Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan

A person convicted by a trial court, even while a motion for reconsideration is pending, does not possess an absolute right to travel abroad and must demonstrate an imperative necessity—such as a serious and life-threatening medical condition requiring treatment unavailable locally—to justify the grant of such permission. The court has the sound discretion to balance this claim against the state's interest in enforcing its judgments and may seek independent expert assistance to verify the factual basis of the motion.

Imelda R. Marcos, the petitioner, was a defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) pending before the Sandiganbayan and regular courts. In two of these cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453), she was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan's First Division and sentenced to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office. Her motion for reconsideration of this conviction was pending resolution. Subsequently, she filed multiple motions seeking permission to travel abroad, primarily to the People's Republic of China and the United States, for diagnostic tests and treatment for alleged "hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior myocardial infarction," claiming the necessary facilities were unavailable in the Philippines.

• Nature of the Case: Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos was convicted in two criminal cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453) for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 by the Sandiganbayan's First Division. Her motion for reconsideration was pending.
• The Motions to Travel: Petitioner filed several motions seeking permission to travel abroad for medical treatment. She claimed to suffer from "hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pectoris, and anterior myocardial infarction," alleging that necessary "sophisticated biochemical tests" and treatment were unavailable in the Philippines. Her motions were supported by medical reports and a letter from her cardiologist, Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio.
• Sandiganbayan's Independent Verification: The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, citing the need for caution due to petitioner's conviction, motu proprio contacted the Philippine Heart Center for an expert opinion. A committee of cardiologists was formed to review the submitted medical evidence.
• Conflicting Medical Opinions: The committee, chaired by Dr. Ramon F. Abarquez, Jr., concluded that the diagnosis of significant coronary heart disease and hypertensive heart disease was not confirmed. It found the necessary tests were available in the Philippines and that local expertise was adequate. This contradicted the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physician.
• Sandiganbayan's Ruling: After hearings where both sides presented evidence, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions, holding that "the imperative necessity of the accused to undertake a trip abroad for diagnosis and treatment has not been established."
• Subsequent Events: Petitioner later filed a motion based on a different medical condition (glaucoma), which the Supreme Court referred back to the Sandiganbayan for appropriate action.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily disregarded the testimonies and findings of her attending physicians and instead relied on the "academic views" of the committee that never personally examined her.
• Unusual and Unorthodox Trial Conduct: Petitioner contended the court acted improperly by motu proprio contacting a third party for an opinion, participating actively in witness examination, and deciding the case based on evidence it sought.
• Primacy of Constitutional Rights: Petitioner maintained that her constitutional rights to life, health, and liberty must prevail over the court's authority over her person. She claimed the court violated her rights to "personhood," "privacy," and "personal liberty."
• Irrelevance of Conviction: Petitioner argued the court improperly considered her conviction (which was not yet final) as a factor in denying her right to travel for medical treatment.

• Proper Exercise of Discretion: The Solicitor General, representing the prosecution, countered that the Sandiganbayan acted properly in seeking independent expert advice to verify the medical necessity claimed in the motion.
• Estoppel: Respondent argued that petitioner was estopped from questioning the referral procedure because her counsel did not object when informed of it and even participated by submitting additional questions and cross-examining the expert witness.
• Balancing of Interests: Respondent contended that the right to life is not absolute and must be balanced against the state's right to prosecute and enforce court judgments. Petitioner's conviction was a relevant "humanitarian and equity" consideration for the court.

• Right to Travel vs. Court Authority: Whether a person convicted by a trial court, pending appeal or reconsideration, has an absolute right to travel abroad for medical treatment.
• Due Process in Expert Consultation: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion or violated due process by motu proprio seeking an independent medical expert opinion to evaluate the petitioner's motion.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in finding that the petitioner failed to prove an "imperative necessity" for travel abroad.

• Right to Travel is Not Absolute for Convicted Accused: The right to travel is subject to the constraints imposed by the necessity of safeguarding the justice system. For an accused convicted by the trial court, even with a pending motion for reconsideration, the right is not absolute. Permission to leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court's sound discretion, and the burden falls on the accused to prove an imperative necessity, such as a danger to health or life requiring treatment unavailable locally.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion in Seeking Expert Opinion: The Sandiganbayan's act of seeking an independent expert opinion was a prudent and justified course of action, given the highly technical medical subject matter beyond the court's competence. This is analogous to a court inviting amici curiae on recondite points of law. No violation of due process occurred because the procedure was disclosed to the parties, who participated without objection. Petitioner is estopped from later challenging it.
• No Grave Abuse in Finding Lack of Imperative Necessity: Based on the conflicting evidence, the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the petitioner failed to prove an imperative necessity for travel abroad was supported by the record. The independent committee's report, which contradicted petitioner's physician and found the needed tests available locally, provided a sufficient basis for the court's factual finding.

• Burden of Proof for Travel by Convicted Accused — An accused who has been convicted by the trial court, even while a motion for reconsideration is pending, does not enjoy the full, unrestricted constitutional right to travel. The state's interest in enforcing judgments and ensuring the accused's presence in court imposes a limitation. Consequently, the burden is on the accused to demonstrate an "imperative necessity" (e.g., a serious, life-threatening medical condition requiring treatment not available in the Philippines) to justify travel abroad. The grant of such permission rests in the sound discretion of the court.
• Court's Authority to Seek Independent Expert Verification — A court is not bound to accept uncritically the evidence or expert opinion presented by a party, especially on technical matters outside judicial expertise. To fulfill its duty of informed adjudication, a court may motu proprio seek independent expert advice or verification. This action does not violate due process provided the source is disclosed to the parties, who are given an opportunity to be heard. Such procedure is analogous to the court's power to invite amici curiae.

• "A person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound discretion." — This passage clarifies the qualified nature of the right to travel for a convicted accused.
• "The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. The subject lay beyond its competence... the respondent court... followed the only prudent course available of seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field." — This justifies the court's active role in verifying factual claims in a motion.
• "Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the result of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence..." — Citing precedent, this excerpt supports the trial judge's active participation in clarifying evidence.

• Manotoc v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 149 (1986) — Cited for the principle that the right to travel is not absolute and may be constrained by legal proceedings.
• Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 260 (1991) — Cited alongside Manotoc for the same proposition regarding the limitation on the right to travel.
• People v. Obngayan, 55 SCRA 465 (1974) — Cited for the principle that a judge has the right and duty to question witnesses to satisfy their mind on material points.
• Ventura v. Judge Yatco, 105 Phil. 287 (1959) — Cited extensively for the doctrine that judges should take an active part in trials to ensure orderly and expeditious justice, and are not mere passive referees.

• Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provision under which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453. Her conviction was a primary factual circumstance that triggered the court's heightened scrutiny of her travel motion.
• Constitutional Right to Travel — While not explicitly cited by article, the petition was grounded on the constitutional right to travel. The Court balanced this right against the state's interest in the administration of justice, holding it is not absolute for a convicted accused.

• Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
• Justice Florenz D. Regalado
• Justice Reynato S. Puno
• Justice Justo R. Mendoza (Ponente)
• Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Not listed in the text but part of the Second Division per the case header; the text lists Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Francisco, JJ., concur. Justice Francisco is noted as concurring.)

N/A — The decision indicates unanimous concurrence.