Manuel vs. People

An affidavit of desistance coupled with express repudiation of material allegations in the Information, the complainant's non-presentation during trial, and contradictory testimony regarding the existence of the underlying transaction may engender reasonable doubt sufficient to warrant acquittal in Estafa cases. Where the private complainant herself admits that no obligation existed for which the checks were issued, both the criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto are extinguished.

Petitioner Lucia Manuel y Cadiz was a trader of live chickens who regularly purchased from various farms, including "Ebot's Farm," where she transacted with booker Nemesio Artates. Private complainant Flordeliza Uy was alleged by the prosecution to be the owner of Ebot's Farm. The case arose from the issuance of ten PNB checks that were dishonored for "Account Closed," leading to parallel criminal charges: Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC before the RTC, and ten counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC of San Rafael, Bulacan. Petitioner maintained that Ebot's Farm was owned by a certain Alex Uson, not Uy, and that she transacted directly with Artates.

Petitioner Lucia Manuel y Cadiz was engaged in the trading of live chickens, purchasing from various growers and farms. Among her regular suppliers was "Ebot's Farm," where she dealt with Nemesio Artates, the farm's booker. According to the prosecution, Ebot's Farm was owned by private complainant Flordeliza Uy, and petitioner would place orders in the morning through Artates, then send her husband Rolando Manuel or nephew Arnel Cadiz to pick up the chickens in the evening and deliver check payments. Petitioner, for her part, maintained that Ebot's Farm was owned by a certain Alex Uson, not Uy, and that she transacted directly with Artates, who would call her to book her orders.

In November 2005, petitioner placed several orders for live chickens through Artates. As was her practice, she issued blank PNB checks — filling out only the date and her signature, leaving the name of the payee and the amount blank — which Rolando or Cadiz would leave as guarantee for payment when picking up the chickens. Ten PNB checks were issued bearing dates from December 3 to December 17, 2005, with amounts ranging from P64,800.00 to P105,667.20, totaling P889,606.00. The checks were made payable to Flordeliza Uy. When presented for payment, all were dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Petitioner admitted she was aware the checks would not be funded on time and had approached the owner of Ebot's Farm to request that the checks not be presented for encashment and to renegotiate payment.

Demand letters were sent to petitioner but left unheeded, prompting Uy to file a criminal complaint for both Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Two sets of Informations were filed: the Estafa case docketed as Criminal Case No. 2450-M-0007 before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 9, and ten Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2554-2563 before the MTC of San Rafael, Bulacan. During trial for the Estafa case, the prosecution presented Artates, farm manager Elizabeth De Leon, and PNB branch manager Felicidad Bernardo, but did not present Uy as a witness. Bernardo testified that the date and signature on the checks were in petitioner's handwriting, but the payee name and amount were written by a different person. Petitioner denied having entered Uy's name as payee and stated she never questioned it because she trusted Artates, with whom she was directly transacting.

In the related B.P. Blg. 22 cases, Uy executed an Affidavit of Desistance in which she declared that there was no legal and factual basis for the criminal charges, admitting that petitioner's obligation arising from the checks was no longer demandable as a liability or debt. During the hearing on the motion to approve the affidavit before the MTC, Uy testified for the first time, admitting she had no transactions with petitioner, that she was not familiar with Ebot's Farm (identifying it instead as "Zenith farm"), and that she did not know why the checks were issued in her name. The MTC dismissed the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, noting that Uy's testimony categorically repudiated the material points in her complaint-affidavit and the Information. Petitioner thereafter sought to admit Uy's Affidavit of Desistance and the MTC Order of dismissal into the records of the Estafa case before the Supreme Court.

• Failure to Prove Elements of Estafa: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of Estafa, specifically the elements of deceit and damage, considering that Uy was never presented as a witness during trial.
• No Transaction with Uy: Petitioner maintained that she never transacted with Uy and that her orders for live chickens were placed with Ebot's Farm, owned by a certain Alex Uson, not Uy.
• Admission of Affidavit of Desistance: Petitioner sought to admit Uy's Affidavit of Desistance and the MTC Order dismissing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, arguing that Uy's express repudiation of the material allegations in the Information — including her admission that she had no transactions with petitioner and was unfamiliar with Ebot's Farm — cast serious doubt on petitioner's guilt.

• Inadmissibility of Affidavit of Desistance: The OSG argued that the Affidavit of Desistance and Uy's testimony in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases should not be admitted in the Estafa case because they were made and introduced in a different proceeding.

