Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis

The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy, because Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity before a party may remarry, and a party who contracts a second marriage without such declaration cannot belatedly obtain one to suspend or defeat criminal prosecution.

Respondent Isagani D. Bobis contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier on October 21, 1985, under the Civil Code. Without that marriage having been annulled, nullified, or terminated, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996, under the Family Code, and allegedly a third marriage with one Julia Sally Hernandez. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was in effect at the time of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry.

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani D. Bobis contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified, or terminated, respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996. Respondent also allegedly contracted a third marriage with one Julia Sally Hernandez. The first marriage was celebrated under the Civil Code, while the second marriage was celebrated under the Family Code.

Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy, invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question.

The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The issue before the Court was limited to whether the subsequent filing of the civil action for nullity constituted a prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy; the Court expressly declined to resolve the validity of the first marriage, noting that the Civil Code presumes the validity and indissolubility of marriage absent a judicial declaration to the contrary.

• Article 40 of the Family Code: Petitioner argued that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, and that the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
• Marriage License Exemption: Petitioner claimed that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license, as prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years, invoking Article 76 of the Civil Code.

• Nullity of First Marriage: Respondent alleged that the first marriage was void for lack of a marriage license and initiated a civil action for judicial declaration of absolute nullity of that marriage.
• Prejudicial Question: Respondent invoked the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy, warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings.

• Prejudicial Question: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

• Prejudicial Question: No. The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy, because Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity before remarriage, and a party cannot use belated filing to defeat prosecution.

• Prejudicial Question: A prejudicial question requires two essential elements under Rule 111, Section 5 of the Rules of Court: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. While the civil action for nullity of the first marriage is related to the bigamy case, its resolution would not be determinative of the criminal charge. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of the second marriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is required before a party may remarry; the clear implication is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense, because there was still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. Respondent's clear intent was to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter invoke that judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. Allowing this would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy, as any bigamist could disregard Article 40, contract a subsequent marriage, and escape prosecution by claiming the first marriage is void. The Civil Code presumes the validity and indissolubility of marriage, and parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage; only competent courts have such authority. Since respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity before entering the second marriage, he was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted the second marriage. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage, making it not essential to the determination of the criminal charge and therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent can raise the nullity of the previous marriage as a defense during the trial proper in the criminal case. The lower court thus erred in suspending the criminal case, respondent having merely resorted to the civil action to frustrate or delay his criminal prosecution.

• Prejudicial Question — A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information to sustain further prosecution. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the civil action for nullity of the first marriage failed to satisfy the second element, because any decision therein would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
• Presumption of Validity of Marriage — Every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage and the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage; only competent courts have such authority. Prior to a judicial declaration of nullity, the validity of the marriage is beyond question, and the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest, or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. The Court relied on this presumption to conclude that respondent was regarded as a married man at the time he contracted the second marriage.
• Prior Judicial Declaration of Nullity Under Article 40 of the Family Code — The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Without a judicial declaration of nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting, and a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The Court applied this to hold that respondent, without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, could not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage, and cannot belatedly obtain that declaration to delay or defeat his criminal prosecution.

• "(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy." — This passage, quoted from Landicho vs. Relova, states the controlling principle that parties cannot unilaterally judge their own marriage void and that contracting a second marriage without prior judicial declaration of nullity carries the risk of bigamy prosecution.
• "He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first." — This articulates the policy rationale against allowing belated nullity declarations to defeat bigamy prosecution, emphasizing that permitting such a strategy would render the bigamy provisions nugatory.
• "Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question." — This states the ratio decidendi: because the civil case's resolution would not alter the factual basis of the bigamy charge, the second element of a prejudicial question is not satisfied.

• Landicho vs. Relova, 22 SCRA 731 (1968) — Controlling precedent. Held that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; only competent courts have such authority. A party who contracts a second marriage before judicial declaration of nullity of the first assumes the risk of prosecution for bigamy. The Court relied on this case as the principal authority for its ruling.
• Beltran vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000 — Applied by analogy. Held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a concubinage case. The Court applied this ruling by analogy to bigamy, since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
• Wiegel vs. Hon. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986) — Cited for the proposition that respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage, the first marriage being presumed subsisting absent a judicial declaration of nullity.
• Nial vs. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000 — Cited for the principle that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
• Apiag vs. Judge Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 (1997) — Cited for the proposition that a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.
• People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935) — Cited for the elements of bigamy: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

• Article 40, Family Code — Requires that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Applied to hold that respondent, without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, could not validly enter into the second marriage and could not belatedly seek such declaration to defeat prosecution.
• Article 76, Civil Code — Provides the exemption from the marriage license requirement for parties who have attained the age of majority and lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Petitioner invoked this provision regarding her marriage to respondent, though the Court noted the issue was limited to the prejudicial question and did not resolve the validity of the first marriage.
• Article 220, Civil Code — Provides that every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage and the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Applied to support the presumption that the first marriage was valid absent a judicial declaration of nullity.
• Article 3, Civil Code — Provides that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Applied to reject any claim of ignorance of Article 40 of the Family Code, the legality of marriage being a matter of law and every person being presumed to know the law.
• Article 350, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes the contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. Cited to underscore that contracting a marriage in disregard of legal requirements is itself penalized.
• Rule 111, Section 5, Rules of Court — Defines the two essential elements of a prejudicial question: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Applied to test whether the civil action for nullity satisfied the requisites of a prejudicial question.

Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Justice Puno, Justice Kapunan, and Justice Pardo concurred.