Marcelo vs. Villordon

Mandamus will not issue to compel a prosecutor to file a criminal information where the prosecutor's inaction stems from the parties' own failure to submit required pleadings, because the determination of whether to file an information is a discretionary, not ministerial, duty—and mandamus lies only to compel the performance of ministerial duties, absent grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners Ernesto Marcelo, Jr. and Lauro Llames were formerly employed as President and General Manager, respectively, of New Sampaguita Builders Construction Incorporated, owned by Eduardo R. Dee, Sr. The dispute originated from Dee's alleged non-payment of their wages, which prompted petitioners to file a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of Article 116 of the Labor Code. Respondent Rafael R. Villordon was the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation of that complaint. The petition before the Supreme Court arose from the dismissal of a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel Villordon to resolve the preliminary investigation.

On 2 April 2004, Ernesto Marcelo, Jr. and Lauro Llames, together with two others, filed a criminal complaint against their former employer Eduardo R. Dee, Sr. with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 04-4682. The complaint charged Dee with estafa and violation of Article 116 of the Labor Code, stemming from Dee's non-payment of petitioners' wages as President and General Manager of New Sampaguita Builders Construction Incorporated. Assistant City Prosecutor Rafael R. Villordon was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation.

On 28 April 2004, Villordon issued a subpoena directing Dee to appear on 18 May 2004. Dee failed to appear. The case was reset on several subsequent dates, but Dee failed to appear at any of them. Each time the case was reset, petitioners asked that it be declared submitted for resolution. On 29 July 2004, Villordon declared the case submitted for resolution.

Three months later, on 5 November 2004, Dee filed a motion to reopen the case and simultaneously submitted his counter-affidavit. Assistant City Prosecutor Rogelio Velasco, Villordon's Division Chief, approved the motion on 8 December 2004. Villordon then scheduled a hearing on 28 December 2004. Dee did not appear, but petitioners attended and signed the minutes confirming they would submit their reply-affidavit on 18 January 2005. Another hearing was set for 3 February 2005. On both dates, Dee failed to appear and petitioners did not submit their reply-affidavit. No further action was taken on the matter.

Frustrated by the delay, petitioners filed a grievance/request for assistance with the Office of the Ombudsman on 22 March 2005. After several follow-ups without receiving any action, they filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 against Villordon with the Ombudsman. On 31 July 2007, the Ombudsman dismissed the case. Meanwhile, on 19 September 2005, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus against Villordon with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 105, praying that he be ordered to resolve the criminal complaint and pay moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. The RTC dismissed the petition on 5 January 2006 for lack of merit, finding that petitioners had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies and had not demonstrated a legal right to compel Villordon to act, given that the case had been reopened with the Division Chief's approval and petitioners had themselves conformed to the subsequent hearing dates but failed to submit their reply-affidavit. The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on 30 May 2006.

• Prematurity of Mandamus Petition: Petitioners argued that the petition for mandamus was not prematurely filed, because under the Rules of Court it is the investigating prosecutor's function to make the resolution, while the Chief City Prosecutor's function is merely to approve or disapprove it; thus, the Chief City Prosecutor could only correct the investigating prosecutor's errors after the latter had submitted his resolution, which had not yet occurred.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners asserted that Villordon committed grave abuse of discretion by unreasonably refusing to file an information despite evidence clearly warranting such action, thereby warranting the issuance of mandamus.

• Premature Remedy: Respondent Villordon maintained that mandamus was a premature remedy because the case was not yet submitted for resolution when petitioners filed their action with the RTC, given that after the 3 February 2005 hearing where no party appeared, he was left uncertain whether the case should be submitted for resolution.
• Failure to Submit Reply-Affidavit: Villordon contended that petitioners failed to submit a reply-affidavit that would have rebutted Dee's counter-affidavit, leaving him without the necessary pleadings to resolve the case.
• Forum-Shopping: Villordon stated that petitioners engaged in forum-shopping by filing multiple cases against him simultaneously in the RTC and the Ombudsman.

