Marcelo vs. Estacio

After a bill of exceptions is approved and the case is elevated on appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction to order execution of its judgment or arrest for noncompliance, unless special reasons are stated in the bill of exceptions under Section 144.

Felisa S. Marcelo and Daniel V. Estacio were spouses; the litigation concerned Daniel’s obligation to provide support to Felisa. The governing backdrop was Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which stayed execution upon the filing of a bill of exceptions unless the trial court, for special reasons stated in the bill, ordered otherwise and, if it wished, required a bond.

Felisa S. Marcelo and Daniel V. Estacio were married on April 24, 1921, but Felisa separated from him after a year of marital life. On May 17, 1937, after learning that Daniel had been named justice of the peace of the municipalities of Moncada and San Manuel in Tarlac, Felisa brought suit for support. In its judgment of October 25, 1937, the CFI of Rizal ordered Daniel to pay Felisa a monthly allowance of P30 from May 18, 1937. Daniel filed a motion for new trial on November 18, 1937, which the CFI denied on December 7, 1937. On January 8, 1938, he announced his exception and intention to appeal, and on February 5, 1938, he filed his bill of exceptions.

On February 8, 1938, Felisa filed a motion asking that Daniel be ordered to pay the allowance awarded in the decision or to post a P2,000 bond notwithstanding his appeal to the Court of Appeals. On February 19, 1938, the CFI approved the bill of exceptions and granted Felisa’s motion. It ordered Daniel, within ten days from receipt of the order, to file an appeal bond of P2,000 or to deposit in the office of the clerk of court, within the first ten days of each month, the monthly allowance of P30 during the pendency of the appeal.

On August 23, 1938, the CFI ordered Daniel to pay Felisa her allowance for October 1937 to July 1938, inclusive, at P30 a month, pursuant to the decision. For his failure to comply, a warrant of arrest was issued. On October 3, 1938, Daniel filed a motion for suspension of his compliance with the order because he had presented a motion to reconsider the August 23 order. The motion was postponed several times and, upon his attorney’s petition, was finally submitted on October 29, 1938, but Daniel adduced no evidence. Although Judge Leopoldo Rovira had stated, when suspending compliance with the arrest order, that Daniel’s motion could not be acted upon until evidence was presented and had set the motion for trial, the trial eventually took place on October 29, 1938, and Daniel presented no evidence on his alleged inability to pay the allowance.

Daniel sought reconsideration, asking that a day be set for the presentation of evidence in support of his October 3 motion. The CFI denied the motions in its orders of November 18 and 28, 1938, and Daniel appealed. The record showed that Daniel had been given a hearing on October 29, 1938, but offered no evidence of poverty or inability to pay, and that no special reasons appeared in the bill of exceptions for executing the support judgment during the appeal.

• Opportunity to Prove Poverty: Daniel V. Estacio, defendant-appellant, argued that the CFI erred in denying his October 3, 1938 motion when, in its October 4, 1938 order, the same court had stated that the motion could not be resolved without the presentation of evidence.
• Denial of Reconsideration: He argued that the CFI erred in denying his November 1938 motion for reconsideration, which sought a day for the presentation of evidence in support of his October 3 motion.
• Arrest After Approval of Bill of Exceptions: He argued that the CFI erred in ordering his arrest under the August 23, 1938 order after approving the bill of exceptions and elevating the case to the Court of Appeals.

• Opportunity to Prove Inability to Pay: Whether the CFI erred in denying Daniel V. Estacio’s motion without allowing him to present evidence of his poverty and inability to pay support.
• Denial of Reconsideration: Whether the CFI erred in denying his motion for reconsideration seeking a day to present evidence.
• Jurisdiction to Order Execution and Arrest After Appeal: Whether the CFI had jurisdiction to order execution of the support judgment and arrest Daniel V. Estacio after approving the bill of exceptions and elevating the case to the appellate court.

• Opportunity to Prove Inability to Pay: No. The CFI set the matter for hearing, but Daniel V. Estacio presented no evidence on October 29, 1938; denial was within sound discretion.
• Denial of Reconsideration: No. The motion was a corollary of the first assignment and had no merit.
• Jurisdiction to Order Execution and Arrest After Appeal: No. After approval of the bill of exceptions and elevation, the CFI lost jurisdiction; the execution and arrest order was void absent special reasons under Section 144.

