Marcos vs. Ruiz

An accused who is not in custody and fails to appear at trial waives the right to be present only for that specific trial date; the trial court may not, without an unequivocal waiver, deem the entire case submitted for decision and thereby foreclose the accused’s right to present evidence. A bail bond may be forfeited solely when the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court, and the bondsmen have been duly notified to produce him; such presence is not indispensable for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine. A motion that lacks a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and presents no question for the court’s consideration.

Two informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner Bienvenido O. Marcos for issuing two checks worth P3,000 each to Fulgencia Oculam, despite knowing he had insufficient funds in his bank account. After the informations were filed, petitioner settled his obligation with the complainant, who executed an Affidavit of Desistance attesting that the matter had been settled and that she was no longer interested in prosecuting the cases. The Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal then filed a Motion to Dismiss one of the two cases, with petitioner’s conformity, based on the complainant’s hostile stance and lack of interest. Before the motion was resolved, the prosecution orally withdrew it, and the accused was arraigned. Trial was set for 8 and 9 April 1985, but when the cases were called, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared; the court received the prosecution’s evidence ex parte, forfeited the bail bond, and declared the cases submitted for decision. Petitioner challenged these orders through a petition for certiorari, asserting denial of his right to be heard.

• Nature: Petitioner Bienvenido O. Marcos was charged in two separate informations — Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892 — for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, having delivered to private complainant Fulgencia Oculam two checks of P3,000 each drawn against Far Fast Bank and Trust Company, knowing he had insufficient funds. Both cases were raffled to Branch II of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, with respondent Judge Fernando S. Ruiz presiding. Petitioner posted a surety bond for his provisional liberty.

• The Affidavit of Desistance and Motion to Dismiss: After the filing of the informations, petitioner settled his obligation with the complainant. On 3 November 1984, Oculam executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that the obligation had been fully settled, she possessed no ground to proceed, and she was willing to have the cases dismissed with the accused’s consent. Acting on this, on 12 November 1984, Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 3892, citing the complainant’s hostility and lack of interest, and asserting that the case could not be successfully prosecuted without her testimony. The motion bore the approval of the Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal and the conformity of petitioner. It was addressed to the Clerk of Court with a request that it be set for resolution upon receipt. No separate motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 3890 appears in the record, though the petition and the parties treated the motion as affecting both cases.

• Arraignment: The initial arraignment on 29 November 1984 did not proceed because of petitioner’s absence due to illness; the court reset it to 7 and 8 February 1985. On 7 February 1985, petitioner appeared with his counsel de parte, Atty. Carlos Marcos. Before arraignment, the prosecution orally moved to withdraw the Motion to Dismiss, stating that the complaining witness had manifested willingness to testify. The trial judge directed the arraignment to proceed without making an explicit ruling on the withdrawal. Petitioner was arraigned in both cases and pleaded not guilty. Immediately thereafter, the court set the joint trial for 8 April 1985 at 2:30 p.m. and 9 April 1985 at 8:30 a.m. Petitioner, his counsel, and the Assistant City Fiscal were all notified in open court of the setting.

• Failure to Appear and the Orders of 8 April 1985: On 8 April 1985, when the cases were called, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared. The prosecution proceeded to present its evidence ex parte and rested its case. On that same date, the trial court issued an Order: (a) forfeiting petitioner’s bond; (b) directing the bondsman, Paramount Insurance Corp., to show cause within thirty days why no judgment should be issued against the bond; and (c) declaring that, as no evidence had been submitted by the petitioner, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.

• The Motion for Resetting: On 9 April 1985, the court received an “urgent motion for resetting” filed by petitioner’s counsel. The motion, dated 29 March 1985 and sent by registered mail, alleged that counsel had a previous legal commitment in Manila requiring his personal attention and that it would be physically impossible for him to arrive on time. It prayed that the hearing be reset to 13 and 14 May 1985. The motion did not contain a notice of hearing to the prosecution; it merely requested the Branch Clerk of Court to submit it for the court’s consideration immediately upon receipt. It had not been received by the court as of 8 April 1985.

• Motion for Reconsideration and Denial: On 23 April 1985, petitioner’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 8 April 1985 Order, arguing that petitioner believed in good faith that the hearing would not proceed because of the pending motion for resetting and the unresolved Motion to Dismiss. The reconsideration motion likewise lacked a notice of hearing to the prosecution. On 29 April 1985, respondent Judge denied the motion, finding that petitioner should not have assumed the postponement would be granted, that he was estopped from insisting on a ruling on the motion to dismiss because he had voluntarily been arraigned and agreed to trial, and that the prosecution’s presentation of evidence amounted to an abandonment of its motion to dismiss.

