Maquiling vs. COMELEC

The use of a foreign passport after executing an oath of renunciation of foreign citizenship recants the oath, reverts the candidate to dual citizen status, and disqualifies them from running for any elective local position.

Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship upon naturalization as a United States citizen. On July 10, 2008, he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act No. 9225, re-acquiring Philippine citizenship and effectively becoming a dual citizen. To qualify for elective office, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his U.S. citizenship on April 3, 2009. Despite this renunciation, Bureau of Immigration records showed that he used his U.S. passport four times to travel in and out of the Philippines between April 14, 2009, and November 24, 2009. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. A rival candidate, Linog Balua, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado or cancel his COC, citing his U.S. citizenship and residency issues. Arnado won the May 10, 2010 elections and was proclaimed Mayor. He justified his use of the U.S. passport by claiming his Philippine passport—issued on June 18, 2009—was not yet in his possession, prompting him to use the available travel document for urgent trips.

• Naturalization and Repatriation: Rommel Arnado, a natural-born Filipino, became a naturalized U.S. citizen, resulting in the loss of his Philippine citizenship. On July 10, 2008, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines under R.A. No. 9225, re-acquiring Philippine citizenship and becoming a dual citizen.
• Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship: On April 3, 2009, to qualify for elective office, Arnado took another Oath of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation, absolutely and perpetually renouncing his allegiance to the United States and divesting himself of all civil and political rights and privileges of U.S. citizenship.
• Continued Use of U.S. Passport: Despite the renunciation, Bureau of Immigration records showed Arnado used his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 to depart for the U.S. on April 14, 2009, and return on June 25, 2009; and to depart again on July 29, 2009, returning on November 24, 2009. He also arrived in the Philippines using the same U.S. passport on January 12, 2010, and March 23, 2010.
• Filing of COC and Election: Arnado filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan on November 30, 2009. He won the May 10, 2010 elections and was proclaimed Mayor.
• Justification for Passport Use: Arnado claimed he used his U.S. passport because his Philippine passport, issued on June 18, 2009, was not yet in his possession; he received it approximately three months later. Upon receipt, he allegedly used the Philippine passport for subsequent travels.
• Intervention of Petitioner: Casan Macode Maquiling, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the COMELEC proceedings, arguing that if Arnado were disqualified, he—Maquiling—should be proclaimed as the winner, not the Vice-Mayor via succession.

• Disqualification due to Dual Citizenship: Petitioner Maquiling argued that Arnado’s continued use of his U.S. passport after renouncing his U.S. citizenship negated his Affidavit of Renunciation, reverting him to dual citizen status and disqualifying him from running for any elective local position under Section 40(d) of the LGC.
• Inapplicability of Succession: Petitioner maintained that Section 44 of the LGC on succession is inapplicable. Because Arnado was disqualified from the outset, his COC was void ab initio, making the votes cast for him stray; thus, Maquiling, as the qualified candidate with the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed the winner.

• Validity of Renunciation: Respondent Arnado argued that he substantially complied with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 (Oath of Allegiance and Affidavit of Renunciation) and that the use of a U.S. passport does not operate to "un-renounce" his prior renunciation or constitute a repudiation of his Philippine citizenship.
• Justification for Passport Use: Respondent contended that his use of the U.S. passport was justified because his Philippine passport had not yet been issued or notified to him, and that he used his Philippine passport as soon as it was in his possession.
• Jurisdiction and Remedy: Respondent claimed that the COMELEC lost jurisdiction after his proclamation, and that the proper remedy to question his citizenship was a petition for quo warranto.
• Popular Mandate: Respondent asserted that he was the people's choice, having won the election, and that the popular vote should prevail.

• Intervention: Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
• Effect of Using Foreign Passport: Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
• Applicability of Succession: Whether the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable when a winning candidate is disqualified based on a void COC.

• Intervention: Intervention by a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when no final judgment has yet been rendered, pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646. The elevation of the case by the intervenor to the Supreme Court prevents the main case from attaining finality.
• Effect of Using Foreign Passport: The use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship. While it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation, it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. By using his U.S. passport after his renunciation, Arnado effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Because he was a dual citizen at the time of filing his COC, he was disqualified from running for any local elective position under Section 40(d) of the LGC.
• Applicability of Succession: The rule on succession under Section 44 of the LGC does not apply. A COC void ab initio produces no legal effect; the votes cast for the ineligible candidate are stray and should not be counted. The "second placer" is actually the first placer among the qualified candidates and must be proclaimed the winner. The doctrine in Topacio v. Paredes stating that the "wreath of victory cannot be transferred" was clarified as mere obiter dictum and illogical when applied to void COCs.