• Opportunity to Prove Inability to Pay: The record showed that after the August 23, 1938 order and arrest warrant, Estacio filed an October 3, 1938 motion to suspend compliance because he had moved to reconsider the August 23 order. The motion was postponed several times and, on his attorney’s petition, was finally submitted on October 29, 1938. Although Judge Rovira had earlier stated that the motion could not be acted upon without evidence and set it for trial, when the trial took place Estacio presented no evidence of his alleged poverty or inability to pay. The CFI therefore acted within its sound discretion in denying the motion, and Estacio could not complain that he was not permitted to adduce evidence.
• Denial of Reconsideration: Estacio’s motion for reconsideration sought a day for the presentation of evidence in support of his October 3 motion. Since that motion had already been set for hearing and submitted without any evidence from him, the reconsideration motion was a mere corollary of the first assignment of error and was likewise without merit.
• Jurisdiction to Order Execution and Arrest After Appeal: Under Rustia vs. Judge of First Instance of Batangas, 44 Phil. 62, approval of the bill of exceptions divests the lower court of jurisdiction over contentious matters connected with the issues in the case. Under Viuda de Syquia vs. Concepcion and Palma, 60 Phil. 186, once an appeal is perfected by approval of the bill of exceptions and transmission to the appellate court, the court a quo has no jurisdiction to reconsider an order directing execution of its judgment. Under Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 2 Phil. 293, the filing of a bill of exceptions suspends execution of a judgment for alimony; the trial court could have provided that execution should not be stayed under Section 144, but it did not. Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows execution pending appeal only by special order, and the power to order execution notwithstanding the bill arises from special reasons stated in the bill itself. The record showed no special reason authorizing the CFI of Rizal to order execution of the support judgment after the bill of exceptions had been approved. The CFI therefore acted without jurisdiction in ordering execution and issuing the arrest order, making that order illegal and void.

• Loss of jurisdiction upon perfection of appeal — Once a bill of exceptions is approved and the case elevated, the trial court loses jurisdiction over contentious matters connected with the issues; it cannot reconsider or execute its judgment. The SC applied this to void the CFI’s August 23, 1938 execution and arrest order issued after the February 19, 1938 approval.
• Stay of execution by bill of exceptions under Section 144 — Filing a bill of exceptions stays execution until final determination unless the court, for special reasons stated in the bill, orders that execution not be stayed; the court may require a bond. The SC applied this because no special reasons appeared in the record, so the execution and arrest order could not stand.
• Sound discretion over motions after opportunity to present evidence — A trial court may deny a motion where the movant was given a hearing but presented no evidence; the movant cannot later claim denial of opportunity. The SC applied this to Estacio’s failure to prove poverty or inability to pay on October 29, 1938.

• "As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of exceptions had been approved, it is very true that upon such approval the lower court losses its jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the issues in the case." — Quoted from Rustia vs. Judge of First Instance of Batangas; it states the loss of jurisdiction after approval of the bill of exceptions.
• "as soon as an appeal is perfected by means of the approval of the bill of exceptions and the transmission thereof to the appellate court, the court a quo has no jurisdiction to reconsider an order entered by it directing the issuance of a writ of execution of its judgment" — Quoted from Viuda de Syquia vs. Concepcion and Palma; it bars reconsideration of an execution order after appeal is perfected.
• "The power of a Court of First Instance to order that a judgment be executed notwithstanding the filing of the bill of exceptions, arises from the existence of special reasons therefor, which reasons should be stated in the bill of exceptions." — It states the Section 144 requirement that special reasons for execution pending appeal must appear in the bill of exceptions.
• "the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in ordering the execution of the judgment, rendered by it against the defendant-appellant Daniel V. Estacio, sentencing him to pay an allowance to his wife, and the issuance of an order of arrest in case of non-compliance with said judgment, after the approval of the bill of exceptions, acted without jurisdiction, wherefore, said order of execution of the judgment is illegal and void." — It is the SC’s holding that the CFI’s execution and arrest order was void for lack of jurisdiction.

• Rustia vs. Judge of First Instance of Batangas, 44 Phil. 62 — Relied on for the rule that approval of a bill of exceptions divests the lower court of jurisdiction over contentious matters connected with the issues.
• Viuda de Syquia vs. Concepcion and Palma, 60 Phil. 186 — Relied on for the rule that after appeal is perfected, the court a quo cannot reconsider an order directing execution of its judgment.
• Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 2 Phil. 293 — Relied on for the rule that filing a bill of exceptions suspends execution of a judgment for alimony unless the trial court provides otherwise under Section 144.

• Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) — Stay of execution: no execution upon a final CFI judgment until the period for perfecting a bill of exceptions expires, except by special order; filing a bill stays execution until final determination unless the court, for special reasons stated in the bill, orders that execution be not stayed, in which case execution may issue at once; the court may require a bond as a condition of stay. The SC applied it by holding that the CFI could order execution notwithstanding the bill only for special reasons stated in the bill, and no such reasons appeared, so the execution and arrest order was void.