Marcelo vs. Mencias

A land registration court that has issued a writ of possession in favor of the successful applicant may order the demolition of improvements as a complement to that writ, with Section 13, Rule 39 applied suppletorily to land registration proceedings.

Rafael Marcelo was the applicant in a land registration case, while Clemente Pagsisihan was the successor-in-interest of Leocadio Pagsisihan, the original oppositor. The dispute concerns the authority of a Court of First Instance sitting as a land registration court over incidents following a final registration decree. The Rules of Court, particularly Section 13, Rule 39 and Section 6, Rule 124, govern execution and auxiliary writs, while the Land Registration Law is silent on demolition.

On June 9, 1954, Rafael Marcelo applied to register in his name three parcels of land — lots 1, 2, and 3 — located in Taguig, Rizal. Leocadio Pagsisihan, the father and predecessor-in-interest of Clemente Pagsisihan, opposed the application. On February 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, rendered a decision in favor of Marcelo, declaring him owner of only one of the three lots, denying Leocadio Pagsisihan's opposition, and declaring the two other lots public lands. Marcelo appealed to the CA; Leocadio did not. The CA reversed the land registration court, holding that Marcelo was also owner of the two lots that had been declared public lands. After the CA judgment became final and executory, respondent Judge, upon Marcelo's motion, issued an order for the issuance of a decree, and a certificate of title was issued for all the lots in Marcelo's name.

Clemente Pagsisihan refused to deliver possession of lots 2 and 3, which he occupied. Marcelo filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, and Clemente opposed it. Clemente's counsel stated that Leocadio Pagsisihan, who had opposed the application, was not in possession of any portion of the property because he died on August 28, 1958. On March 14, 1959, respondent Judge granted the petition for a writ of possession.

Despite the writ of possession, Clemente Pagsisihan refused to surrender possession of lots 2 and 3 and to remove his house standing thereon. Marcelo filed a petition for demolition. On May 2, 1959, respondent Judge denied the petition. Marcelo moved for reconsideration on May 19, 1959, and on June 8, 1959, respondent Judge denied the motion. Marcelo then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

• Jurisdiction to Order Demolition: Petitioner contended that under the jurisprudence on the matter, the court has jurisdiction to issue an order of demolition, which is simply the coercive process or remedy to render effective the writ of possession already issued by it.

• Scope of Section 13, Rule 39: Respondent Judge maintained that Section 13, Rule 39 refers only to ordinary actions involving delivery or restitution of property, not to proceedings under the Land Registration Law, which is silent on the point; hence the land registration court has no jurisdiction to order demolition.
• Other Remedy: Respondent Judge believed that petitioner had another remedy by resorting to ordinary civil actions in the regular courts, such as forcible entry and detainer or recovery of possession, in which those courts would be competent to issue the writ.

• Jurisdiction to Order Demolition: Whether a Court of First Instance sitting as a land registration court has jurisdiction or authority to order the demolition of improvements as a consequence of a writ of possession issued by it.

• Jurisdiction to Order Demolition: Yes. The land registration court may issue a writ of demolition as a complement to the writ of possession, with Section 13, Rule 39 applied suppletorily and Section 6, Rule 124 and inherent power supporting auxiliary writs.

• Jurisdiction to Order Demolition: Section 13, Rule 39 provides that the officer must enforce execution for delivery or restitution of property by placing the plaintiff in possession, and may not destroy, demolish, or remove improvements made by the defendant or his agent except by special order of the court, which may issue only upon petition of the plaintiff after due hearing and upon the defendant's failure to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. Respondent Judge read this as limited to ordinary actions and inapplicable to land registration because the Land Registration Law is silent. The SC rejected that view: the Rules of Court apply to land registration cases in a suppletory character under Rule 132. Since a writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies delivery of possession to the successful litigant (Demorar vs. Ibanez; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario; Manlapas vs. Llorente), a writ of demolition must likewise issue as a complement; without it the writ of possession would be ineffective. Requiring a separate action for forcible entry and detainer or recovery of possession would be cumbersome, foster unnecessary and expensive litigation, and result in multiplicity of suits, which the judicial system abhors; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario states that such a construction would compel a successful litigant to commence other actions to secure the fruits of victory, contrary to the law's purpose. Section 6, Rule 124 also provides that when jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed, and if procedure is not specified, any suitable process or mode conformable to the spirit of the rules may be adopted. Under that provision, respondent Judge had power to issue the auxiliary writ of demolition to carry into effect the jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. Shioji vs. Harvey further recognizes that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction; issuance of the demolition writ was reasonably necessary to do justice to Marcelo, who was deprived of possession because Clemente continued to refuse to remove his house and restore the premises. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings on the demolition petition pursuant to Section 13, Rule 39.