• Probative Value of Affidavit of Desistance: Whether the Affidavit of Desistance executed by private complainant Uy in the related B.P. Blg. 22 cases, together with her testimony during the hearing for its admission, may be considered in the Estafa case and whether it creates reasonable doubt as to petitioner's guilt.
• Elements of Estafa: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of deceit and damage under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, given the conflicting testimonies and Uy's admission that she had no transactions with petitioner.
• Civil Liability ex Delicto: Whether petitioner's civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by her acquittal.

• Probative Value of Affidavit of Desistance: Yes. Under special and exceptional circumstances, an affidavit of desistance coupled with express repudiation of material points in the Information, the complainant's non-presentation during trial, and contradictory testimony may engender serious doubts as to the accused's liability sufficient to warrant acquittal.
• Elements of Estafa: No. The prosecution failed to prove deceit and damage beyond reasonable doubt because Uy herself admitted she had no transactions with petitioner and was unfamiliar with Ebot's Farm, contradicting the prosecution's evidence of the underlying obligation for which the checks were issued.
• Civil Liability ex Delicto: Yes, extinguished. Because Uy admitted no obligation existed from which the checks were issued, the act or omission from which civil liability could arise did not exist, and civil liability ex delicto is deemed extinguished.

• Probative Value of Affidavit of Desistance: While affidavits of desistance are generally viewed with disfavor because they can be secured through intimidation or monetary consideration, and serve merely as additional grounds to buttress the accused's defenses, exceptional circumstances justify their consideration. Citing Gomez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, which in turn cited People vs. Pimentel and People vs. Manigbas, the Court held that an affidavit of desistance coupled with other circumstances may create serious doubts as to the liability of the accused and warrants a second hard look at the records. In this case, Uy's Affidavit of Desistance was not merely a loss of interest but an express repudiation of the existence of any demandable obligation. Her testimony during the hearing for the affidavit's admission — where she admitted having no transactions with petitioner, was unfamiliar with Ebot's Farm (identifying it as "Zenith farm"), and could not explain why the checks were issued in her name — directly contradicted the prosecution's evidence. Although the affidavit was submitted in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, it finds application in the Estafa case because both involve identical facts and the same subject PNB checks. Combined with Uy's non-presentation during trial and the prosecution's failure to present countervailing evidence on the payee issue — particularly given that petitioner denied issuing the checks in Uy's name and the prosecution's own witness testified that the payee name and amount were written by a different person — these circumstances engender serious and reasonable doubt as to petitioner's liability.

• Elements of Estafa: The elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) are: (1) the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance, the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. Citing Juaquico vs. People, deceit and damage are essential elements that must be established with satisfactory proof. The issuance of the check must be the efficient cause of defraudation — the inducement for the surrender of money or property. It is not the non-payment of a debt which is punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. Here, Uy admitted she had no transactions with petitioner, and there was no contracted obligation for which the checks were issued. The prosecution's witness Artates testified that Ebot's Farm was owned by Uy, but Uy herself denied familiarity with Ebot's Farm, identifying it instead as "Zenith farm." This conflicting testimony renders the existence of the underlying transaction highly dubious. In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that an obligation was contracted for which the PNB checks were issued, the elements of deceit and damage could not be established.

• Civil Liability ex Delicto: As a general rule, acquittal does not automatically preclude civil liability, particularly where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt and only preponderance of evidence is required for civil liability. However, civil liability based on the delict is deemed extinguished when the final judgment in the criminal action finds that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist, or that the accused did not commit the acts imputed. Here, Uy herself testified during the clarificatory hearing on her affidavit of desistance that she had no existing transactions with petitioner. From the very admission of the private complainant, the alleged obligation contracted for which the PNB checks were issued did not exist. Accordingly, petitioner's civil liability ex delicto is deemed extinguished.

• Exception to the rule on questions of law in Rule 45 petitions — While only questions of law may generally be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court may review factual findings of lower courts where the findings are not conformable to the evidence of record, or where facts that could affect the result were overlooked or disregarded. The Court applied this exception to review the factual findings of the RTC and CA in light of Uy's Affidavit of Desistance and testimony, which the lower courts had not considered.

