Marcelo vs. Bungubung

An administrative finding of guilt by the Office of the Ombudsman is conclusive only when supported by substantial evidence; evidence consisting of uncorroborated affidavits, self-serving records, and a complainant’s subsequent voluntary recantation admitting fabrication does not meet the substantial evidence standard. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must possess rational probative force.

Leopoldo F. Bungubung served as Manager of the Port District Office of Manila of the Philippine Ports Authority and Chairman of its Ports District Security Bids and Awards Committee. In 2001, Roberto C. Doromal, president of Combat Security & Executive Protection Agency, a security firm that participated in the bidding for the PPA security services contract, filed a complaint-affidavit before the PPA Resident Ombudsman alleging that Bungubung and other PPA officials demanded and received monthly “balato” or “payola” from him and his late wife in connection with prior security contracts, and that Bungubung later solicited a Mitsubishi Pajero van and additional cash in exchange for the 2001 contract award. The Resident Ombudsman’s investigation report recommended the filing of criminal and administrative complaints against Bungubung.

• Nature of the Complaint: Roberto C. Doromal, President of Combat Security & Executive Protection Agency (CSEPA), filed a Complaint-Affidavit dated 7 September 2001 before the PPA Resident Ombudsman accusing Bungubung, the PDO-Manila Port District Manager and Chairman of the PDSBAC, of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Doromal alleged that Bungubung and other PPA officials demanded “balato” from his late wife beginning in 1995 and continued demanding monthly sums after her death, with Bungubung personally receiving amounts ranging from ₱2,000 to ₱50,000 per month. Doromal further claimed that in late February 2001, he personally delivered ₱50,000 to Bungubung at the latter’s office and that Bungubung then demanded a late-model Mitsubishi Pajero van as a condition for the award of the 2001 security contract. When Doromal failed to deliver the vehicle, the contract was awarded to another agency, Star Special Watchman & Detective Agency, Inc. Doromal stated that his investigation revealed a Pajero van with plate number WLA-674 registered under Bungubung’s son.

• Evidence Submitted by Doromal: In support of his complaint, Doromal submitted (a) the affidavit of his secretary, Evalyn Cruz, who recounted personally handing ₱50,000 in cash to Bungubung on 16 January 2001; and (b) a CSEPA “blue book” allegedly detailing monthly “balato” or “payola” paid to PPA officials from July 2000 to February 2001, recorded as representation expenses. The blue book was purportedly prepared by a certain Evalyn M. Ebora and approved by Doromal.

• Evidence Submitted by Bungubung: Bungubung filed a Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit denying the charges. He submitted (a) the affidavit of Celso A. Fernandez, President of Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., who denied giving money or a vehicle to Bungubung; (b) the affidavit of Rufino Valenzuela, who denied summoning Doromal to Bungubung’s office; (c) a copy of Civil Case No. 01-100678 filed by Doromal before the RTC questioning the legality of the bidding, which contained no mention of the alleged Pajero solicitation; (d) a notarized Deed of Sale showing that the Pajero with plate WLA-674 was purchased by Bungubung’s son from Teresito Uy; (e) a Traffic Accident Incident Report from the Central Police Traffic Enforcement Office indicating that an employee of CSEPA had filed a false “hit-and-run” report against Bungubung’s son’s Pajero on 4 May 2001; and (f) PDSBAC Resolutions showing that the security contracts were awarded through public bidding.

• Ombudsman’s Ruling: The Ombudsman, in an Order dated 11 January 2005, gave credence to Doromal’s evidence, found Bungubung liable for grave misconduct (absorbing the lesser offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service), and dismissed him from service with accessory penalties.

• Subsequent Recantation by Doromal: While Bungubung’s appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, Doromal executed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated 18 August 2005 and an Affidavit of Desistance dated 23 August 2005. He expressly admitted that all his allegations against Bungubung were fabricated; that Bungubung never demanded or received any “balato” or vehicle from him or his wife; and that the charges were wholly untrue.

• Reliance on Affidavits and Due Process: The Ombudsman maintained that its reliance on the affidavits of Doromal and Cruz in determining Bungubung’s administrative liability was proper and did not violate due process, as administrative proceedings may be resolved solely on the basis of position papers, affidavits, and documentary evidence.

• Substantial Evidence: The Ombudsman argued that its finding of grave misconduct against Bungubung was supported by substantial evidence, namely the positive declarations in the complaint-affidavit and corroborating affidavit of Cruz, and the CSEPA blue book.

• Great Weight of Ombudsman Findings: The Ombudsman invoked the principle that its findings of fact, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and must be accorded full respect and credit by the courts.

• Lack of Substantial Evidence: Bungubung countered that the Court of Appeals correctly found no substantial evidence to hold him liable for grave misconduct. He stressed that the affidavits were hearsay because the affiants failed to appear and personally attest to their contents.

• Denial of Due Process: Bungubung contended that the Ombudsman’s absolute reliance on the affidavits, without affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants through a formal investigation, deprived him of due process.

• Effect of Desistance: Bungubung argued that the Court of Appeals properly considered Doromal’s Ex-Parte Manifestation, Motion to Withdraw Complaint, and Affidavit of Desistance as proof of his lack of culpability, since Doromal explicitly admitted fabricating the charges.