• Suppletory application of the Rules of Court in land registration cases — The Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character to land registration proceedings. The SC applied this because the Land Registration Law was silent on demolition, allowing Section 13, Rule 39 to govern the demolition incident after a writ of possession.
• Writ of demolition as complement of writ of possession — A writ of possession in a land registration case implies delivery of possession to the successful litigant, and a writ of demolition must issue as its complement; otherwise the writ of possession would be ineffective. The SC applied this to allow demolition of Clemente Pagsisihan's house on lots 2 and 3 after he refused to surrender possession.
• Requisites for special demolition order under Section 13, Rule 39 — Before the officer may destroy, demolish, or remove improvements, there must be (a) a special order of the court; (b) upon petition of the plaintiff; (c) after due hearing; and (d) the defendant's failure to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The SC applied these requirements by remanding the case for further proceedings on Marcelo's demolition petition.
• Auxiliary writs under Section 6, Rule 124 — When jurisdiction is conferred on a court, it may employ all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry that jurisdiction into effect; if no procedure is specified, it may adopt a suitable process conformable to the spirit of the rules. The SC used this to uphold the land registration court's power to issue the demolition writ.
• Inherent power of courts — Every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. The SC applied this as an additional basis for the demolition order, which was reasonably necessary to give Marcelo the possession he had won.
• Avoidance of multiplicity of suits — A successful litigant in a land registration case should not be forced to file a separate ordinary action for possession, because that would be cumbersome, foster unnecessary and expensive litigation, and result in multiplicity of suits. The SC applied this to reject the view that Marcelo's remedy lay in forcible entry and detainer or recovery of possession.

• "The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus is whether the Court of First Instance Of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction or authority to order the demolition of improvements, as a consequence of a writ of possession issued by it." — This frames the sole question the SC resolves.
• "The view is not Correct, for the reason that the provisions of the Rules of Court are applicable, to land registration cases in a suppletory character (Rule 132)." — The SC rejects respondent Judge's reading that Section 13, Rule 39 is confined to ordinary actions; this sentence supplies the suppletory-application rule.
• "a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective." — The SC derives the demolition writ from the writ of possession and treats it as necessary to make the possession writ effective.
• "every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction." — The SC invokes this inherent power as an additional basis for the demolition order.

• Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil., 72; 51 Off. Gaz., 2872 — Relied on for the rule that a writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies delivery of possession to the successful litigant.
• Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil., 391 — Relied on for the writ of possession and for the policy against compelling a successful land registration litigant to file separate actions, which would foster multiplicity of suits.
• Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298 — Relied on for the rule that after registration the applicant may ask for a writ of possession and that the writ may issue against occupants of the land during the registration proceedings.
• Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333 — Relied on for the inherent power of every court to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.

• Section 13, Rule 39, Rules of Court — The SC applied this provision suppletorily to land registration cases; it supplied the procedure for a special demolition order after petition, due hearing, and failure to remove improvements within a reasonable time, and the case was remanded for that proceeding.
• Rule 132, Rules of Court — The SC cited this to hold that the Rules of Court apply to land registration cases in a suppletory character, rejecting the view that Rule 39 is confined to ordinary actions.
• Section 6, Rule 124, Rules of Court — The SC applied this to recognize the land registration court's power to issue all auxiliary writs, including the writ of demolition, necessary to carry into effect its jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession.