner's Version: Petitioner claimed he borrowed only his service record, which did not contain the missing documents. He alleged that complainant provoked him and that he was merely reacting to the provocation.

• Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction for serious slander by deed. He maintained that the prosecution failed to prove he choked the complainant, asserting that the choking allegation was an afterthought evidenced by inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. He challenged the trial court's finding that he shouted invectives in the presence of several persons.

• Respondent, through the Solicitor General, defended the conviction based on the factual findings of the lower courts. However, the Solicitor General noted that the sentence imposed was excessive, implicitly conceding that no aggravating circumstance was proved.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court can review factual issues raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the sex of the offended party constitutes a valid aggravating circumstance in serious slander by deed.
  • Whether the lower courts correctly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in fixing the penalty.

• Procedural: The Court held that it cannot review factual issues raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding. Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls under any recognized exception to this rule.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the victim's sex is not per se an aggravating circumstance. To be considered aggravating, there must be proof that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the victim's sex or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood. Because no such proof existed, the lower courts erred in crediting an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the lower courts misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Absent any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty must be within the medium period of the prescribed penalty, and the minimum term must be within the penalty next lower in degree without regard to its periods. The penalties imposed by the MTC and the CA exceeded these ranges. Nonetheless, because the offense was committed in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court exercised its discretion to impose a fine instead of imprisonment.

• Conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals' factual findings — Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court, unless the case falls under recognized exceptions, such as diverse factual findings of the lower courts or findings entirely grounded on speculations. The Court applied this doctrine to decline reviewing petitioner's challenge to the finding that he choked the complainant.
• Aggravating circumstance of sex — The mere fact that the victim is a woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance. There must be proof of specific fact or circumstance, other than the victim being a woman, showing insult or disregard of her sex, such as deliberate intent to offend or insult the victim's sex or manifest disrespect to her womanhood. The Court applied this doctrine to strike down the lower courts' appreciation of the victim's sex as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
• Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code — The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The minimum term must be fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in degree without regard to its three periods or any modifying circumstance. The maximum term must be fixed considering the attending circumstances; if no modifying circumstances are present, it must be within the medium period of the prescribed penalty. The Court applied this doctrine to correct the erroneous penalties imposed by the MTC and the CA.

• "The mere fact that the victim is a woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance. There was no finding that the evidence proved that the accused in fact deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect to the offended woman or displayed some specific insult or disrespect to her womanhood."
• "The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."

• People v. Braña, 30 SCRA 307 (1969) — Followed. The Court cited this case to support the ruling that the mere fact that the victim is a woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance.
• People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933) — Followed. The Court cited this case to support the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, specifically the rules for fixing the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty.

• Article 359, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes serious slander by deed with arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or a fine ranging from P200.00 to P1,000.00. The Court applied this provision to impose a fine of P1,000.00 instead of imprisonment.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) — Governs the imposition of indeterminate penalties. The Court applied its provisions to correct the lower courts' computation of the minimum and maximum terms of the penalty.
• Rule 120, Section 2, 1985 Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure — Requires the court to state the aggravating circumstances in the decision. The Court noted that the MTC failed to specify the aggravating circumstance it appreciated.

Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concurred. (Davide, Jr., C.J., was on official leave. Ynares-Santiago, J., took no part.)