• Entitlement to Mandamus: Whether petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the investigating prosecutor to resolve the preliminary investigation and file a criminal information against the respondent in the criminal complaint.

• Entitlement to Mandamus: No. Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. The prosecutor's determination of whether to file a criminal information is a discretionary executive function, and petitioners failed to establish grave abuse of discretion or the absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies.

• Entitlement to Mandamus: The function of determining whether there is sufficient ground for filing an information is executive in nature and rests solely with the prosecutor, who exercises quasi-judicial discretion in deciding whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus will lie only when (1) an officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and (2) there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As held in Hipos vs. Judge Bay, mandamus lies only to compel a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; the prosecutor's discretion will be reviewed by mandamus only when it is gravely abused. Here, Villordon could not be faulted for not yet resolving the case, because Dee's counter-affidavit had been admitted after the case was reopened with the Division Chief's approval, and petitioners had failed to submit their reply-affidavit to rebut it despite being directed to do so. Villordon was entitled to await the submission of additional evidence from both parties before making his determination. Petitioners' assertion that the evidence against Dee was strong was unsupported by anything beyond bare declarations. Moreover, a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available—petitioners could simply have submitted their reply-affidavit to enable Villordon to resolve the case. Instead, they resorted to filing cases in multiple fora. Since the institution of a criminal action involves the exercise of sound prosecutorial discretion, and other adequate remedies were available, the resort to mandamus must fail.

• Mandamus Lies Only for Ministerial Duties, Not Discretionary Ones — Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that compels an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. It will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his own judgment. The only exception is when the officer gravely abuses his discretion. In this case, the prosecutor's determination of whether to file a criminal information is discretionary; absent grave abuse, mandamus will not lie to compel him to file it.
• Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Informations — The function of determining whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of an information is executive in nature and rests with the prosecutor alone, who has quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. This discretion may be reviewed by mandamus only upon a clear showing of grave abuse.
• Requisites of Mandamus Under Rule 65 — Mandamus will lie if (1) a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled; and (2) there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• "The function of determining whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of the information is executive in nature and rests with the prosecutor. It is the prosecutor alone who has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court." — This passage articulates the foundational principle of prosecutorial discretion that bars mandamus absent grave abuse, serving as the ratio decidendi for denying the petition.
• "Mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court." — This is the canonical formulation of the rule distinguishing ministerial from discretionary duties in the context of mandamus, as cited from Hipos vs. Judge Bay.
• "A more expeditious and effective recourse could have been simply to submit their reply-affidavit in order for Villordon to make the proper determination whether there was sufficient ground to hold Dee for trial." — This passage identifies the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioners, explaining why the second requisite of mandamus was not satisfied.

• Hipos vs. Judge Bay, G.R. Nos. 174813-15, 17 March 2009, 581 SCRA 674 — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that mandamus lies only to compel ministerial duties, not discretionary ones, and that a prosecutor's discretion is reviewable by mandamus only upon grave abuse thereof.
• Knecht vs. Hon. Desierto, 353 Phil. 494 (1998) — Followed for the same proposition that mandamus cannot control the exercise of prosecutorial discretion absent grave abuse.
• Uy vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 73 — Cited for the principle that preliminary investigation is a substantive right, not a mere formal or technical one, serving to protect both the innocent and the State.
• D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168 (1996) — Cited in support of the rule on the limits of mandamus vis-à-vis discretionary functions.

• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines the remedy of mandamus and its two requisites: unlawful neglect of a duty enjoined by law, and absence of any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to determine that petitioners failed to satisfy both requisites.
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Define preliminary investigation and identify the officers authorized to conduct it. Applied to establish that the prosecutor's function in preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial and discretionary in nature.
• Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the corrupt practice of neglecting or refusing, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before a public officer. Petitioners invoked this provision in their complaint against Villordon before the Ombudsman, which was dismissed.

Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad, and Jose C. Mendoza concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.