Marasigan vs. Fuentes

Probable cause in a preliminary investigation requires only a well-founded belief, based on likelihood and common sense, that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty; it does not require clear and convincing evidence of guilt. Where the evidence shows concerted assault and an attempt to hit the victim's head with a hollow block while others restrained him, probable cause exists to charge attempted murder, not merely less serious physical injuries, and the felony remains attempted where the assailants are prevented from completing their design by the timely arrival of neighbors.

The incident occurred in Adelina I Subdivision, Barangay San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, where Marasigan was walking home and where Fuentes' house was located. The case involves the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation and the Department of Justice's review of the provincial prosecutor's resolution, with the central legal question being the proper criminal charge for which respondents should stand trial.

At about 3:00 a.m. on December 20, 2006, Mark Reynald Marasigan was walking home along Hebrew Street, Adelina I Subdivision, Barangay San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. He had passed by the house of Reginald Fuentes, where merrymaking was ongoing, when he felt someone throw an object at him from behind. Turning around, he saw Fuentes, who disappeared upon noticing that he had been seen. A witness, Jefferson Pablo, spoke with Marasigan and confirmed that Fuentes had thrown the object.

While Marasigan and Pablo were speaking, Fuentes reappeared with Robert Calilan, Alain Delon Lindo, and another unidentified individual. Fuentes suddenly punched Marasigan on the face, causing his nose to bleed. Calilan and Lindo also hit him while their unidentified companion sought to stop them. Fuentes then picked up a stone, described as a piece of hollow block, and attempted to hit Marasigan's head with it. Marasigan parried the stone with his hand, causing his hand to fracture. Fuentes again picked up the stone. Lindo and Calilan took hold of each of Marasigan's arms. Several more men who had been in Fuentes' home joined the assault.

Sensing that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo were determined to crush him with hollow blocks from a nearby construction site, Marasigan shouted for help. Gregoria Pablo, Jefferson Pablo's mother, rushed out of their house and tried to pacify the assailants, but they continued to assault Marasigan. It was only upon the arrival of neighbors Marcelo Maaba and Lauro Agulto that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo ceased their assault and fled. In their sworn statements, Marcelo Maaba stated that he saw four persons beating Marasigan and that the group left him bloodied; Lauro Agulto stated that Calilan's group, with seven others, ganged up on Marasigan, punching and kicking him even after he fell; and Gregoria Pablo stated that she saw the group intending to kill Marasigan while he lay on the ground and was being pulled and struck by six or seven large men.

Assisted by his parents, Marasigan submitted himself to two medico-legal examinations and an x-ray examination. He also filed reports and complaints at the barangay hall and police station. The medico-legal findings showed that he sustained contusions and abrasions and a fracture on the metacarpal bone of the second digit of his right hand, with a healing period of less than 30 days. On December 28, 2006, he formally filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against Fuentes, Calilan, Lindo, and one John Doe before Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Milaflor Tan Mancia.

After preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Christopher R. Serrano issued a Resolution dated August 16, 2007 finding probable cause to charge Fuentes and Calilan with less serious physical injuries and clearing Lindo of liability. He reasoned that there were no qualifying circumstances to support murder and that Marasigan's injuries, including the fractured finger, required a healing period of not more than 30 days. The DOJ later reviewed the matter, and the conflicting resolutions on probable cause led to the present petition.

• Frustrated Murder Charge: Petitioner argued that the medical findings made on him and the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength justified prosecution for frustrated murder.
• Lindo's Participation: Petitioner added that Lindo's acts were unambiguous and indicated his participation in a design to kill him.

• Proper Crime for Trial: Whether the proper crime, if any, for which any or all of the respondents must stand trial is attempted murder, frustrated murder, less serious physical injuries, or none.
• Probable Cause Standard: Whether the Department of Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in requiring clear and convincing evidence of collective intent to kill instead of applying the probable cause standard for preliminary investigation.
• Conspiracy and Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether probable cause exists to charge all respondents with attempted murder on the basis of conspiracy and abuse of superior strength.
• Stage of Execution: Whether the felony, if any, reached only the attempted stage rather than the frustrated stage.

