Marcos vs. Cabrera-Faller

A judge who issues warrants of arrest, immediately archives a criminal case without any ground under Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, recalls the warrants as "inadvertently issued" without explanation, and hastily dismisses the case despite strong evidence of probable cause is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The judge's failure to personally determine probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest violates Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion warranting dismissal from service.

Complainant Martonino R. Marcos is a retired judge whose grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos, died during initiation rites of the Lex Leonum Fraternitas held on July 29, 2012 at Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite. Respondent Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller presided over the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, where the criminal case for violation of Republic Act No. 8049 (The Anti-Hazing Law) was filed. The Office of the City Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation and issued a Resolution dated May 8, 2013 recommending prosecution of several Lex Leonum members and the discharge of Cornelio Marcelo as a state witness under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981.

Complainant Martonino R. Marcos is a retired judge whose grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos, died during the initiation rites of the Lex Leonum Fraternitas held on July 29, 2012 at the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite. A preliminary investigation was conducted, and the Office of the City Prosecutor issued its Resolution dated May 8, 2013, recommending the prosecution of several Lex Leonum members for Violation of Republic Act No. 8049, otherwise known as The Anti-Hazing Law. In the same resolution, the OCP recommended that Cornelio Marcelo, the person assigned to be the buddy or "angel" of Marc Andrei during the initiation rites, be discharged as a state witness pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981.

Thereafter, the Information for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed against Jenno Antonio Villanueva, Emmanuel Jefferson Santiago, Richard Rosales, Mohamad Fyzee Alim, Chino Daniel Amante, Julius Arsenio Alcancia, Edrich Gomez, Dexter Circa, Gian Angelo Veluz, Glenn Meduen, and several aliases before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11862-13. Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued an Order dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of warrants of arrest and, at the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the accused. On June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales, Alim and Amante, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another Order directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three accused, which she claimed were issued inadvertently.

On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable cause and to withhold issuance of warrants of arrest and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest filed by the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause. According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to indict the accused for violation of R.A. No. 8049 as the statement of Marcelo and those of the other accused "were not put in juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their respective weight and substance." To her, "there were nagging questions left unanswered by the testimony of Marcelo and some improbabilities therein that boggle the mind and disturb the conscience into giving it absolute currency and credence." In her view, "the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites" and failed to show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. She found the statements of prosecution witnesses Cabansag and Ragaza either untruthful, immaterial and incompetent or brimming with flip flopping testimonies. She brushed aside the admission of the accused that initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were allegedly present in the different stages of the initiation rites, and simply believed the version of the accused that it was Marcelo, the recruiter and "angel" of Marc Andrei, who inflicted the fatal blows on him, causing his death.

The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file the administrative case against Judge Cabrera-Faller. In his Letter-Complaint, complainant alleged that the judge demonstrated incompetence and gross ignorance of the law when she issued the June 3, 2013 Order finding probable cause and directing the issuance of warrants of arrest, then subsequently held that the warrant was inadvertently issued against accused Santiago. Complainant argued that a judge who issues a warrant of arrest inadvertently has no place in the judiciary. He further alleged that the August 15, 2013 Omnibus Order dismissing the case was based solely on the judge's own conjectures and pre-determined decision to dismiss, without conducting hearings and without waiting for comments from the public and private prosecutors. Complainant pointed out that the OCP resolution was based on the sworn statements of Marcelo, corroborated by the statements of neophytes Cabansag and Ragaza, and the farm overseers Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza.

In her Very Respectful Comment, Judge Cabrera-Faller denied the accusations and asserted that charging her administratively for performing a judicial function would cause a heavy toll on her. She mentioned that the "grapevine, as well as newspaper accounts" had it that the private complainant had already received settlement from all of the accused, except for Marcelo, allegedly for the amount of 5 million pesos. She stated that the questioned order was a twenty-page resolution where the respective postures of the parties were explicitly and painstakingly incorporated, which negated corruption and malicious rendering of an unjust judgment. She argued that alleged errors committed by a judge pertaining to the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. In his Reply, complainant insisted that Judge Cabrera-Faller did not simply commit an error of judgment but knowingly rendered an unjust judgment contrary to law, and denied that they had been paid the amount of ₱5 million.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Complainant argued that Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated incompetence and gross ignorance of the law when she issued the June 3, 2013 Order finding probable cause and directing the issuance of warrants of arrest, then subsequently recalled the warrant against accused Santiago claiming it was "inadvertently issued," which showed she did not personally evaluate the records before directing the issuance of warrants.