• Impending Promulgation: On 3 May 1985, a Notice of Promulgation was issued setting the promulgation of sentence in both cases for 17 May 1985. To prevent the promulgation from proceeding, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on 14 May 1985, and the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 16 May 1985.

• Denial of Right to Be Heard: Petitioner maintained that the trial court’s orders effectively denied him his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him and to present evidence, because he was prevented from cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses and was not afforded an opportunity to adduce his own evidence.

• Failure to Resolve the Motion to Dismiss: Petitioner argued that respondent Judge erred in not first resolving the pending Motion to Dismiss before proceeding with his arraignment and receiving the prosecution’s evidence; the pendency of that motion should have precluded the trial from going forward.

• Justification for Non-Appearance: Petitioner contended that his failure to appear was not unjustified because he believed, in good faith, that the motion for resetting would be granted and that his presence would therefore be unnecessary; he also relied on the unresolved Motion to Dismiss as a reason for expecting the proceedings to be halted.

• Estoppel and Abandonment: Respondent Judge asserted that petitioner was estopped from questioning the inaction on the Motion to Dismiss because he voluntarily appeared at his arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and agreed to the scheduling of the trial. The prosecution’s presentation of evidence was deemed an abandonment of the motion.

• Discretion and Due Process: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the challenged orders were interlocutory and thus not appealable, that respondent Judge acted in accordance with law and within the bounds of sound discretion, and that petitioner was not denied his day in court.

• Motion to Dismiss: Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the arraignment of the accused and receiving the prosecution’s evidence without first resolving the Motion to Dismiss.

• Forfeiture of Bond and Trial in Absentia: Whether the forfeiture of the bail bond, the ex-parte reception of the prosecution’s evidence, and the declaration that petitioner had waived his right to present evidence and that the cases were submitted for decision constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Denial of Reconsideration and Promulgation: Whether the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the setting of the promulgation of judgment on 17 May 1985 were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Motion to Dismiss: The absence of a formal resolution on the Motion to Dismiss did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. What actually transpired before the trial court was that the prosecution orally withdrew the motion in the presence of the accused and his counsel; neither of them objected, recognizing there was no legal basis to resist the withdrawal. The trial judge implicitly granted the oral withdrawal by immediately directing arraignment. The only procedural infirmity was his failure to state an explicit ruling on the oral motion. The demands of orderly procedure require that actions on motions be unequivocal and not left to conjecture; nevertheless, this omission did not amount to a jurisdictional defect that would vitiate the subsequent proceedings.

• Forfeiture of Bond: The forfeiture of the bail bond was a grave abuse of discretion. A bail bond may be forfeited only when the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court, and the bondsmen have been duly notified to produce the accused on a given date. There was no showing that the court had specifically required the bonding company to produce petitioner’s body on 8 and 9 April 1985. Moreover, the offenses charged — violations of B.P. Blg. 22 — carry a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine, or both; under the Rules, the accused’s presence at trial is not indispensable for such offenses in the same way it is required at arraignment, promulgation (except light offenses), and for identification by prosecution witnesses.

• Trial in Absentia: Proceeding with the trial in absentia on 8 April 1985 was proper. Petitioner had been duly notified of the setting, and his motion for resetting had not yet been received by the court; respondent Judge could not be faulted for deeming petitioner’s non-appearance unjustified. This course of action was authorized by the Constitution and Sections 2(c), Rule 114 and 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court. However, declaring the cases submitted for decision after the prosecution rested was a grave abuse of discretion. The Rules explicitly provide that the absence of an accused who is not in custody waives his right to be present only for that particular trial date, not for all subsequent trial dates. By ordering the cases submitted for decision, the judge effectively treated the waiver as extending to the entire trial and foreclosed petitioner’s right to present evidence. Such a waiver of a constitutional right must be clear and coupled with an actual intention to relinquish it; nothing in the record indicated that petitioner intended to waive his right to adduce evidence. The motion for resetting, by requesting new trial dates, demonstrated the contrary.

• Validity of Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892: No valid arraignment was conducted in Criminal Case No. 3892. After the reading of the information in the first case and the entry of a plea, petitioner’s counsel offered to waive the reading of the information in the second case and requested that a plea of not guilty be entered. The record does not show that the court made any ruling on this manifestation, nor was petitioner asked to confirm the waiver or personally enter his plea. Section 1(b), Rule 116 requires the accused to personally enter his plea; the absence of a personal plea rendered the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892 void.

