Mantaring vs. Roman

A judge must exercise sedulous regard for the principle of cold neutrality and inhibit himself from a case where a prior administrative complaint filed by a party creates a reasonable appearance of bias or susceptibility to prejudice. Additionally, the issuance of a warrant of arrest in a preliminary investigation requires not only a finding of probable cause but also a specific determination that placing the respondent under immediate custody is necessary to prevent the frustration of the ends of justice.

Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato, presiding judge of the MTC of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, issued a search warrant against Joel Gamo and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr. The search yielded firearms and ammunition from a house. A criminal complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was subsequently filed against Gamo, Mantaring, Jr., and his father, Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. (the herein complainant). Judge Molato conducted the preliminary investigation, found probable cause against all three, and ordered their arrest. Prior to these events, Mantaring, Sr. had filed an administrative complaint (A.M. No. RTJ-93-964) against Judge Molato and another judge for conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary, which was dismissed for lack of merit.

• Parties and Prior Administrative Case: Complainant Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr. filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato (and another judge) for conduct unbecoming of the judiciary. This complaint was dismissed by the Supreme Court on February 21, 1994.
• The Criminal Investigation: On the application of SPO4 Pacifico L. Fradejas, Judge Molato issued a search warrant against Joel Gamo and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr. The search of a house yielded firearms and ammunition. A criminal complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Gamo, Mantaring, Jr., and Mantaring, Sr.
• Judge Molato's Actions: Judge Molato conducted the preliminary investigation. He found probable cause to believe that Mantaring, Sr. and his son, as owners of the house where the items were found, had constructive possession. He issued a warrant for their arrest without holding a hearing where they were present.
• Inhibition: Judge Molato inhibited himself from the criminal case only after the preliminary investigation was concluded and the arrest warrant issued, and only after Mantaring, Sr. filed a petition for inhibition which the Executive Judge found to be well-taken.
• Outcome of Criminal Case: The Provincial Prosecutor subsequently dismissed the criminal charges against Mantaring, Sr. and his son, finding the house did not belong to Mantaring, Sr. and that he was in Manila during the search.

• Basis for Arrest Warrant: Petitioner Mantaring, Sr. argued that since his name was not included in the original search warrant and he was not present at the preliminary investigation for the warrant's issuance, there was no probable cause for his arrest.
• Duty to Inhibit: Petitioner maintained that Judge Molato should have inhibited himself from the preliminary investigation because the petitioner was the same person who had previously filed an administrative complaint against him, creating a motive for revenge.
• Timing of Inhibition: Petitioner contended that the judge's inhibition came too late, only after the preliminary examination was terminated and the arrest warrant issued.

• Probable Cause: Respondent Judge Molato countered that he found probable cause based on witness testimonies and the fact that the house where contraband was found belonged to the complainant and his son, establishing constructive possession.
• Grounds for Inhibition: Respondent argued that the mere filing of an administrative case is not a per se ground for disqualification, citing jurisprudence that judges cannot be forced to inhibit themselves on that basis alone to prevent paralysis in the judicial system.
• Regular Performance of Duty: Respondent denied acting out of hatred or revenge and claimed he performed his duty regularly, eventually inhibiting himself when ordered by the Executive Judge.

• Judicial Inhibition: Whether respondent Judge Molato should have voluntarily inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation in the criminal case involving complainant Mantaring, Sr.
• Issuance of Arrest Warrant: Whether respondent Judge Molato committed an irregularity in issuing the warrant of arrest against complainant and his son.

• Judicial Inhibition: The failure to inhibit was improper. While the mere filing of an administrative case is not an automatic ground for disqualification, the circumstances here—an administrative complaint that had been adjudicated—created a permissible appearance of bias. The judge should have exercised "sedulous regard" for the principle of "cold neutrality" and steered clear of the case to avoid any suspicion that his actions were motivated by revenge.
• Issuance of Arrest Warrant: The issuance of the arrest warrant was irregular. The judge based the warrant solely on a finding of probable cause, omitting the third indispensable requirement established by jurisprudence: a determination that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody "in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." This constituted a failure to comply with constitutional and procedural safeguards.

• The "Cold Neutrality of an Impartial Judge" — A party is entitled to a judge who is completely free from bias or prejudice. This principle requires not only that a decision be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. The Court applied this to hold that a judge should voluntarily inhibit when a prior administrative complaint by a party creates a reasonable suspicion of bias, even if the complaint was dismissed.
• Requisites for Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest in Preliminary Investigations — The investigating judge must: (a) examine in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) determine that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The Court emphasized that all three requisites are mandatory, and the failure to make a specific finding on the third (necessity of immediate custody) renders the warrant's issuance irregular.

• "The impression could not be helped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirit of revenge against complainant for the latter's having filed an administrative disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called for sedulous regard on his part for the principle that a party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." — This passage underscores the core ethical obligation that justified the finding of misconduct.
• "He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody 'in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.'" — This identifies the specific procedural lapse that compounded the ethical violation.

• Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995 — Cited by the OCA to distinguish the probable cause determinations for search warrants versus arrest warrants. The Court agreed with this distinction.
• Medina v. De Guia, 219 SCRA 153 (1993); Aparicio v. Andal, 175 SCRA 572 (1989); Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 161 (1967) — Cited for the principle that the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualification, especially if filed to force inhibition. The Court distinguished these cases because the administrative case here was filed before, not during, the proceedings in question.
• Samulde v. Salvani, Jr., 165 SCRA 734 (1988); Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988) — Cited as controlling authority establishing the three-part test for the issuance of arrest warrants during preliminary investigations.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, and mandating that probable cause for warrants be determined personally by a judge. The Court invoked the spirit of this provision to underscore the judge's duty to act with utmost circumspection.

Justices Regalado, Romero, and Puno concurred.