• Manifest Bias: Complainant argued that the August 15, 2013 Omnibus Order dismissing the case demonstrated manifest bias in favor of the accused, as the judge ruled that the information was filed only on the basis of the lone statement of Marcelo without corroborating testimony, which was absolutely false given the corroborating statements of Cabansag, Ragaza, Andaya, and Atienza.

• Misapplication of the Anti-Hazing Law: Complainant argued that under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, there is no need to prove conspiracy to inflict fatal injuries; mere presence during hazing or initiation rites is already prima facie evidence of participation as principal unless the person prevented the commission of the acts.

• Usurpation of Prosecutorial Discretion: Complainant argued that the judge was only called upon to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of issuing warrants of arrest, not to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause absent manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice.

• Judicial Function Defense: Respondent argued that charging her administratively for performing a judicial function would cause a heavy toll on her, and that alleged errors committed by a judge pertaining to the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.

• Alleged Settlement: Respondent mentioned that the "grapevine, as well as newspaper accounts" had it that the private complainant had already received settlement from all of the accused, except for Marcelo, allegedly for the amount of 5 million pesos, which would make the cries of injustice a charade.

• Thorough Resolution: Respondent asserted that the questioned order was a twenty-page resolution where the respective postures of the parties were explicitly and painstakingly incorporated, which negated corruption, malicious rendering of an unjust judgment, and any signs of shoddy disposition of the case.

• Immediate Archiving: Whether Judge Cabrera-Faller violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 when she ordered the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13 after ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest.

• Recall of Warrants: Whether Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, or gross ignorance of the law, when she issued the June 13, 2013 Order recalling the warrants of arrest against accused Alim, Amante, and Rosales claiming they were issued inadvertently.

• Hasty Dismissal: Whether Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively accountable for hastily dismissing Criminal Case No. 11862-13 for lack of probable cause despite strong evidence presented by the prosecution.

• Immediate Archiving: Yes. Judge Cabrera-Faller violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 when she issued the June 3, 2013 Order directing the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13 after ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest, without citing any ground enumerated in the circular for the suspension of proceedings.

• Recall of Warrants: Yes. Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, if not gross ignorance of the law, when she issued the June 13, 2013 Order recalling the warrants of arrest against three accused claiming they were issued inadvertently, without any explanation for such inadvertence, constituting an abdication of her constitutional mandate to personally determine probable cause.

• Hasty Dismissal: Yes. Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively accountable for hastily dismissing Criminal Case No. 11862-13, as the dismissal was precipitate in the face of overwhelming evidence, and her reasoning that there was no probable cause was strained and taxed one's credulity.

• Immediate Archiving: The Court held that the archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure designed to shelve cases but is done only where no immediate action is expected. A.C. No. 7-A-92 enumerated the circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of a criminal case, including when the accused remains at large for six months from the delivery of the warrant, when proceedings are ordered suspended due to the accused's unsound mental condition, when a valid prejudicial question is invoked, when an interlocutory order is pending resolution before a higher court, or when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment. When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the case without citing any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92. She did not even bother to wait for the return of the warrants or wait for the six-month period. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if not incompetence and ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. The Court stated that it could also be that she knew the law but opted to completely ignore it or the regulations, which constituted grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not in accord with law or justice.

• Recall of Warrants: The Court held that in the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judge Cabrera-Faller was mandated to personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause. In the June 13, 2013 Order, she recalled the warrants of arrest against three of the accused but failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently, merely writing that they were "inadvertently issued" without any explanation. The Court could not accept this and found it to be a clear abdication of the judicial function. The records contained not only the information but all the supporting documents like the statement of Marcelo and the corroborating statements of Cabansag and Ragaza and those of Andaya and Atienza. The Court stated that it could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to personally determine the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest. The Court quoted: "when the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority."

• Hasty Dismissal: The Court held that although the well-settled rule is that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the said court, this rule is not absolute. The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss must always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative, for the judge's action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and the offended party to due process of law. Citing People vs. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for "want of evidence," because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The Court agreed with the OCA that there was haste in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The Information was instituted on May 10, 2013; on June 3, 2013, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the order finding probable cause; barely 10 days later, on June 13, 2013, she recalled the warrants against three accused; and on August 15, 2013, she lifted the warrants and dismissed the case. The Court noted that the OCP resolution was based on the sworn statements executed by Marcelo, corroborated by the two neophytes Cabansag and Ragaza, and the farm overseers Andaya and Atienza, all presenting a consistent and coherent version of the events. Considering the strong evidence, it would have been more prudent for Judge Cabrera-Faller to conduct summary hearings in view of the conflicting statements. The Court held that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, if the person subjected to hazing suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members who actually participated shall be liable as principals, and the officers and members present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually participated, unless it can be shown that they prevented the commission of the punishable acts. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause. The Court concluded that Judge Cabrera-Faller's utter disregard of the laws and rules of procedure displayed her lack of competence and probity, constituting gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

• Personal Determination of Probable Cause — Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The judge must personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. In this case, Judge Cabrera-Faller's recall of warrants as "inadvertently issued" without explanation constituted an abdication of this constitutional mandate.