• Motion for Reconsideration and Promulgation: The denial of the motion for reconsideration was not itself an abuse of discretion, because the motion for resetting upon which petitioner relied was a mere scrap of paper — it contained no notice of hearing to the prosecution, in violation of Section 5, Rule 15. Counsel unreasonably presumed that a motion mailed on 29 March 1985 would be received and granted before 8 April 1985, despite knowing that continuances lie in the court’s sound discretion. Petitioner is bound by his counsel’s procedural mistakes. Nevertheless, because the underlying order of 8 April 1985 was partially invalid, the notice of promulgation based on that order had to be set aside.

• Waiver of presence by a non-custodial accused — Under Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, the absence of an accused who is not in custody, without justifiable cause and despite due notice, constitutes a waiver of his right to be present only for the trial set on that particular date. It does not operate as a waiver for all subsequent trial dates. A custodial accused who escapes, by contrast, waives the right for that date and all subsequent dates until custody is regained. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the trial court could not treat petitioner’s single-day absence as a waiver of his right to present evidence for the entire case.

• Forfeiture of bail bond — A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court, and despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him on a given date, the accused fails to appear. The Court found that the bondsmen were never thus directed and that, for an offense under B.P. Blg. 22, the accused’s presence was not indispensable; thus, the forfeiture order was void.

• Motion without notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper — A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing directed to the adverse party and stating the time and place of hearing violates Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Such a motion presents no question that merits judicial attention; the clerk has no right to receive it and the court acquires no jurisdiction to act upon it. The Court characterized petitioner’s urgent motion for resetting as a mere scrap of paper, thereby stripping it of any legal effect.

• Client bound by counsel’s acts — A client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. If prejudiced by counsel’s negligence or misconduct, the client’s remedy is an action for damages, not the nullification of the proceedings. This principle supported the ruling that petitioner could not disown his counsel’s failure to file a proper motion for postponement.

• Personal plea at arraignment — Section 1(b), Rule 116 requires the accused to personally enter his plea. A mere manifestation by counsel that the reading of the information may be waived and a plea of not guilty be entered, without the accused personally confirming the plea, does not constitute a valid arraignment.

• “The demands of orderly procedure require that a judge of a court of record must ensure that actions on motions must not be left to conjecture but must, in a manner of speaking, be done in black and white.” (On the judge’s failure to make an explicit ruling on the oral withdrawal of the motion to dismiss.)

• “With respect to an accused who is not in custody, his non-appearance constitutes a waiver of his right to be present only for the trial set for the particular date of which he had notice. Upon the other hand, such non-appearance by an accused in custody and who later escapes is considered a waiver of the right on such date and all subsequent trial dates until such custody is regained.” (Defining the limits of trial in absentia under Rule 115.)

• “A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is but a mere scrap of paper, it presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and hence, the clerk has no right to receive it.” (Reiterating the effect of a defective motion under Rule 15.)

• “While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right.” (On the insufficiency of inferring a waiver of the right to present evidence from mere non-appearance.)

• United States v. Lorenzana, 12 Phil. 64 (1908) and United States v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919) — Cited for the rule that the granting of motions for postponement in criminal cases lies within the sound discretion of the court, a discretion that is judicial and not arbitrary. The Court relied on these precedents to reject petitioner’s assumption that his motion for resetting would be granted as a matter of course.

• Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses Corp., 198 SCRA 689 (1991) — Followed for the doctrine that a motion lacking a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. The Court applied this rule directly to petitioner’s motion for resetting, holding that the trial court was under no duty to consider it.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Allows trial to proceed in the absence of the accused after arraignment, provided he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The Court held that the trial in absentia on 8 April 1985 was constitutionally permissible.

• Sections 2(c), Rule 114 and 1(c), Rule 115, Rules of Court — Section 2(c), Rule 114 deems the failure of an accused to appear at trial without justification and despite due notice an express waiver of his right to be present on that date. Section 1(c), Rule 115 contains the critical distinction between the waiver effected by a non-custodial accused (limited to that particular trial date) and a custodial escapee (waiver extends to all subsequent dates). The Court held that the trial court transgressed Section 1(c) by extending the waiver to the remainder of the trial.

• Section 1(b), Rule 116, Rules of Court — Requires the accused to personally enter his plea at arraignment. The failure of the trial court to secure the accused’s personal plea in Criminal Case No. 3892 rendered the arraignment void.

• Section 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Mandates that a notice of motion state the time and place of hearing and be directed to the parties concerned. The Court found that petitioner’s motion for resetting violated this provision, causing it to be a mere scrap of paper.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — The statute penalizing the making or drawing and issuance of a check without sufficient funds. The penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine, or both, was relevant to the Court’s determination that the presence of the accused at trial was not indispensable for forfeiture purposes.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concurred. Feliciano, J., was on leave.