• Probative value of affidavits of desistance — Affidavits of desistance are generally viewed with disfavor as they can be easily secured through intimidation or monetary consideration, and serve merely as additional grounds to buttress the accused's defenses, not as the sole consideration for acquittal. However, under special and exceptional circumstances — where the affidavit is coupled with express repudiation of material points in the Information, the complainant's non-presentation during trial, and contradictory testimony — it may engender serious doubts as to the accused's liability and warrant acquittal. The Court applied this doctrine by considering Uy's Affidavit of Desistance together with her testimony, her non-presentation during trial, and her express repudiation of the existence of any demandable obligation.

• Elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC — The elements are: (1) the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance, the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. Deceit must be the efficient cause of defraudation, such that the issuance of the check is the inducement for the surrender of money or property. It is not the non-payment of a debt which is punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish elements (1) and (3) because no obligation was proven to have been contracted with Uy, and Uy herself could not have been defrauded if she had no transactions with petitioner.

• Extinction of civil liability ex delicto upon acquittal — While acquittal does not automatically preclude civil liability, civil liability based on the delict is deemed extinguished where the final judgment in the criminal action finds that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist, or that the accused did not commit the acts imputed. Where the private complainant herself admits no obligation existed, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished.

• "However, under special and exceptional circumstances, an affidavit of desistance coupled with an express repudiation of the material points alleged in the Information, may engender doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on when an affidavit of desistance may suffice to create reasonable doubt, establishing the exceptional circumstances test that the Court applied to warrant acquittal.

• "To constitute Estafa, deceit must be the efficient cause of the defraudation, such that the issuance of the check should be the means to obtain money or property from the payer resulting to the latter's damage. In other words, the issuance of the check must have been the inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property." — This passage defines the doctrinal relationship between deceit and damage in Estafa by issuance of bad checks, clarifying that the check must be the efficient cause of the fraud, not merely evidence of an unpaid debt.

• "Accordingly, in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that an obligation was contracted for which the PNB checks were issued, the elements of deceit and damage could not be established." — This sentence states the ratio decidendi connecting the factual finding (no proven obligation) to the legal conclusion (failure to establish deceit and damage), directly supporting the acquittal.

• "In the present case, private complainant Uy herself testified during the clarificatory hearing on her affidavit of desistance that she had no existing transactions with petitioner. Thus, from the very admission of private complainant Uy, the alleged obligation contracted for which the PNB checks were issued did not exist. Accordingly, petitioner's civil liability ex delicto is deemed extinguished." — This passage establishes the basis for extinguishing civil liability ex delicto, tying the admission of non-existence of obligation to the rule under Rule III, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.

• Gomez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 Phil. 295 (1985) — Controlling precedent on the probative value of affidavits of desistance. The Court relied on this case for the principle that an affidavit of desistance coupled with other circumstances may create serious doubts as to the liability of the accused, warranting a second hard look at the records and the basis for the judgment of conviction.

• People vs. Pimentel, 204 Phil. 327 (1982) — Cited within Gomez for the principle that unless special circumstances coupled with a retraction raise doubts as to the truth of testimony given at trial and accepted by the judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction such that its elimination would lead to a different conclusion, a new trial based on retraction would not be justified.

• People vs. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469 (1960) — Cited within Gomez for the same principle regarding retractions and the need for special circumstances to justify reliance on affidavits of desistance.

• Juaquico vs. People, 827 Phil. 145 (2018) — Followed for the principle that in Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements that must be established with satisfactory proof, and the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneous with the issuance of the bad check.

• Dayap vs. Sendiong, 597 Phil. 127 (2009) — Followed for the exceptions to the rule that acquittal does not automatically preclude civil liability, and for the principle that civil liability ex delicto is extinguished where the final judgment finds that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 4885) — Defines and penalizes Estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or insufficient funds. The failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor constitutes prima facie evidence of deceit. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of deceit and damage under this provision, as no obligation contracted with the payee was established.

• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari, generally limited to questions of law. The Court applied the recognized exception allowing review of factual findings where lower court findings are not conformable to the evidence of record or where material facts were overlooked or disregarded.

• Rule III, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides that civil liability ex delicto is deemed extinguished when the final judgment in the criminal action finds that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist, or that the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed. The Court applied this provision to extinguish petitioner's civil liability, given Uy's admission that no obligation existed.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Marquez, and Singh, JJ., concurred. (Dimaampao, J., took no part due to prior action in the Court of Appeals; Marquez, J., was designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 29, 2021.)