• Due Process: Whether Bungubung was denied due process when the Ombudsman resolved the administrative case on the basis of affidavits and pleadings without conducting a formal hearing.

• Substantial Evidence: Whether the Ombudsman’s finding of administrative liability for grave misconduct was supported by substantial evidence sufficient to render it conclusive under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.

• Effect of Affidavit of Desistance: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly considered Doromal’s Affidavit of Desistance and its express repudiation of the original charges.

• Due Process: No denial of due process occurred. In administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and pleadings; a formal hearing is not an inherent right unless requested for clarification or to propound searching questions on unclear matters. The standard of due process in administrative tribunals is satisfied by an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration. Bungubung was afforded ample opportunity to be heard: he submitted a counter-affidavit, a rejoinder-affidavit, and a motion for reconsideration, and he initially manifested his conformity to the submission of the case for resolution without formal investigation.

• Substantial Evidence: The Ombudsman’s finding of grave misconduct was not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion — was absent. Doromal’s evidence was critically deficient: (a) his allegation that Bungubung solicited a Pajero van was suspect because Doromal failed to mention this significant claim in his earlier civil case and petition for TRO before the RTC, raising it only later in his complaint-affidavit; (b) the CSEPA “blue book” was self-serving and uncorroborated, its purported preparer never having been presented, and its entries unverified by any independent audit; (c) the Traffic Accident Incident Report, prepared by the police in official capacity and enjoying a presumption of regularity, established that Doromal filed a false “hit-and-run” report against Bungubung’s son’s vehicle, demonstrating ill motive; and (d) Bungubung’s denials, though generally weak as a defense, carried weight here because they were supported by his own controverting evidence, whereas Doromal’s evidence consisted merely of mutually corroborating affidavits. The totality of evidence lacked the rational probative force required to sustain an administrative finding of guilt.

• Effect of Affidavit of Desistance: The Affidavit of Desistance could not be ignored. While the Court generally disfavors desistance affidavits, Doromal’s document was not a mere expression of loss of interest but an explicit, voluntary admission that he had fabricated all charges. In the absence of evidence of fraud or duress, this express repudiation of material points substantially undermined the probative value of his original complaint-affidavit. As in Gaviola v. Salcedo, where an administrative case could not be proven without the complainant’s evidence, the administrative charge against Bungubung collapsed once its foundational allegations were repudiated.

• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Proceedings — Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive only when supported by substantial evidence; conversely, they are not binding when the evidence falls short of this standard. The burden rests on the complainant to prove allegations by substantial evidence.

• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings — Due process in administrative tribunals does not require a formal hearing. It is satisfied by affording a party an opportunity to explain his side or seek reconsideration. Cases may be resolved solely on the basis of position papers, affidavits, and documentary evidence as long as fairness is not disregarded. A formal adversarial proceeding becomes necessary only for clarification or when a party requests it.

• Grave Misconduct Defined — Grave (or serious) misconduct is a transgression of an established and definite rule of action — unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer — that has a direct relation to and is connected with the performance of official duties. It must be weighty, momentous, and not trifling.

• Positive Denial as Evidence — The rule preferring positive testimony over denial does not strictly apply when the denial comes from a person in a position to know whether the fact occurred. Such a denial has the same weight as a contrary assertion when supported by controverting evidence.

• Effect of Affidavit of Desistance — An affidavit of desistance does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of an administrative case. However, when the desistance includes an explicit voluntary admission that the original charges were fabricated, and the administrative case rests entirely on the repudiated complaint, the case must fall for lack of evidence.

• “Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.”

• “Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. … The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.”

• “[T]he assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.” (quoting Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations)

• “[A]ffidavits are deemed hearsay evidence because the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. Hence, affidavits are generally deemed inadmissible or rejected outright unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.” (quoting Dela Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, as cited by the Court of Appeals)

• Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158 (2003) — Established the guidelines for judicial review of administrative decisions: the complainant bears the burden of proving allegations by substantial evidence; administrative findings are respected if supported by substantial evidence; and administrative decisions may be set aside only upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

• Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 109 (1992) — Affirmed that actual adversarial proceedings in administrative cases are necessary only for clarification; summary proceedings based on affidavits and position papers are permissible.

• Gaviola v. Salcedo, A.C. No. 3037, 428 SCRA 563 (2004) — Applied the principle that an administrative complaint cannot proceed when it relies solely on the evidence of a complainant who later executes an affidavit of desistance.

• Amosco v. Judge Magro, 165 Phil. 110 (1976) and In re: Impeachment of Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212 (1922) — Defined misconduct and serious misconduct, respectively, requiring a direct relation to official duties and a character that is weighty and momentous.

• Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) — Declared that administrative decisions must be based on evidence having rational probative force.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Mandates that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Conversely applied, when findings lack substantial evidence, they are not binding.

• Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The criminal charge against Bungubung was based on this provision penalizing public officers who directly or indirectly request or receive any gift or benefit in connection with a government contract. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause under this section was noted but not directly at issue in the administrative appeal.

• Section 24, Republic Act No. 6770 — Cited as the basis for the initial recommendation of preventive suspension.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Nachura, Reyes, JJ.