• Proper Crime for Trial: Attempted murder. The Court reinstated the Undersecretary's resolution directing the filing of informations for attempted murder against Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo.
• Probable Cause Standard: Yes, grave abuse of discretion. The DOJ Secretary erred in requiring clear and convincing evidence; probable cause requires only a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the respondent is probably guilty.
• Conspiracy and Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts, and abuse of superior strength was shown by the assailants' numerical superiority and restraint of the victim while another aimed at his head.
• Stage of Execution: Attempted, not frustrated. The assailants commenced the felony by overt acts but did not perform all acts of execution because the timely arrival of neighbors, a cause other than spontaneous desistance, stopped them.

• Proper Crime for Trial: The Court framed the sole issue as the proper crime, if any, for which any or all respondents must stand trial. It found that the Court of Appeals' affirmance of Secretary Devanadera's resolution rested on a gross misapprehension of facts. The evidence available to the prosecutors and the Department of Justice showed probable cause to charge all three respondents with attempted murder. The Court thus reinstated the Undersecretary's September 2, 2009 Resolution.

• Probable Cause Standard: Preliminary investigation ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released; it inquires only into probable cause, which rests on likelihood rather than certainty and on common sense rather than clear and convincing evidence. Probable cause for filing a criminal information consists of facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty. It does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty; it does not require evidence sufficient to procure a conviction, clear and convincing evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt, or absolute certainty of guilt. The DOJ Secretary therefore erred in citing with approval the prosecutor's demand for clear and convincing evidence of collective intent to kill. Although Rule 45 generally raises only questions of law and factual findings are binding, the Court recognized exceptions, including grave abuse of discretion and misapprehension of facts. The DOJ Secretary had jurisdiction to review the prosecutor's resolution, but she acted with grave abuse of discretion when she disregarded evidence and insisted on conclusions contrary to the evidence and established evidentiary principles.

• Conspiracy and Abuse of Superior Strength: The Court rejected the DOJ Secretary's view that the evidence was equivocal on homicidal intent and that the physical evidence negated it. In Rivera vs. People, superficial or non-fatal wounds did not negate attempted murder. Here, several assailants pummeled Marasigan, and efforts were made to hit his head with stones or hollow blocks. That Marasigan parried a blow and suffered a hand fracture instead of a fatal head injury did not negate homicidal intent; Fuentes attempted to hit his head with a hollow block while Calilan and Lindo restrained him. Witness statements showed the attack was made with numerical superiority, and Gregoria Pablo stated she saw the group intending to kill Marasigan. These facts provided reasonable basis to appreciate abuse of superior strength. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the mode, method, and manner of the offense or from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest. It is not essential to prove a previous agreement; it is enough that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. As in People vs. Amodia, citing People vs. Manalo, holding the victim's hand while another strikes a blow indicates conspiracy. Calilan and Lindo held each of Marasigan's arms while Fuentes was about to strike him with a hollow block, showing a common design.

• Stage of Execution: Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. An attempt exists when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The elements of attempted felony are: (1) the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all acts of execution; (3) the act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to a cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance. The first requisite requires external acts with a direct connection to the intended crime. Here, the coordinated assault culminated in efforts to hit Marasigan's head with a stone or hollow block. Had respondents succeeded, they could have dealt fatal blows. They were unable to inflict fatal blows only because neighbors responded to calls for help and arrived in time. The felony therefore reached only the attempted stage, not the frustrated stage, and the Undersecretary's conclusion was sustained.

• Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigation — Probable cause for filing a criminal information consists of facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty. It rests on likelihood, opinion, and reasonable belief, not on actual or positive cause, absolute certainty, clear and convincing evidence, or proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this standard to hold that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused her discretion in requiring clear and convincing evidence of collective intent to kill.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in DOJ Review — The DOJ Secretary has jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's resolution, but she may not disregard the evidence and records or insist on conclusions contrary to the evidence and established evidentiary principles. A gross misapprehension of facts amounting to grave abuse of discretion warrants reversal. The Court found such abuse in the Secretary's dismissal of the complaints against Fuentes and Lindo and her limitation of Calilan's liability to less serious physical injuries.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises the moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, and forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence; absent direct proof, it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was perpetrated or inferred from acts pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest. An accused participates by performing an overt act as a direct or indirect contribution, including active participation or moral assistance. The Court applied this to Calilan and Lindo holding Marasigan's arms while Fuentes aimed a hollow block at his head.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is a qualifying circumstance that may be appreciated when the assailants take advantage of their numerical superiority or employ means to weaken the victim's defense. The Court found a reasonable basis for this circumstance where several assailants attacked Marasigan, with Fuentes attempting to hit his head with a hollow block while Calilan and Lindo restrained him.