• Recantation of Renunciation by Use of Foreign Passport — The use of a foreign passport after executing an Oath of Renunciation constitutes a recantation of that oath. It is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to nationality that repudiates the absolute and perpetual renunciation of foreign citizenship, reverting the individual to dual citizen status and triggering the disqualification for local elective office under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
• Void Certificate of Candidacy and Stray Votes — A certificate of candidacy void ab initio produces no legal effect. The votes cast for a candidate who is legally not a candidate at all (due to a void COC) are stray votes and must not be counted. The candidate with the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates is the rightful winner.
• Continuing Citizenship Requirement — Qualifications for public office, particularly citizenship, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of the renunciation of foreign citizenship but continuously throughout the candidacy and tenure. Any act violating the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
• Rejection of the "Wreath of Victory" Doctrine in Void COC Cases — The dictum in Topacio v. Paredes that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate" does not apply when the ineligible candidate's COC is void ab initio. The popular vote does not cure the vice of ineligibility, especially when the deficiency is lack of exclusive citizenship.

• "The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship."
• "Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country."
• "When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate."
• "The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates."

• Mercado v. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999) — Followed. Established the right of intervention in disqualification cases under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and hinted that acts violating an oath of renunciation could warrant sanctions, including loss of citizenship.
• Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009 — Followed. Distinguished dual citizenship by birth (where filing a COC implies renunciation) from dual citizenship by naturalization (which requires the twin requirements of Oath of Allegiance and Affidavit of Renunciation).
• Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012 — Followed. Ruled that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect; votes for a non-candidate are stray votes, and the qualified candidate with the highest votes should be proclaimed.
• Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) — Overruled/Distinguished. The oft-quoted statement that the "wreath of victory cannot be transferred" was declared mere obiter dictum and illogical as a blanket rule, especially when the COC is void ab initio.
• Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934 (1989) — Followed. Affirmed that the popular vote does not cure the vice of ineligibility, particularly the lack of citizenship.
• In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago — Distinguished. The disqualification of a naturalized citizen who renewed a foreign passport was distinguished from a natural-born citizen who merely used an existing foreign passport, though the underlying principle of strict adherence to oaths of allegiance was affirmed.

• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) — Requires those seeking elective public office to meet constitutional and legal qualifications and, at the time of filing their COC, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. Applied to mandate strict compliance with the twin requirements of Oath of Allegiance and Affidavit of Renunciation for naturalized dual citizens.
• Section 40(d), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Disqualifies "[t]hose with dual citizenship" from running for any elective local position. Applied to disqualify Arnado, who reverted to dual citizenship after recanting his renunciation by using his U.S. passport.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Provides that any candidate declared disqualified by final judgment shall not be voted for, and votes cast for them shall not be counted; allows intervention in disqualification cases even after election if no final judgment has been rendered. Applied to justify Maquiling's intervention and the treatment of votes for Arnado as stray.
• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 63 — Enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Interpreted; while using a foreign passport is not among the enumerated acts that expatriate a Filipino citizen, it operates as a recantation of the Oath of Renunciation required for elective office, thereby reverting the individual to dual citizen status for election law purposes.

• Carpio, J. — Concurred, emphasizing that Philippine courts have no power to declare whether a person possesses citizenship other than that of the Philippines, but ruled that Arnado's use of his U.S. passport constituted a retraction of his renunciation, rendering his COC void ab initio.
• Abad, J. — Filed a separate concurring opinion, arguing that Arnado failed to comply with U.S. requirements for renouncing citizenship (specifically Section 349(a)(5) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act), meaning the U.S. still regarded him as a citizen, thus sustaining his dual citizenship disqualification.
• Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ. — Concurred in the majority decision.

• Brion, J. — Dissented on two grounds: (1) Arnado’s use of his U.S. passport was an isolated, justified act (due to the unavailability of his Philippine passport) that did not constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63; and (2) all doubts should be resolved in favor of Arnado's eligibility out of respect for the popular mandate, noting that disenfranchising 5,952 voters to seat a minority mayor undermines the democratic will. The dissent argued that the COMELEC En Banc's factual findings on the justification for passport use were supported by substantial evidence and not reviewable for grave abuse of discretion.