• Archiving of Criminal Cases — Under Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, archiving of criminal cases is permitted only under enumerated circumstances: (a) when the accused remains at large for six months from delivery of the warrant and the peace officer has explained why the accused was not apprehended; or (b) when proceedings are suspended indefinitely due to the accused's unsound mental condition, a valid prejudicial question, an interlocutory order pending before a higher court, or when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment. The immediate archiving of a case without citing any ground constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

• Prima Facie Presumption of Participation in Hazing — Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, if a person subjected to hazing suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority, or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals, and the officers and members present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually participated, unless it can be shown that they prevented the commission of the punishable acts. Mere presence during hazing gives rise to this disputable presumption.

• Probable Cause Standard — A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A judge may dismiss a case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is, when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith, such defense adheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the basic issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error.

• "When the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." — This passage articulates the standard for determining when a judge's failure to consider basic legal rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, and was applied to Judge Cabrera-Faller's recall of warrants without explanation.

• "We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for 'want of evidence,' because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial." — This quotation from People vs. Court of Appeals states the controlling principle that trial courts should respect the prosecutor's determination of probable cause absent manifest error or grave abuse of discretion.

• "A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged." — This passage defines the limited circumstances under which a judge may dismiss a case for lack of probable cause, which Judge Cabrera-Faller exceeded in hastily dismissing the hazing case.

• "Hazing is commonly characterized by secrecy and silence and to require the prosecution to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case would be a strenuous task." — This passage explains why the Court should not require the prosecution to present all evidence at the probable cause stage in hazing cases, given the secretive nature of the offense.

• People vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401 (1999) — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for "want of evidence," because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during trial.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Cited for the well-settled rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court, though this rule is not absolute.

• Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015 — Cited for the prima facie presumption of participation in hazing arising from mere presence during the hazing under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049.

• Posa vs. Mijares, 436 Phil. 295 (2002) — Cited for the principle that when inefficiency springs from failure to consider basic and elemental rules, the judge is either insufferably incompetent or too vicious that the oversight was deliberately done in bad faith.

• Chua Keng Sin vs. Judge Mangeten, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015, 750 SCRA 262 — Cited as a case where a respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law due to procedural lapses in disposing motions in a criminal case, and could not be relieved from consequences simply because he was a newly appointed judge with a heavy case load.

• Baltazar vs. People, 582 Phil. 275 (2008) — Cited for the principle that upon filing of the Information, it is the presiding judge's task to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

• People vs. Grey, 639 Phil. 535 (2010) — Cited for the principle that it was incumbent upon the judge to assess the resolution, affidavits, and other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor to satisfy herself that probable cause existed before a warrant of arrest could be issued.

• Andres vs. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

• Paredes vs. Calilung, 546 Phil. 198 (2007) — Cited for the principle that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.

• Young vs. People, G.R. No. 213910, February 3, 2016 — Cited for the rule that a judge may dismiss a case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause.

• State Prosecutors vs. Judge Muro, 321 Phil. 474 (1995) — Cited for the principle that speed is not the chief objective of a trial; careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial.

• De Guzman, Jr. vs. Judge Sison, 407 Phil. 351 (2001) — Cited for the principle that when the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Applied to find that Judge Cabrera-Faller failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to personally determine probable cause.

• Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, and to issue a warrant of arrest if probable cause is found. Applied to find that Judge Cabrera-Faller's recall of warrants as "inadvertently issued" constituted abdication of judicial function.

• Section 4, R.A. No. 8049 (The Anti-Hazing Law) — Provides that if the person subjected to hazing suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members who actually participated shall be liable as principals, and those present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually participated unless they prevented the commission of the acts. Applied to find that Judge Cabrera-Faller should not have dismissed the case given the prima facie presumption of participation.

• Section 12, R.A. No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program) — Cited in the OCP Resolution as the basis for discharging Cornelio Marcelo as a state witness.

• Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 — Enumerates the circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of a criminal case. Applied to find that Judge Cabrera-Faller violated this circular by immediately archiving the case without citing any ground.

• Section 8, Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC — Classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension for more than three but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Applied to determine the appropriate penalty for Judge Cabrera-Faller.

• Rule 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. Applied to find that Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon.

• Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires judges to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all times. Applied as a basis for the finding of guilt.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno; Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Francis H. Jardeleza, and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa. Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. took no part in the decision.