• Attempted Felony — Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of a cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The elements are: (1) commencement by overt acts; (2) non-performance of all acts of execution; (3) absence of spontaneous desistance; and (4) non-performance due to a cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance. The Court applied this to hold that the crime was attempted murder, not frustrated murder, because the timely arrival of neighbors prevented completion.

• Intent to Kill and Non-Fatal Injuries — The fact that wounds are superficial or non-fatal does not negate liability for attempted murder or the existence of homicidal intent. Intent to kill may be inferred from the circumstances, including the use of a weapon, the targeting of a vital area, and the concerted acts of the assailants. The Court applied this in rejecting the DOJ Secretary's reliance on the medico-legal findings to rule out homicidal intent.

• Rule 45 and Rule 65; Factual Review — A Rule 65 petition for certiorari is limited to errors of jurisdiction, while a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari generally raises only questions of law. However, factual findings may be reviewed in recognized exceptions, including grave abuse of discretion and misapprehension of facts. The Court applied this to review the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the DOJ Secretary's factual appreciation.

• "A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." — This passage states the quantum of evidence for probable cause and is the basis for the Court's holding that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused her discretion in requiring clear and convincing evidence.

• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of conspiracy, which it applied to infer a common design from Calilan and Lindo's act of restraining Marasigan while Fuentes aimed at his head.

• "There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." — This quotation reproduces Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code and supports the Court's conclusion that the crime was attempted murder, not frustrated murder.

• "The fact that petitioner was successful in blocking the blow with his hand does not, in and of itself, mean that respondents could not have possibly killed him. It does not negate any homicidal intent. It remains that respondent Fuentes attempted to hit petitioner on the head with a hollow block while respondents Calilan and Lindo made efforts to restrain petitioner." — This passage rejects the DOJ Secretary's reliance on the non-fatal nature of the injuries and explains why the evidence supported a finding of homicidal intent.

• Rivera vs. People, 515 Phil. 824 (2006) — The Court relied on this case for the rule that superficial or non-fatal wounds do not negate attempted murder and for the elements of an attempted felony. It found the circumstances similar: several assailants pummeled the victim, and efforts were made to hit his head with a hollow block.

• People vs. Amodia, 602 Phil. 889 (2009) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the perpetrators and that holding the victim's hand while another strikes a blow indicates conspiracy.

• People vs. Manalo, 428 Phil. 682 (2002) — Cited in Amodia for the proposition that holding the victim's right hand while he was being stabbed constituted sufficient proof of conspiracy.

• Reyes vs. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 582 Phil. 505 (2008) — Cited for the definition and quantum of probable cause in preliminary investigation, including that it need not rest on clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• AAA vs. Judge Carbonell, 551 Phil. 936 (2007) — Cited for the principle that preliminary investigation ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released.

• People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610 — Cited for the distinction between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction in Rule 65 and Rule 45 remedies.

• Ligot vs. Republic, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 509 — Cited in connection with the Rule 65/Rule 45 distinction.

• Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers vs. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 656 — Cited for the exceptions to the rule that factual findings are binding on the Supreme Court.

• Odango vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 147420, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 633 — Cited for the principle that a ruling may be reversed if the tribunal acted capriciously, whimsically, or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy.

• Sajonas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 Phil. 201 (1990) — Cited in Odango for the same principle.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. The Court applied it to hold that the crime was attempted murder because respondents commenced the felony by overt acts but did not perform all acts of execution due to the timely arrival of neighbors, a cause other than spontaneous desistance.

• Rule 45, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. The Court cited it but recognized exceptions allowing factual review, including grave abuse of discretion and misapprehension of facts.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari and limits review to errors of jurisdiction. The Court discussed it in distinguishing the remedy Marasigan filed before the Court of Appeals from the Rule 45 petition before the Supreme Court.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Jose Catral Mendoza concurred. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, Chief Justice, certified the conclusions. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.